International Offers of Assistance Guidelines – Developing an IMO Tool to "Internationalize" Oil Spill Readiness and Response

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 328-339 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heather A. Parker ◽  
Scott R. Knutson ◽  
Andy Nicoll ◽  
Tim Wadsworth

ABSTRACT During the Macondo 252 incident in 2010, it became apparent that the lack of clear guidance to effectively manage the flood of response assistance offered and required from other nations and organizations. To help address these concerns, the U.S. Coast Guard hosted an international ad hoc workgroup after the 2011 International Oil Spill Conference to discuss challenges and issues associated with sharing equipment, technology and expertise among nations and organizations to support a national response authority faced with a significant oil spill exceeding the domestic response capacity. Ideas and recommendations were captured and the need for the development of a comprehensive set of guidelines for International Offers of Assistance (IOA) was formed. The U.S. Coast Guard recognized the importance of establishing these guidelines with a broad, global perspective and proposed the concept to the International Maritime Organization's Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC). In July 2011, MEPC approved the proposal submitted by the United States, and added this item to the work program of the Technical Working Group of the IMO Protocol on Preparedness, Response and Co-operation to pollution Incidents by Hazardous and Noxious Substances (OPRC-HNS TG). The OPRC-HNS TG began this work during its 13th session in March 2012, and continues to conduct the bulk of guideline development during intersessional periods via an International Correspondence Group, comprised of a range of national response authorities, spill contractors and industry representatives from around the world. These international guidelines will be available for use by nations as a tool to assist in managing a multitude of requests for and offers of assistance from other countries, regional coordinating bodies, or other entities. This paper summarizes work already completed and still in progress on the development of the IMO International Offers of Assistance Guidelines for oil spills. The ultimate goal for these Guidelines, once completed within the OPRC-HNS TG and approved by MEPC, will be adoption and utilization by IMO Member States, particularly those that are party to OPRC Convention and to the OPRC-HNS Protocol which require States to establish procedures for international cooperation during pollution incidents.

2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 711-714
Author(s):  
Heather A. Parker-Hall ◽  
Timothy P. Holmes ◽  
Norma A. Hernandez Ramirez

ABSTRACT Exercise and evaluation of the Pacific Annex of the Joint Contingency Plan Between the United Mexican States and the United States of America Regarding Pollution of the Marine Environment by Discharges of Hydrocarbons or Other Hazardous Substances (MEXUSPLAN) uncovered a significant need for joint training between spill responders, planners, decision-makers and stakeholders on both sides of our border. Sponsored by U.S. Coast Guard District 11 (USCG Dll) and the Second Mexican Naval Zone (ZN2), a series of training sessions were held for Mexican officials from the Northern Baja California region and Mexico City in early 2003. The first of these well-attended sessions was held in two locations: San Diego, CA and Ensenada, Mexico in February 2003. The U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Hazmat facilitated the first session, the Joint Mexico-United States Oil Spill Science Forum. It provided a scientific view of oil spills. The following joint session facilitated by USCG Dll and held in Ensenada was a tabletop exercise designed in preparation for the signing of the MEXUSPAC Annex. Through the use of a spill drill scenario, this session included instruction and dialogue about the roles and responsibilities of both U.S. and Mexican spill responders. Both sessions included presentations from several agencies of the Regional Response Team IX/Joint Response Team: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, U.S. Dept. of the Interior and California's Office of Spill Prevention and Response. Industry partners also contributed topics of discussion, further complementing the U.S. response landscape. Mexican response agencies, including PEMEX, SAGARPA, SEMARNAT and PROFEPA, provided valuable input ensuring dialogue helping to identify additional joint response gaps. Upon the most significant gaps brought to light was the need for additional information regarding dispersant use by Mexican agencies, particularly in light of the approaching international SONS Exercise in April 2004. To this end, USCG Dll and NOAA HAZMAT developed and presented a modified Ecological Risk Assessment for their Mexican counterparts. Hosted by ZN2 in October 2003, this highly successful workshop brought together many key decision makers, planners and stakeholders from both sides of the border to discuss tradeoffs inherent in the use of existing spill response tools, including dispersants. Joint training and discussion sessions such as these are key to ensuring any measure of success in a joint spill response. Several additional training and discussion topics designed for the Mexican-U.S. joint response forum have been identified with many in the planning phase. Acknowledging the similarities as well as differences in response systems of our two nations' is essential to the success of these joint collaborations. Such continued efforts will help bridge existing gaps.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (1) ◽  
pp. 684710
Author(s):  
Jim Elliott

