U.S. APPROACH TO IMPLEMENTING IMO GUIDELINES ON PLACES OF REFUGE1

2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 305-309 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Albertson
Keyword(s):  
Coast Guard ◽  
Maritime History ◽  
Real Thing ◽  
Effective Response ◽  
Response System ◽  
National Response ◽  
Safety Committees ◽  
Oil Tanker ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT When the oil tanker Prestige broke apart and sank off the coast of Spain in November 2002, it joined an infamous line of environmental catastrophes in maritime history. The way in which the Prestige incident unfolded and, in particular, the denial of a place of refuge for the tanker intensified existing pressures on the IMO to finalize and adopt guidelines intended to assist all concerned parties in dealing with similar circumstances. At the 23rd Assembly, the IMO answered by adopting two resolutions on the issue. These resolutions offer excellent planning, preparedness, and response guidelines and a framework for effectively dealing with the next Prestige. The IMO guidelines are compatible with the U.S. National Response System and existing laws designed to protect the environment, public health, and welfare. As such, their implementation requires neither regulation nor significant adjustments to U.S. policy. With few exceptions, the National Response System should assimilate the IMO guidelines. Specifically, Area Committees and Harbor Safety Committees should plow the IMO guidelines into current planning, preparedness, and response activities in order to ensure effective response to places of refuge scenarios. The most critical and urgent issue is to ensure the decisionmaking criteria and process for both allowing and taking a ship in need of assistance to a place of refuge is well developed, agreed upon, and exercised beforehand, so that when the real thing occurs those who need to make the decision know exactly what to do and who to contact. This paper discusses relevant aspects of the National Response System and authorities as they pertain to the IMO guidelines and the role of the U.S. Coast Guard as the federal agency charged with their implementation.

RESPONSE TO A SPILL OF NATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE1

1993 ◽  
Vol 1993 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald S. Jensen ◽  
Robert Pond ◽  
Mark H. Johnson
Keyword(s):  
Task Force ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Response Strategy ◽  
Local Response ◽  
National Response ◽  
Response Organization ◽  
Unified Command ◽  
National Significance ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT Responding to a spill of national significance (SONS), such as the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill, requires an augmenting organization to support the local response organization. The U.S. Coast Guard has developed a SONS protocol to be better prepared to respond to these infrequent catastrophic spills. A flag-level Coast Guard officer assumes the role of national incident commander (NIC) and federal on-scene coordinator (OSC), and is supported by a national incident task force (NITF). The major role of the NITF is to develop a national response strategy, acquire response resources and allocate them efficiently, and effectively deal with many peripheral national issues. Unified command concepts have been incorporated into the NITF and its primary organizational elements. In addition, frequent training and exercising is essential to keep the SONS protocol's preparedness at an acceptable level.

POST-OPA 90 NATIONAL STRIKE FORCE1

1993 ◽  
Vol 1993 (1) ◽  
pp. 273-275 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lt. Alvin M. Crickard ◽  
Donald S. Jensen
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spills ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
Public Information ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Special Forces ◽  
The Public ◽  
Response System ◽  
Marine Environmental Protection ◽  
National Response ◽  
Federal Water Pollution Control

ABSTRACT The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) has resulted in an overall restructuring and enhancement of the national strike force. The OPA 90 legislation amended the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 (FWPCA), which first gave the Coast Guard a role in marine environmental protection. The FWPCA led to the establishment of the national response system (NRS) and the establishment of “special forces” which would be available for pollution response. These special forces included the Coast Guard manned strike teams (collectively, the national strike force, or NSF) and the public information assist team (PIAT). OPA 90 legislation affected the NSF by requiring the Coast Guard to establish a national response unit (NRU) located at Elizabeth City, North Carolina. The NRU, now renamed the National Strike Force Coordination Center (NSFCC), would provide overall management of the strike teams and PIAT and in addition, perform several new functions in consulting, exercise management, coordination of spill response, and logistics and maintenance of worldwide resource inventories. This paper examines all OPA 90 initiatives affecting the national strike force. It concludes that the overall impact on the national response system is quite positive and should result in significant improvement in response to both major and catastrophic oil spills.

scholarly journals The Marine Transportation System's Economic Juggernaut: A Tonic for Pollution Prevention?1

