Moses, money, and multiple-choice: The Moses illusion in a multiple-choice format with high incentives

When people answer the question “How many animals of each kind did Moses take on the Ark?”, they usually respond with “two,” although Moses does not appear in the biblical story of the Ark. We investigated this “Moses illusion” in a multiple-choice format and tested the influence of monetary incentives on the illusion’s strength. Thereby, we addressed the role of a cooperative communication context for the illusion’s emergence, as well as the role of participants’ motivation. In four experiments (total N = 914), we found that the Moses illusion persists in a multiple-choice format. As the multiple-choice format realizes a cooperative context in which the correct answer is always available, we exclude a cooperative context explanation for the illusion. Monetary incentives reduced the strength of the illusion. However, the reduction was numerically and statistically small. We thereby show that the illusion is not due to violations of cooperative communications, and not due to a lack of motivation. The multiple-choice approach will facilitate further research on the Moses illusion and the data provide additional evidence for the Moses illusion’s empirical robustness and constrain its theoretical explanations.

The Magician’s Choice: Providing illusory choice and sense of agency with the Equivoque forcing technique.

Forcing techniques allow magicians to subtly influence spectators’ choices and the outcome of their actions, and they provide powerful tools to study decision-making and the illusory sense of agency and freedom over choices we make. We investigate the Equivoque force, a technique that exploits semantic ambiguities and people’s failure to notice inconsistencies, to ensure that a spectator ends up with a pre-determined outcome. Similarly to choice blindness paradigms, the Equivoque forces participants to end up with an item they did not choose in the first place. However, here, the subterfuge is accomplished in full view. In three experiments, we showed that the Equivoque is highly effective in providing participants an illusory sense of agency over the outcome of their actions, even after 2 repetitions of the trick (experiment 2), and using items for which pre-existing preferences can be present (experiment 3). Across all experiments, participants were oblivious to inconsistencies in the procedure used to guide their decisions, and they were genuinely surprised by the experimenter’s matching prediction. Contrary to our prediction, the Equivoque force did not significantly change participants’ preference for the chosen item. We discuss the results with regards to other illusions of agency (e.g. forcing, choice blindness), failures in noticing semantic inconsistencies (e.g Moses illusion), and issues surrounding choice-induced-preference literature.

Validation of semantic illusions independent of anomaly detection: evidence from eye movements

Several theorists have argued that readers fail to detect semantic anomalies during reading, and that these effects are indicative of “shallow processing” behaviours. Previous studies of semantic anomalies such as the Moses illusion have focused primarily on explicit detection tasks. In the present study, we examined participants’ eye movements as they read true/false statements that were non-anomalous, or contained a semantic anomaly that was either high- or low-related to the correct information. Analyses of reading behaviours revealed that only low-related detected anomalies resulted in initial processing difficulty, but both detected and undetected anomalies, regardless of whether they were high- or low-related, resulted in delayed processing difficulty. The results extend previous findings on semantic anomalies and are discussed in terms of the RI-Val model of text processing.

Competitors or Teammates

Research has documented that proper names are more difficult to learn and remember than other types of words. Various causes of this difficulty have been proposed to better understand how proper names are represented in memory and the degree to which names compete with each other. In the retrieval of names, some studies show competition, whereas other studies find facilitation. During comprehension, names demonstrate competition by causing a Moses illusion: People erroneously answer invalid questions such as “How many animals did Moses take on the ark?”, failing to detect that Noah is the correct name for the question. Errors in both name retrieval and comprehension are more likely when the correct name and distractor name sound similar, share biographical characteristics, or have some visual resemblance. However, shared visual information has played a competitive role more consistently in name comprehension than retrieval, an asymmetry that remains to be investigated.