Abstract The marine salvage industry plays a vital role in protecting the marine environment. Governments, industry and the public, worldwide, now place environmental protection as the driving objective, second only to the safety of life, during a marine casualty response operation. Recognizing over 20 years after the passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 that the effectiveness of mechanical on-water oil recovery remains at only about 10 to 25 percent while the international salvage industry annually prevents over a million tons of pollutants from reaching the world's oceans, ten years ago the United States began implementing a series of comprehensive salvage and marine firefighting regulations in an effort to improve the nation's environmental protection regime. These regulations specify desired response timeframes for emergency salvage services, contractual requirements, and criteria for evaluating the adequacy of a salvage and marine firefighting service provider. In addition to this effort to prevent surface oil spills, in 2016, the U.S. Coast Guard also recognized the salvage industries advancements in removing oil from sunken ships and recovering submerged pollutants, issuing Oil Spill Removal Organization (OSRO) classification standards for companies that have the capabilities to effectively respond to non-floating oils. Ten years after the implementation of the U.S. salvage and marine firefighting regulatory framework, this paper will review the implementation of the U.S. salvage and marine firefighting regulations and non-floating oil detection and recovery requirements; analyze the impacts and effectiveness of these new policies; and present several case studies and recommendations to further enhance salvage and oil spill response effectiveness.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 1772-1783
Author(s):  
Drew Casey ◽  
John Caplis

ABSTRACT As observed during several recent major oil spills, most notably the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, the current regulatory planning standard for mechanical recovery equipment has been often scrutinized as an inadequate means for vessel and facility plan holders to calculate their oil spill equipment needs. Effective Daily Recovery Capacity, or EDRC, was developed during a negotiated rulemaking process following the enactment of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. During an IOSC 2011 Workshop sponsored by the American Petroleum Institute (API), the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), and the U.S. Coast Guard, there was general agreement among workshop participants that EDRC is not an accurate planning tool for determining oil spill response equipment needs. In addition, many attendees agreed that EDRC should account for the skimmer system as a whole, not individual skimmer components such as pump nameplate capacity. In 2012, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) and the U.S. Coast Guard initiated and completed a third-party, independent research contract to review the existing EDRC regulations and make recommendations for improving planning standards for mechanical recovery. The contractor's final report methodology is based on oil spill thickness as a fundamental component in calculating mechanical recovery potential, and it emphasizes the importance of response time on-scene and storage for recovered oil. This research provides a more realistic and scientific approach to evaluating skimmer system performance, and more accurately accounts for a wide range of operating conditions and external influences. The federal government, with input from the oil industry, OSRO community, and other interested stakeholders, now has a sound methodology to serve as a starting point for redesigning the current planning standard that more accurately reflects skimmer system performance.


2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-147
Author(s):  
Daniel R. Norton

ABSTRACT The annual volume of oil spilled into the marine environment by tank vessels (tank barges and tanks hips) is analyzed against the total annual volume of oil transported by tank vessels in order to determine any correlational relationship. U.S. Coast Guard data was used to provide the volume of oil (petroleum) spilled into the marine environment each year by tank vessels. Data from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the U.S. Department of Transportation's (US DOT) National Transportation Statistics (NTS) were used for the annual volume of oil transported via tank vessels in the United States. This data is provided in the form of tonnage and ton-miles, respectively. Each data set has inherent benefits and weaknesses. For the analysis the volume of oil transported was used as the explanatory variable (x) and the volume of oil spilled into the marine environment as the response variable (y). Both data sets were tested for correlation. A weak relationship, r = −0.38 was found using tonnage, and no further analysis was performed. A moderately strong relationship, r = 0.79, was found using ton-miles. Further analysis using regression analysis and a plot of residuals showed the data to be satisfactory with no sign of lurking variables, but with the year 1990 being a possible outlier.


