Value in the Development and Conclusion of Abstract Right

This chapter is a reading of “Abstract Right” that demonstrates the centrality of value and inference to the account. Hegel’s account unfolds private property as the immediate expression of the free will in the external world. When the argument turns toward the use of property, Hegel’s account of value comes to the fore as the universality of property ownership that is implicit in the right to use what one owns. While dealt with only briefly in the published Philosophy of Right, value gets a much more extensive treatment in the 1824–1825 lectures, where it becomes the main concept for understanding the process and result of the alienation of property. The chapter shows that the transition from alienation to contract brings Hegel’s account of mutual recognition to the fore along with an inferential equivalence form of value. Equivalence of value is a central dimension of punishment, but that equivalence can be secured only with the transition to the moral will.

Ethico-Theology without Postulates: Questioning the Prehistory of Kant’s Philosophical Theology

According to the prevailing opinion of the Kantian scholars, Kants critique of the traditional philosophical theology in the chapter of his Critique of Pure Reason dedicated to the ideal of reason motivated his rejection of transcendental theology in favor of a construction foundeв on postulates of reason. An examination of Kants sistematics of philosophical-theological disciplines reveals nonetheless some changeability of the borderlines of transcendental theology. This means that Kants critical arguments do not necessarily affect all kinds of trancendental theology, and allows us to investigate Kants reflection of the transcendental ideal if reason as a foundation for an alternative version of philosophical ethico-theology which does not need practical postulates. In the first Critique there is no ground for such a construction, because Kant's concept of virtue remains partly naturalistic at that time. The idea of a pure aprioristic ethics of duty as expounded by Kant later furnished the needed conceptual foundation for a concept already prepared in the theory of the ideal, asserting the reality of a transcendental-practical ideal as a prototype of moral will, as humanity in its comprehensively determined moral perfection, as the realm of ethical ends, and lastly, in an anticipation of the prototypical Christology of Kant's late treatise on religion, as the divine human person within us. Compared with this version of transcendental philosophical theology Kants ethico-theology of postulates should be legitimately determined as a form of natural theology.

Moral Altruis dalam Filsafat Sosial Perspektif Perbandingan dengan Akhlak dalam Islam dan Pengaruhnya terhadap Ekonomi

The term Altruist moral can be corresponded with al-akhlaq al-mahmudah (good moral). The word "altruist" derives from "altruistic" (English) which means a character that emphasizes on other needs. Therefore, someone with altruist moral can be called as a person who has a character that emphasizes on other needs. Globalization era which is dominated by rapid development of information and technology has carried out an enormous changes to the life of society in many factors, including economic. Recently, many people have begun to question again about competence as well as moral role and ability to manage and control moral of society that becomes more permissive, not submissive anymore as occurred in the past. Analysis result says that whether in social philosophy or Islam, Altruist moral will deliver economic attitude which orients to do the obligation first, than asking for the right to its own necessity (individual egoist - annaniyah). Altruist moral, referred to Yusuf Qardhawi, will widely give effect on the whole aspect of economy, whether in the case of production, consumption, circulation or distribution.

Habermas’s discourse ethics and Hegel’s critique of Kant

In this article I follow James Gordon Finlayson who claims that a Hegelian criticism applies both to Kant and also to Habermas, namely, the criticism of the will as a tester of maxims. The issue is that Kant cannot connect the will of morality and the will of the particular agent and this leaves the empirical will unaffected. According to Finlayson, Habermas can be charged with this criticism, insofar as he draws a distinction between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons. The upshot is that in Discourse Ethics the empirical will seems to be left also unaffected by the moral will. In light of an analysis of ideal role taking, and rational discourse, I claim that Habermas can rebut the Hegelian criticism. Nonetheless, I show that these concepts are incompatible with the distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons. Hence, either the concepts or the distinction have to be removed. Habermas can only afford to discard the distinction, and indeed this modification answers the criticism. The final issue that arises is why does Habermas maintain the distinction? And what would be the consequences for his moral theory if he discards it? At the end of the article I sketch some of the implications and challenges that this alternative could have for Habermas’s Discourse Ethics.

Kant's Demonstration of Free Will, Or, How to Do Things with Concepts

ABSTRACT:Kant famously insists that free will is a condition of morality. The difficulty of providing a demonstration of freedom has left him vulnerable to devastating attack: critics charge that Kant's post-Groundwork justification of morality amounts to a dogmatic assertion of morality's authority. My paper rebuts this objection, showing that Kant offers a cogent demonstration of freedom. My central claim is that the demonstration must be understood in practical rather than theoretical terms. A practical demonstration of x works by bringing x into existence, and what the demonstration of freedom brings into existence is a moral will, a will regulated by the moral law and capable of acting in accordance with it. Since to act morally is to act freely, bringing a moral will into existence actualizes our capacity for freedom and demonstrates that we possess it. To confirm the viability of such a demonstration, Kant must establish that agents can regulate their wills by practical principles, and that practical judgments are efficacious of themselves (i.e., that non-Humean motivational internalism is true). Kant, I argue, is successful on both counts.