scholarly journals THE NATIONAL RESPONSE SYSTEM: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?1

1993 ◽  
Vol 1993 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-72
Author(s):  
Richard C. Johnson

ABSTRACT The response to the Exxon Valdez incident showed that the nation needs to be better prepared to respond to a spill of that magnitude. In research conducted on the Valdez response, several inadequacies were noted in the National Response System (NRS). A key deficiency identified was the critical need for a standardized management system to direct the response effort more effectively and efficiently. The most pressing question for preparedness planners in improving the NRS is “where do we go from here?” In answering this question, planners must address another question, “how long is it going to take?” There has been widespread failure to put existing knowledge into practice. To fill the management void identified in the NRS, it is imperative that a response management system be adopted as soon as possible. Once adopted, it can be modified and refined to provide a more effective response. The system proposed in this paper uses the sound management practices of an incident command system and modifies and/or expands these practices to fit onto the foundation built by the NRS. This response management system could be used for all spills from minor ones to large, catastrophic spills of national significance (SONS).

2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (2) ◽  
pp. 1033-1034
Author(s):  
Don Costanzo

ABSTRACT Over the years, many organizations have attempted to automate the Incident Command System (ICS). These attempts have ranged from computerizing T-cards to a nationwide spill operations system. Over time, these systems have had varying degrees of success. While certain inherent reasons exist for not automating ICS, they are outweighed by the tremendous potential of successful automation. The need to produce documentation, the integration of ICS sections, and the rapid change of information all lend themselves to automation. Successful ICS automation does not start with computerizing ICS forms. The hey to automating ICS is to automate both ICS and response processes. In a response effort, many separate and distinct processes occur daily. The requisitioning of resources, the planning and application of the response organization, cost accounting, and the development of an Incident Action Plan (IAP) occur many times during an incident. This paper describes a framework for automating and integrating these processes. This framework offers organizations a road map for successful ICS automation. The poster presentation includes a software demonstration that illustrates the benefits of integrated automation.


1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 567-571
Author(s):  
Mark O'Malley

ABSTRACT Following the Exxon Valdez spill, the need for an effective organization to manage a spill of such magnitude was readily apparent. The publication of a revised NC? reflected this need by defining a Spill of National Significance (SONS) as a spill that, because of its severity, size, location, or actual or potential impact on the public health and welfare or the environment, the necessary response effort is so complex that it requires extraordinary coordination of federal, state, local, and responsible party (RP) resources to contain and clean up the discharge. The U.S. Coast Guard adopted the Incident Command System (ICS) as the response management organization for oil and hazardous substance incidents in 1996. An integral part of ICS is the Area Command concept, which provides a level of strategic management and support for the existing Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) response organization. This concept was evaluated for its suitability at a SONS exercise held on 16–18 September 1997 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Washington, D.C. The exercise was also designed to assess interagency policy and cooperation with regard to emergency response by having the participants deliberate on critical issues in a collegial setting, as opposed to a stress-elevating, oil spill equipment deployment and command center organization drill. This paper examines the makeup of the unique design of the exercise and discusses several issues that arose during the exercise.


1997 ◽  
Vol 1997 (1) ◽  
pp. 737-742
Author(s):  
LT Tina M. Burke ◽  
LT John P. Flynn

ABSTRACT In recent years, the usefulness of the incident command system (ICS) has received much attention. Much of the oil industry and several government agencies involved in all types of emergency response have been using ICS for many years. In addition, the U.S. Coast Guard formally adopted the national interagency incident management system (NIIMS) ICS as the response management system of choice in February of 1996. The response to the tank barge North Cape grounding was a complex multiagency effort that brought with it many of the issues and problems responders face when dealing with crisis situations. This paper describes the ICS-based organization that was established to respond to the major North Cape oil spill, analyzes the organization compared to standard ICS, and discusses how the ICS framework and principles contributed to the success of the response. It also explains how closer conformity to standard ICS could have remedied many of the issues that later surfaced as lessons learned, resulting in improved response efficiency. The North Cape response provides a vivid example of how ICS is a helpful management tool that, if rigorously learned and applied in a widespread fashion, can greatly enhance the nation's oil spill response posture.


