Conclusions

Super Bomb ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 151-166
Author(s):  
Ken Young ◽  
Warner R. Schilling

This concluding chapter returns to the alignment of forces that worked to sideline those scientists who opposed the then-predominant doctrine of strategic bombing. It stresses the confusion and the acrimony of the brief but decisive period in which the Super's potential for U.S. security or global insecurity was contested. With distance, it becomes possible to understand the vigor and passion with which the Super, and the deployment of nuclear weapons for massive retaliation, was resisted, as well as the organizational imperatives of air force leaders to outwit that resistance, the better to protect the deeply embedded air power doctrines that prevailed at that time. The result is that the world was left with the proliferation of nuclear and thermonuclear weaponry. The question remains, however, as to whether that proliferation would bring stability or fragility.

This introduction describes the strategic bombing mission of the US Army Air Forces’ Eighth Air Force against the Fock-Wulfe plant at Bremen, Germany, on April 17, 1943, assessing the use of high-altitude daylight precision bombing,. The introduction then reviews American strategic bombing theory from its origins in World War I to the thinking of three great interwar air power theorists―the Italian Giulio Douhet, the Briton Hugh Trenchard, and the American Billy Mitchell―to the founding of the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS), the development of the Norden bombsight and B-17 bomber, and the genesis of HADPB theory at the Air Corps Tactical School.


Author(s):  
François Le Roy ◽  
Drew Perkins

Visionary leaders craft clear and compelling visions that motivate followers through a shared sense of direction. Unlike institutional leaders, who draw on managerial and administrative skills, visionary leaders must identify long-term objectives and maintain their organizations’ focus and momentum. By steadfastly pursuing deliberate objectives, leaders such as Arnold change the status quo and provide their organizations with control over their operating environments. Along with other pioneering aviators of the early twentieth century such as General Billy Mitchell, Arnold developed an appreciation for the potential role of air power in modern warfare. His vision was to create a massive, technically advanced air force that was organizationally independent of the army and thus operationally capable of strategic bombing campaigns. Research and development were central to Arnold’s conception of building and sustaining America’s air dominance, and he envisioned close and continuous collaboration between air force personnel and civilian scientists in academia and industry. Unlike other air power visionaries, Mitchell included, Arnold demonstrated considerable political skill to oversee the transformation of America’s air power. His leadership success was defined by the clear articulation of a comprehensive vision, an extensive knowledge of aeronautics and logistics, and a fierce resolve to achieve his objectives.


2020 ◽  
pp. 51-68
Author(s):  
Jérôme de Lespinois

This chapter endeavors to analyze the creation of the Regia Aeronautica in 1923, with a special focus on Italian military education and the Air Force academy, the Accademia Aeronautica. The creation of a third military service did not happen in a vacuum, but was heralded by important air power theorists. Among these, Giulio Douhet stands out as the most controversial. His book, The Command of the Air, heralded the study of airpower theory by underscoring the potentially revolutionary effect of heavier-than-air aircraft for military purposes, namely for strategic bombing. Contrary to popular belief Douhet's theories were critically debated during the 1920s and 1930s but were not universally endorsed in the Italian military community. In particular, his overarching view of the air force as an independent service ruffled more than a few feathers even in the newly-created Accademia Aeronautica.


Author(s):  
Ramesh Thakur

The very destructiveness of nuclear weapons makes them unusable for ethical and military reasons. The world has placed growing restrictions on the full range of nuclear programs and activities. But with the five NPT nuclear powers failing to eliminate nuclear arsenals, other countries acquiring the bomb, arms control efforts stalled, nuclear risks climbing, and growing awareness of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear war, the United Nations adopted a new treaty to ban the bomb. Some technical anomalies between the 1968 and 2017 treaties will need to be harmonized and the nuclear-armed states’ rejection of the ban treaty means it will not eliminate any nuclear warheads. However, it will have a significant normative impact in stigmatizing the possession, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons and serve as a tool for civil society to mobilize domestic and world public opinion against the doctrine of nuclear deterrence.


2002 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 261-292 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Michael Martinez

In the wake of India's May 1998 decision to resume nuclear testing for the first time since 1974, as well as arch-rival Pakistan's subsequent response, the attention of the world again has focused on nuclear nonproliferation policy as a means of maintaining stability in politically troubled regions of the world. The 1990s proved to be an uncertain time for nonproliferation policy. Pakistan acquired nuclear capabilities. Iraq displayed its well-known intransigence by refusing to allow International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) arms inspectors access to facilities suspected of manufacturing nuclear weapons. North Korea maintained a nuclear weapons program despite opposition from many Western nations. Troubling questions about nuclear holdings persisted in Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa. New nuclear powers were created in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Even the renewal of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1995 failed to assuage the concerns of Western powers fearful of aggressive measures undertaken by rogue nuclear proliferants.


Vulcan ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 110-129
Author(s):  
Frode Lindgjerdet

The Norwegian army and navy built their separate air arms around a few flimsy aircraft acquired from 1912. During the interwar period, the Army Air Force desired independence while its smaller naval counterpart fought tenaciously to remain part of the navy. The battle was carried out in the national military journals. Army aviation officers seduced by the air power theories of Giulio Douhet advocated independent operations; they maintained that challenges of air war and the skills required were independent of the surface over which it was fought. They also expected economic benefits from a unified service that could acquire fewer types of aircraft and unify technical services and education. Naval aviation officers maintained that naval air operations required knowledge of naval warfare, seamanship, tight naval integration, and specialized aircraft. What’s more, they resented the very idea that air power could win wars independently.


Author(s):  
Michele K. Troy

This chapter examines how the Allied bombings of Germany affected the lives of people in the Albatross-Tauchnitz fold, particularly Max Christian Wegner and Walter Gey. To celebrate the tenth anniversary of Adolf Hitler's reign, the Nazi elite gathered with thousands of party loyalists on January 30, 1943 for an evening of rousing speeches at the Berlin Sportpalast. The Allies commemorated Hitler's tenth anniversary by sending Royal Air Force Mosquito light bombers on a daylight air raid on the German capital. For Prime Minister Winston Churchill, President Franklin Roosevelt, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this attack marked the beginning of the “strategic bombing” campaign they had agreed upon at the Casablanca Conference days earlier. This chapter considers Wegner's arrest and imprisonment at the height of World War II as well as Gey's efforts to make the best of the Albatross Press's ever-shrinking terrain.


1981 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 213-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
George H. Quester

Nine predictions are advanced on the impact on the international system of a successful effort to contain nuclear proliferation.The world will see a modest dilution of the prerogatives of sovereignty, very much tailored to the halting of nuclear weapons spread. Some breakthroughs will be achieved in the multinational management of nuclear industry. Current “pariah states” may escape such status, simply through the latent possibility of nuclear proliferation. Nuclear weapons will continue to go unused in combat, just as they have since 1945. Soviet-American cooperation on the nuclear proliferation front will continue. The traffic in conventional arms may by contrast go relatively unchecked, as most countries conclude that this kind of weapons spread is less bad than nuclear proliferation. All of this will be carried through by statements distorted by the normal deceptions of diplomacy. The world will nonetheless generally become more sophisticated in discounting any glamor or political clout in nuclear weapons programs. Most of the barrier to proliferation will come through normal political and economic exchange, rather than through any violent or military interventions.


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