1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 635-638
Author(s):  
William C. Rogers ◽  
Jean R. Cameron

ABSTRACT Oil shipping companies operating on the West Coast of the United States are subject to international, federal, and state oil spill prevention and response planning regulations. Many companies wrote separate plans for each jurisdiction with the result that tank vessels carried several different plans on board and parent companies faced an administrative burden in keeping plans current. In June 1996, oil shipping company representatives proposed that the States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force work with them to develop a format incorporating West Coast states' and U.S. Coast Guard contingency planning requirements. A workgroup comprised of representatives of the Task Force, industry, and the U.S. Coast Guard, working cooperatively, eventually proposed a voluntary integrated plan format based on the key elements of the U.S. Coast Guard Vessel Response Plan. This format allowed correlation with state planning requirements as well as with the Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan (SOPEP) required by international regulations. The U.S. Coast Guard, the Canadian Ministry of Transport, and all West Coast states have subsequently documented their agreement to accept vessel plans in this format, to coordinate review as needed, and to allow references to public documents such as Area Plans.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 173-192
Author(s):  
Stacey L. Crecy ◽  
Melissa E. Perera ◽  
Elizabeth J. Petras ◽  
John A. Tarpley

ABSTRACT #2017-373 Federal agencies involved in oil spill response in the U.S. are required to comply with several environmental compliance laws. Where a Federal agency is operating in a way that may affect endangered species in the area, Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) requires the agency to “consult” with the two Federal agencies responsible for protecting those species and habitats – the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS). Following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, nonprofit organizations filed several lawsuits against the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (the “Action Agencies”) for failure to comply with the ESA during oil spill contingency planning. In one case, a settlement required the Action Agencies to consult with the NMFS and USFWS (together, called the “Services”) on the plan to use oil spill dispersants in California waters. Perhaps responding to these developments, several Regional Response Teams across the country initiated or made plans to review the status of their ESA Section 7 consultations. These efforts have varied in cost, scope, composition of agency representatives involved, and success in completing a consultation for a variety of reasons. There have been numerous challenges for USCG and EPA in meeting the ESA Section 7 consultation requirements for oil spill planning. First, the most recent framework for cooperation between the Action Agencies and the Services regarding consulting on oil spill planning and response activities is contained in an Interagency Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) signed in 2001. Although the agreement is still valid, some parts have been identified as outdated or in need of clarification. Secondly, there are no direct funding mechanisms or dedicated personnel assigned to the Action Agencies to work on pre-spill ESA Section 7 consultations. Third, recommendations and consultation outcomes can vary between Service agencies as well as internally within each Service agency due to a high level of regional autonomy. In 2015, the National Response Team (NRT) formed a new, interagency subcommittee to improve the Federal Action Agencies’ ability to comply with environmental laws such as the ESA with respect to oil spill response and pre-spill planning. A workgroup of the NRT Subcommittee was formed to specifically address pre-spill ESA Section 7 consultation processes. The workgroup includes regional and national representatives from the Action Agencies and the Services. In addition to strengthening relationships and understanding among the participating agencies, the workgroup has identified gaps in the 2001 MOA and is in the process of developing tools and templates on how to conduct pre-spill ESA Section 7 consultations to help fill some of the existing gaps. The workgroup ultimately hopes to facilitate the development of updated, complete, efficient, and consistent ESA Section 7 consultations across the nation.


2008 ◽  
Vol 2008 (1) ◽  
pp. 1219-1223 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald Cantin ◽  
Roger Laferriere ◽  
Larry Hewett ◽  
Charlie Henry

ABSTRACT Every nation faces the possibility of a major natural disaster and few plans are in place to deal with the massive consequences that follow. When Hurricane Katrina reached landfall, the human toll and extent of damage made it the worst natural disaster in American history. The news headlines were filled with the images of desperation and the efforts of the thousands of heroes across the spectrum of government who worked tirelessly to help the citizens of the Gulf Coast of the United States recover. Less visible to the American public was the vast environmental impact caused by millions of gallons of oil released by hundreds of individual oil spills. The total oil volume lost to the environment is estimated at over 8.2 million gallons, making it the second largest oil spill in United States history. Moreover, this spill was the first major environmental disaster managed under the newly published National Response Plan, a plan developed following the tragic events of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. This paper will describe how response managers overcame the incredible challenges of managing multiple oil spills in an enormous area devoid of the support infrastructure, human resources and the logistics network normally present in major spills within the United States. The authors will offer a first hand account of the strategies employed by the response management system assembled to combat the spills. They will describe key lessons learned in overcoming competition for critical resources; the importance of combining scientific, legal and other support in determining response options such as burning and debris removal; and the methodology employed in creating a Unified Area Command that included multiple responsible parties. Finally, this paper will provide insights to processes within the Joint Field Office, an element of the National Response Plan, and how well it performed in supporting response efforts.