Author(s):  
Timothy Jones ◽  
Craig Hedberg

Although most outbreaks are confined to a local jurisdiction, the number of multijurisdictional outbreaks (i.e., involving multiple geographic areas, widely distributed contaminated food or pharmaceutical products, or multiple government agencies) is increasing. In such cases, a clear and effective management system for the response must be established promptly. The roles and expectations of all involved responders should be clearly defined and closely monitored. Partners should be in regular communication throughout the response. Procedures and mechanisms for sharing of appropriate data and protecting sensitive information should be established from the onset of the investigation. Public communication about the investigation and response should be closely coordinated among agencies and preferably handled by a single spokesperson. Following the established procedures of the Incident Command System is often appropriate for large-scale or multijurisdictional outbreak responses.


2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 539-542 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emma Quinn ◽  
Travers Johnstone ◽  
Zeina Najjar ◽  
Toni Cains ◽  
Geoff Tan ◽  
...  

AbstractThe incident command system (ICS) provides a common structure to control and coordinate an emergency response, regardless of scale or predicted impact. The lessons learned from the application of an ICS for large infectious disease outbreaks are documented. However, there is scant evidence on the application of an ICS to manage a local multiagency response to a disease cluster with environmental health risks. The Sydney Local Health District Public Health Unit (PHU) in New South Wales, Australia, was notified of 5 cases of Legionnaires’ disease during 2 weeks in May 2016. This unusual incident triggered a multiagency investigation involving an ICS with staff from the PHU, 3 local councils, and the state health department to help prevent any further public health risk. The early and judicious use of ICS enabled a timely and effective response by supporting clear communication lines between the incident controller and field staff. The field team was key in preventing any ongoing public health risk through inspection, sampling, testing, and management of water systems identified to be at-risk for transmission of legionella. Good working relationships between partner agencies and trust in the technical proficiency of environmental health staff aided in the effective management of the response. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2018;12:539–542)


2003 ◽  
Vol 2003 (1) ◽  
pp. 1179-1183
Author(s):  
Duane Michael Smith

ABSTRACT There are likely few that would argue with the proposal that a national incident management system would be of benefit. Numerous articles have been put forward over time, both for and against the adoption of an incident command system (ICS) as the model for a national incident management system. Those in favor of its adoption point out to its many successes, from major wildfires to the 2002 Olympics. Many seem to view ICS as simply another way of expressing the term command and control. In reality, ICS is not another way to say command and control; rather it is a specific of command and control system. The question then is whether ICS, and in particular the National Inter-agency Incident Management System – Incident Command System (NIIMS-ICS) is the model upon which this national system should be based. Most of the studies and papers regarding the use and adoption of ICS have focused on its use within the fire service community. This may be somewhat intuitive, given the origins of the system; however, if we are to truly gauge the applicability of this system to all risks, we must begin to exam it in those other events. It was a series of disasters that led to the development of the initial ICS system. It has been a subsequent series of disasters or national emergencies that have led to the continued evolution of ICS toward a national model. The question now before us is whether we need another disaster to take that final step to a truly national incident management system or are we willing to go there now. In this time of heightened national security we owe it to ourselves to have the best incident management system in the world.


2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 305-309 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Albertson

ABSTRACT When the oil tanker Prestige broke apart and sank off the coast of Spain in November 2002, it joined an infamous line of environmental catastrophes in maritime history. The way in which the Prestige incident unfolded and, in particular, the denial of a place of refuge for the tanker intensified existing pressures on the IMO to finalize and adopt guidelines intended to assist all concerned parties in dealing with similar circumstances. At the 23rd Assembly, the IMO answered by adopting two resolutions on the issue. These resolutions offer excellent planning, preparedness, and response guidelines and a framework for effectively dealing with the next Prestige. The IMO guidelines are compatible with the U.S. National Response System and existing laws designed to protect the environment, public health, and welfare. As such, their implementation requires neither regulation nor significant adjustments to U.S. policy. With few exceptions, the National Response System should assimilate the IMO guidelines. Specifically, Area Committees and Harbor Safety Committees should plow the IMO guidelines into current planning, preparedness, and response activities in order to ensure effective response to places of refuge scenarios. The most critical and urgent issue is to ensure the decisionmaking criteria and process for both allowing and taking a ship in need of assistance to a place of refuge is well developed, agreed upon, and exercised beforehand, so that when the real thing occurs those who need to make the decision know exactly what to do and who to contact. This paper discusses relevant aspects of the National Response System and authorities as they pertain to the IMO guidelines and the role of the U.S. Coast Guard as the federal agency charged with their implementation.


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