scholarly journals Kekalahan Cambodia People’s Party di Wilayah Urban Kamboja pada Pemilu Tahun 2013

2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 271
Author(s):  
Farizan Fajari
Keyword(s):  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Phnom Penh ◽  
People's Party ◽  
Dominant Party

Kamboja merupakan salah satu negara yang menerapkan sistem pemilu otoriter. Kondisi tersebut dimanfaatkan oleh partai penguasa, Cambodia People’s Party (CPP), sebagai sarana untuk mendominasi kursi parlemen Kamboja hingga pemilu tahun 2008. Namun, peta kekuatan partai politik di Kamboja mengalami perubahan pada pemilu tahun 2013. Pada pemilu tersebut, perolehan kursi CPP mengalami penurunan signifikan dan menjadi hasil terburuk bagi mereka sejak pemilu tahun 1998. Penurunan tersebut utamanya dilatarbelakangi oleh kegagalan CPP dalam mendapatkan kursi terbanyak di empat wilayah urban Kamboja: Kampong Cham, Phnom Penh, Prey Veng, dan Kandal, yang memiliki proporsi jumlah kursi terbanyak. Padahal, CPP sebelumnya tidak pernah mengalami kekalahan di keempat wilayah tersebut secara bersamaan. Artikel ini berargumen bahwa kekalahan CPP dalam rezim otoriter disebabkan oleh kondisi-kondisi penting yang terjadi di Kamboja. Dengan mengelaborasi teori Dominant Party Authoritarian Regimes dan konsep pengawas pemilu internasional, artikel ini melihat tiga kondisi penting yang terjadi di Kamboja yang menjadi penyebab menurunnya suara CPP di perkotaan, yaitu: kebijakan pemerintahan Hun Sen yang menyebabkan permasalahan dalam masyarakat, menguatnya partai oposisi dan keberhasilan isu dan strategi kampanye yang digunakan, dan peran pengawas pemilu internasional dalam menurunkan praktik intimidasi politik oleh militer. Dalam mengumpulkan data, artikel ini menggunakan metode kualitatif, dengan cara mengumpulkan data primer melalui wawancara mendalam dan analisis data sekunder dari kajian literatur.

Repeated Multiparty Elections in Cambodia: Intensifying Authoritarianism Yet Benefiting the Masses

2020 ◽  
Vol 93 (3) ◽  
pp. 567-592
Author(s):  
Sivhuoch Ou
Keyword(s):  
Economic Policy ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Party System ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
People's Party ◽  
Dominant Party ◽  
Authoritarian Government ◽  
The Masses ◽  
Ruling Party

The United Nations (UN) introduced multiparty elections to Cambodia in 1993 in the hope of bringing about democracy in that country. Ironically, the two-and-a-half decades of uninterrupted elections have led to an ever-more authoritarian government under Prime Minister Hun Sen and the Cambodian People's Party (CPP). Authoritarianism under the single-dominant party system began in 1997, but has intensified since 2017 with the ban on the leading opposition party. While concurring that repetitive elections have consolidated authoritarianism, this paper argues that elections are not merely tools that authoritarian leaders deploy to hold on to power. Elections are arguably mechanisms that have compelled the CPP to offer several extraordinary economic concessions since 2013; this is the first argument of the paper. The developments have created a win-win scenario for the rulers and the ruled—the authoritarian leaders prolong their rule, and the masses have more disposable income, among various benefits. The second argument is that such policy concessions are made only when the ruling party senses critical challenges from the opposition and voters. This paper contributes to the literature arguing that multiparty elections in electoral authoritarian regimes extract economic policy concessions.

Authoritarian Regimes

2020 ◽  
pp. 338-355
Author(s):  
Po Jen Yap
Keyword(s):  
Political Party ◽  
Singular Control ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Dominant Party ◽  
Democratic Regimes ◽  
The World ◽  
Regime Types ◽  
Constitutional System ◽  
The Military ◽  
Independent Branch

This chapter examines authoritarian regimes in relation to the configuration of political power/parties that is central to how autocracy is practised and sustained within the respective constitutional system. First, it discusses dominant party democracies—semi-democratic regimes that have been ruled by the same dominant political party or coalition since the nation’s independence or transition to a new constitutional system. Next, the chapter explores independent military democracies. In such democracies, the military is an independent branch of government and is not under the firm control of the civilian government. Finally, there are the communist regimes, where elections are a sham, and all levers of state power—the executive, the legislature, the military, and the judiciary—are subjected to the singular control of the country’s Communist Party. These three regime types are not exhaustive of all the authoritarian configurations of power in the world, but they are the predominant ones in Asia, from which this chapter’s case studies are drawn.