2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (1) ◽  
pp. 249-252
Author(s):  
Mark H. Johnson
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spills ◽  
Current System ◽  
Pollution Prevention ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Army Corps ◽  
Marine Transportation ◽  
Decision Tools ◽  
Early Results ◽  
Safety Committees ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT In September 1999, U.S. Secretary of Transportation Rodney Slater delivered a report on the marine transportation system (MTS) to the U.S. Congress. It captured the growing alarm by MTS stakeholders that the current system of marine transportation was barely adequate now and certainly not capable of accommodating the predicted growth and changing nature of shipping over the next two decades. While the report's recommendations seemed to highlight the economic aspects of the MTS, solving impediments to economic efficiency also can translate into significant pollution prevention. Principal among potential pollution prevention is in the area of reducing the numbers of vessel collisions, allisions, and groundings—29 of which resulted in oil spills of 10,000 gallons or more between 1995–1999. These casualties impact the ability of a port to conduct business, resulting in accrual of demurrage and risking competitive position. Attacking the port-specific and systemic factors influencing human factor causes of collisions, allisions, and groundings, the U.S. Coast Guard has embarked on several risk-based decision tools that enable local MTS coordinating committees, called harbor safety committees (HSCs), to evaluate the greatest factors that can contribute to vessel casualties. The tools include a Ports and Waterways Safety Assessment (PWSA) and a tailored model to evaluate U.S. Army Corps of Engineers facility permits. Early results show opportunities to improve navigational risk in specific ports. Additionally, another MTS effort involves providing real-time navigational and environmental information to vessels to aid decision making.

THE NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER OF THE U.S. COAST GUARD

1979 ◽  
Vol 1979 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-122
Author(s):  
James C. Clow
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Environmental Quality ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Hazardous Substances ◽  
Federal State ◽  
Telephone Number ◽  
Local Authorities ◽  
Contingency Plan ◽  
National Response ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT The National Response Center (NRC) was established at U.S. Coast Guard headquarters under the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, and is an arm of the Council on Environmental Quality. It is a 24-hour center, providing a toll-free telephone number from any point in the continental United States for reports of oil discharges and discharges of other polluting substances. These reports, which may come from individual citizens, federal, state, or local authorities, or others, are relayed to the appropriate on-scene coordinator (OSC—who may be from any appropriate federal agency) for action under the relevant U.S. Government laws and regulations. The NRC also provides a number of other services and functions related to polluting incidents.

International Offers of Assistance Guidelines – Developing an IMO Tool to "Internationalize" Oil Spill Readiness and Response

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 328-339 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heather A. Parker ◽  
Scott R. Knutson ◽  
Andy Nicoll ◽  
Tim Wadsworth
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Oil Spills ◽  
Guideline Development ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Global Perspective ◽  
National Response ◽  
Response Capacity ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT During the Macondo 252 incident in 2010, it became apparent that the lack of clear guidance to effectively manage the flood of response assistance offered and required from other nations and organizations. To help address these concerns, the U.S. Coast Guard hosted an international ad hoc workgroup after the 2011 International Oil Spill Conference to discuss challenges and issues associated with sharing equipment, technology and expertise among nations and organizations to support a national response authority faced with a significant oil spill exceeding the domestic response capacity. Ideas and recommendations were captured and the need for the development of a comprehensive set of guidelines for International Offers of Assistance (IOA) was formed. The U.S. Coast Guard recognized the importance of establishing these guidelines with a broad, global perspective and proposed the concept to the International Maritime Organization's Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC). In July 2011, MEPC approved the proposal submitted by the United States, and added this item to the work program of the Technical Working Group of the IMO Protocol on Preparedness, Response and Co-operation to pollution Incidents by Hazardous and Noxious Substances (OPRC-HNS TG). The OPRC-HNS TG began this work during its 13th session in March 2012, and continues to conduct the bulk of guideline development during intersessional periods via an International Correspondence Group, comprised of a range of national response authorities, spill contractors and industry representatives from around the world. These international guidelines will be available for use by nations as a tool to assist in managing a multitude of requests for and offers of assistance from other countries, regional coordinating bodies, or other entities. This paper summarizes work already completed and still in progress on the development of the IMO International Offers of Assistance Guidelines for oil spills. The ultimate goal for these Guidelines, once completed within the OPRC-HNS TG and approved by MEPC, will be adoption and utilization by IMO Member States, particularly those that are party to OPRC Convention and to the OPRC-HNS Protocol which require States to establish procedures for international cooperation during pollution incidents.

scholarly journals THE NATIONAL RESPONSE SYSTEM: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?1

1993 ◽  
Vol 1993 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-72
Author(s):  
Richard C. Johnson
Keyword(s):  
Management System ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Response Effort ◽  
Effective Response ◽  
Incident Command System ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
Response System ◽  
National Response ◽  
National Significance ◽  
Sound Management

ABSTRACT The response to the Exxon Valdez incident showed that the nation needs to be better prepared to respond to a spill of that magnitude. In research conducted on the Valdez response, several inadequacies were noted in the National Response System (NRS). A key deficiency identified was the critical need for a standardized management system to direct the response effort more effectively and efficiently. The most pressing question for preparedness planners in improving the NRS is “where do we go from here?” In answering this question, planners must address another question, “how long is it going to take?” There has been widespread failure to put existing knowledge into practice. To fill the management void identified in the NRS, it is imperative that a response management system be adopted as soon as possible. Once adopted, it can be modified and refined to provide a more effective response. The system proposed in this paper uses the sound management practices of an incident command system and modifies and/or expands these practices to fit onto the foundation built by the NRS. This response management system could be used for all spills from minor ones to large, catastrophic spills of national significance (SONS).

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