2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (1) ◽  
pp. 263-266
Author(s):  
Jean R. Cameron

ABSTRACT An issue of increasing concern worldwide is that of oil spills from nontank vessels that carry large quantities of petroleum product as fuel or lubricants. The New Carissa incident in Oregon in 1999 is only one of several that have impacted the U.S. West Coast in the last few years. Others include the M/V Kuroshima, which grounded in Dutch Harbor, Alaska in 1997, and the M/V Kure, which spilled oil in Humbolt Bay also in 1997. The Tenyo Maru was cut in half in a collision and sank with the loss of one life and a spill of at least 100,000 gallons of heavy fuel oil and diesel in Washington State in 1991. Additional examples of both spills and threats of spills are sited, both in the United States and worldwide. This paper examines a number of actions that have been taken in response to this threat. One such model is the Canadian requirement that vessel owner/operators demonstrate a formal agreement with an approved response contractor, and list that contractor in their Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan (SOPEP). A more comprehensive approach would be to establish approved “umbrella” contingency plans for major port areas, supported by contracts with oil spill removal organizations (OSROs). This preferred model has been adopted by the U.S. West Coast states, and affords the opportunity for the contracted responders to drill with emergency response officials, thus improving the likelihood of an efficient, coordinated spill response. This paper also proposes spill prevention design elements for nontank vessels.


1979 ◽  
Vol 1979 (1) ◽  
pp. 217-224
Author(s):  
Warren G. Hansen ◽  
Ernest Clements ◽  
Elizabeth A. Lundt

ABSTRACT In response to Environmental Protection Agency and U.S. Coast Guard regulations, the United States Navy has undertaken a comprehensive program to minimize the potential for land-based oil spills originating from naval shoreline oil storage and handling facilities. Construction and maintenance projects have been begun to prevent land-based oil spills from occurring or from reaching adjacent navigable waters. These projects were preceded by careful policy development, surveys of existing conditions, and analyses of remedial alternatives. Specifically, the Naval Facilities Engineering Command divisions have assisted shoreline activities in the preparation of oil spill prevention, control, and countermeasures (SPCC), and oil spill contingency plans. Improved spill containment and cleanup technologies, as well as improved personnel training, have contributed greatly to the refinement and upgrading of these plans. SCS Engineers (SCS) has been involved in all phases of compliance with these plans. Plan and manual reviews were supplemented by detailed field surveys and subsequent development of remedial projects to be instituted at all deficient facilities. Based on the preliminary recommendations and design sketches prepared for tank farm sites at San Clemente Island, SCS is now providing design and related services for oil spill prevention and control facilities.


1993 ◽  
Vol 1993 (1) ◽  
pp. 263-265
Author(s):  
Jon Neel ◽  
John Bones ◽  
Elizabeth Dimmick ◽  
Lynn J. Tomich Kent ◽  
Roger Dunstan ◽  
...  

ABSTRACT The States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force was established in 1989 to enhance spill coordination among the West Coast states and British Columbia, and to address a number of issues that became apparent during the Nestucca barge and Exxon Valdez oil spills. Task Force members are the directors of the oil spill prevention and response agencies in Alaska, British Columbia, California, Oregon, and Washington. The Task Force has become a national model for facilitating cooperation and building consensus between coastal states and provinces and their federal governments. In October of 1990, the task force issued a report containing a comprehensive set of recommendations addressing oil spill prevention, preparedness, and response. The group had achieved remarkable consensus, and many of the report's recommendations have been included in recent legislation enacted by the member states. The success of the task force's approach to regional coordination has also reduced the need for a proposed Pacific Oceans Resources Interstate Compact, which has been proposed to expand the states' role in areas of regulation that are otherwise federally preempted. The task force has become an effective mechanism for developing vigorous, productive relationships between government agencies, industry, and the public in both the United States and Canada. It has created important linkages between state/provincial and federal regulatory activities; for example, by providing input to Coast Guard and EPA rulemaking that implemented the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. It also assisted in assuring a well-coordinated international response to the July 1991 Tenyo Maru oil spill outside the Strait of Juan De Fuca between Washington and British Columbia. The task force is continuing to advance its goals of promoting public policy on oil spill prevention; cooperative management of major spills by government and industry; protection of the states/provincial rights and their natural and economic resources; and inter-governmental consistency in regulations adopted for oil spill prevention, contingency planning, and resource damage assessment.


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