Chapter 18 The Moral Status of Animals

2021 ◽  
pp. 450-469
1978 ◽  
Vol 28 (111) ◽  
pp. 177
Author(s):  
Mary Midgley ◽  
Stephen R. L. Clark

2019 ◽  
pp. 165-188
Author(s):  
Peter Carruthers

Chapter 7 concluded that there is no fact of the matter concerning phenomenal consciousness in animals, while also arguing that this conclusion is of no importance for science. The present chapter inquires whether it is nevertheless important in other ways, specifically for our ethical treatment of animals, arguing that it is not. But a challenge remains for those who theorize about the moral status of animals: they need to prize the foundations of their theories apart from assumptions about consciousness. The chapter also considers what should be said about the phenomenally conscious status of humans who, like animals, only partially share a full global-broadcasting architecture, such as human infants and people suffering from age-related cognitive impairments.


2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
CAROLYN P. NEUHAUS ◽  
BRENDAN PARENT

Abstract:Gene editors such as CRISPR could be used to create stronger, faster, or more resilient nonhuman animals. This is of keen interest to people who breed, train, race, and profit off the millions of animals used in sport that contribute billions of dollars to legal and illegal economies across the globe. People have tried for millennia to perfect sport animals; CRISPR proposes to do in one generation what might have taken decades previously. Moreover, gene editing may facilitate enhancing animals’ capacities beyond their typical limits. This paper describes the state of animal use and engineering for sport, examines the moral status of animals, and analyzes current and future ethical issues at the intersection of animal use, gene editing, and sports. We argue that animal sport enthusiasts and animal welfarists alike should be concerned about the inevitable use of CRISPR in sport animals. Though in principle CRISPR could be used to improve sport animals’ well-being, we think it is unlikely in practice to do so.


BioScience ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 69 (10) ◽  
pp. 778-788 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine E Webb ◽  
Peter Woodford ◽  
Elise Huchard

Abstract Animal ethics—the field of philosophy concerned with the moral status of animals—is experiencing a momentum unprecedented in its history. Surprisingly, animal behavior science remains on the sidelines, despite producing critical evidence on which many arguments in animal ethics rest. In the present article, we explore the origins of the divide between animal behavior science and animal ethics before considering whether behavioral scientists should concern themselves with it. We finally envision tangible steps that could be taken to bridge the gap, encouraging scientists to be aware of, and to more actively engage with, an ethical revolution that is partly fueled by the evidence they generate.


1983 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-153
Author(s):  
Alastair S. Gunn ◽  

1997 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 445-448 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter J. Whitehouse

Community discourse about the moral status of animals is critical to the future of bioethics and, indeed, to the future of modern society. Thomasma and Loewy are to be commended for sharing thoughts and trying to attain some common ground. I am grateful to them for fostering discussion and allowing me to respond. I cannot endorse the negative tone of the end of their conversation, however. They end with serious concerns about the possibility of any agreement between themselves. Even though I perceive some moral differences between them, I do not believe that they are moral strangers. In this commentary I review the ways in which I agree and disagree with Thomasma and Loewy and conclude with some thoughts about the kind of broad ethical thinking we need to do to address our moral relationship to nonhuman, living creatures.


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