Beyond Patronage: Violent Struggle, Ruling Party Cohesion, and Authoritarian Durability

2012 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 869-889 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven R. Levitsky ◽  
Lucan A. Way
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Organizational Structures ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Post Cold War ◽  
Dominant Party ◽  
Material Resources ◽  
International Pressure ◽  
The Face ◽  
Party Cohesion ◽  
The Cost

We explore the sources of durability of party-based authoritarian regimes in the face of crisis. Recent scholarship on authoritarianism suggests that ruling parties enhance elite cohesion—and consequently, regime durability—by providing institutionalized access the spoils of power. We argue, by contrast, that while elite access to power and spoils may ensure elite cooperation during normal times, it often fails to do so during crises. Instead, the identities, norms, and organizational structures forged during periods of sustained, violent, and ideologically-driven conflict are a critical source of cohesion—and durability—in party-based authoritarian regimes. Origins in violent conflict raise the cost of defection and provide leaders with additional (non-material) resources that can be critical to maintaining unity and discipline, even when a crisis threatens the party's hold on power. Hence, where ruling parties combine mechanisms of patronage distribution with the strong identities, solidarity ties, and discipline generated by violent origins, regimes should be most durable.We apply this argument to four party-based competitive authoritarian regimes in post-Cold War Africa: Kenya, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. In each of these cases, an established single- or dominant-party regime faced heightened international pressure, economic crisis, and a strong opposition challenge after 1990. Yet whereas ruling parties in Kenya and Zambia were organized almost exclusively around patronage, those in Mozambique and Zimbabwe were liberation parties that came to power via violent struggle. This difference is critical to explaining diverging post-Cold War regime outcomes: whereas ruling parties in Zambia and Kenya imploded and eventually lost power in these face of crises, those in Mozambique and Zimbabwe remained intact and regimes survived.

Trump win may benefit China in ASEAN and Cambodia

2016 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Relations ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Development Aid ◽  
Xi Jinping ◽  
Phnom Penh ◽  
Content Type ◽  
People's Party ◽  
President Elect ◽  
Operating Constraints

Subject Cambodian politics and foreign relations, including Beijing and Washington. Significance Following up on his pre-election enthusiasm for the Republican candidate, Prime Minister Hun Sen congratulated US President-elect Donald Trump on his election win on November 9. In the wake of the October 13-14 visit of China's President Xi Jinping to Cambodia, this is adding to media speculation about what Trump's policy towards South-east Asia might be, and how it might affect Cambodian domestic politics and the dynamics of the Beijing-Phnom Penh relationship. Impacts Western calls are unlikely to be the catalyst for improvements in Cambodian human rights and democracy. The Cambodian People's Party will leverage Chinese development aid to try to gain electoral advantage. Cambodia's opposition could suffer electorally because of operating constraints.

Dominant party rule and legislative leadership in authoritarian regimes

2012 ◽  
Vol 20 (5) ◽  
pp. 663-674 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ora John Reuter ◽  
Rostislav Turovsky
Keyword(s):  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Dominant Party

Investment climate and government turnover in russian regions

2014 ◽  
pp. 88-117 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. Syunyaev ◽  
L. Polishchuk
Keyword(s):  
Economic Development ◽  
Theoretical Model ◽  
Private Sector ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Russian Regions ◽  
Investment Climate ◽  
Regional Data ◽  
Endogenous Property Rights ◽  
The Impact

We study the impact of Russian regional governors’ rotation and their affiliation with private sector firms for the quality of investment climate in Russian regions. A theoretical model presented in the paper predicts that these factors taken together improve “endogenous” property rights under authoritarian regimes. This conclusion is confirmed empirically by using Russian regional data for 2002—2010; early in that period gubernatorial elections had been canceled and replaced by federal government’s appointments. This is an indication that under certain conditions government rotation is beneficial for economic development even when democracy is suppressed.

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