Integrating Environmental Impacts into Capital Investment Decisions

Abstract Prior to entering into any joint venture agreement (JVA), dealmakers should be aware of the options available to resolve future investment disagreements. There are three broad capital investment structures commonly found in joint ventures: (i) standard passmark rules; (ii) non-consent/opt-out; and (iii) sole risk. Within each category, deal practitioners have numerous options to tailor capital investment structures. As much as possible, deal practitioners should contemplate the most likely areas of disagreement, and then tailor the capital investment structures appropriately to ensure that the joint ventures (JV) can manage capital investment decisions in an efficient, value-preserving way. While it is impossible to establish a formula to determine which specific contractual structures will best accommodate future capital investments in a given JV, companies should weigh various factors to inform their position. We reviewed 40 JVAs to understand various capital investment mechanics and how they differ based on the nature of the venture and owner context. Our research found an extremely diverse array of creative structural work-arounds to address different owner appetites to make future capital investments. The purpose of this article is to describe, illustrate and provide benchmarks on different mechanics and contractual terms found in joint venture agreements, and to offer guidance as to which future capital investment mechanics should be included in venture agreements.

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Promotion Signaling and Human Capital Investments

American Economic Journal Microeconomics ◽

10.1257/mic.20180285 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 12 (1) ◽

pp. 125-155 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Michael Waldman ◽

Ori Zax

Keyword(s):

Human Capital ◽

Labor Market ◽

Capital Investment ◽

Investment Decisions ◽

Human Capital Investment ◽

Capital Investments ◽

Human Capital Investments ◽

Asymmetric Learning ◽

Specific Human Capital ◽

Investment Choices

In a world characterized by asymmetric learning, promotions can serve as signals of worker ability, and this, in turn, can result in inefficient promotion decisions. If the labor market is competitive, the result will be practices that reduce this distortion. We explore how this logic affects human capital investment decisions. We show that, if commitment is possible, investments will be biased toward the accumulation of firm-specific human capital. We also consider what happens when commitment is not possible and show a number of results including that, if investment choices are not publicly observable, choices are frequently efficient. (JEL D82, J24, J31, M12, M51)

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