The clinical significance of anomalous experience in the explanation of monothematic delusions

Monothematic delusions involve a single theme, and often occur in the absence of a more general delusional belief system. They are cognitively atypical insofar as they are said to be held in the absence of evidence, are resistant to correction, and have bizarre contents. Empiricism about delusions has it that anomalous experience is causally implicated in their formation, whilst rationalism has it that delusions result from top down malfunctions from which anomalous experiences can follow. Within empiricism, two approaches to the nature of the abnormality/abnormalities involved have been touted by philosophers and psychologists. One-factor approaches have it that monothematic delusions are a normal response to anomalous experiences whilst two-factor approaches seek to identify a clinically abnormal pattern of reasoning in addition to anomalous experience to explain the resultant delusion. In this paper we defend a one-factor approach. We begin by making clear what we mean by atypical, abnormal, and factor. We then identify the phenomenon of interest (monothematic delusion) and overview one and two-factor empiricism about its formation. We critically evaluate the cases for various second factors, and find them all wanting. In light of this we turn to our one-factor account, identifying two ways in which ‘normal response’ may be understood, and how this bears on the discussion of one-factor theories up until this point. We then conjecture that what is at stake is a certain view about the epistemic responsibility of subjects with delusions, and the role of experience, in the context of familiar psychodynamic features. After responding to two objections, we conclude that the onus is on two-factor theorists to show that the one-factor account is inadequate. Until then, the one-factor account ought to be understood as the default position for explaining monothematic delusion formation and retention. We don’t rule out the possibility that, for particular subjects with delusions there may be a second factor at work causally implicated in their delusory beliefs but, until the case for the inadequacy of the single factor is made, the second factor is redundant and fails to pick out the minimum necessary for a monothematic delusion to be present.

Cotard syndrome, self-awareness, and I-concepts

Various psychopathologies of self-awareness, such as somatoparaphrenia and thought insertion in schizophrenia, might seem to threaten the viability of the higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness since it requires a HOT about one’s own mental state to accompany every conscious state. The HOT theory of consciousness says that what makes a mental state a conscious mental state is that there is a HOT to the effect that “I am in mental state M.” I have argued in previous work that a HOT theorist can adequately respond to this concern with respect to somatoparaphrenia and thought insertion. There is also Cotard syndrome which is a rare neuropsychiatric disorder in which people hold the delusional belief that they are dead, do not exist, or have lost their blood or internal organs. In this paper, I argue that HOT theory has nothing to fear from it either and can consistently account for what happens in such unusual cases. I analyze Cotard syndrome in light of my previous discussion of somatoparaphrenia and thought insertion, and argue that HOT theory can provide a somewhat analogous account without the worry of inconsistency. It is crucial to recognize that there are multiple “self-concepts” and levels of HOTs which can help to provide a more nuanced explanation. With regard to the connection between consciousness and self-consciousness, it is proposed that Cotard patients are indeed capable of having some “I-thoughts” about their bodies and mental states.

Etiological factors and treatment challenges in an adolescent male with body dysmorphic disorder: A case report

There are very few existing reports in adolescents about the clinical presentation and treatment challenges associated with body dysmorphic disorder coexisting with suicidal behaviour. This case report describes a 13-year old male with body dysmorphic disorder, who was completely convinced that his belief related to the disorder is true (delusional belief) and therefore had no insight into his condition. His preoccupation with the shape of his nose progressed significantly over a 2-year period to the extent that he wore a surgical mask on a daily basis to camouflage the perceived defect. The distress due to the persistent preoccupation and intrusive thinking became so severe that he started to experience suicidal ideation and attempted suicide twice with no harm sustained. This case report focuses on three treatment challenges faced by the treating team: the need of continued treatment with pharmacotherapy and psychotherapy following a cosmetic procedure, the impact of the mother’s preoccupation with her physical appearance on the recovery of the young person, and the management of suicidality. We have also highlighted the probable causative factors of the development of the illness in this patient which are consistent with the established aetiology of body dysmorphic disorder.

Capgras-féle tünettel összefüggő szülőgyilkosságok. Két eset bemutatása

Capgras symptom is characterized by the delusional belief that a person significant to the patient has been replaced by a ‘double’ or ‘impostor’. Capgras symptom was discussed to be associated with violent behavior. We report here the cases of two male patients with schizophrenia paranoid type, where parricide was connected to Capgras delusion. It is important to emphasize that in our observed cases, non-adherence played an essential role in the development of violent behavior, parricide. Orv Hetil. 2019; 160(42): 1673–1676.

Thoughts without Thinkers

Thought insertion is a puzzling psychotic phenomenon that is usually considered a delusional belief and has specific diagnostic significance for schizophrenia; this article examines the phenomenology of thought insertion in terms of the senses of agency and ownership over thought and also in relation to hallucinations as a spectrum of unusual experiences, and argues that thought insertion is first and foremost a near-sensory experience before any secondary delusion formation. It goes on to outline the paradoxical nature of thought insertion when considered as a delusion and offers a new line of inquiry which views it a duplex phenomenon combining a generative sensory experience with an explanatory delusional elaboration. The article posits that by investigating the two related yet distinct layers of the same phenomenon in question, we will be able to better understand the subjective experience of thought insertion.

198 Who Am I: Delusion of Misidentification of Self

Delusional misidentification syndromes are rare psychotic disorders, in which the patient believes that the identity of a person, object, or place has been changed or replaced by another. These disorders include Capgras syndrome, Fregoli syndrome, and inter-metamorphosis. Reverse types of misidentification syndromes were introduced to distinguish alteration of the self rather than of others.Reverse Capgras syndrome refers to the psychological change of the self as opposed to others, while reverse Fregoli syndrome is the delusional belief in which the patient has undergone fundamental changes in physical makeup without any psychological changes, and reverse intermetamorphosis is a variant in which patients believe that they have undergone physical and psychological transformation.Here we present an interesting case of a transgender woman presenting with delusional misidentification of the self in the context of Schizophrenia. A review of literature, with emphasis on etiological factors, forensic implications and association with violence is presented.Funding AcknowledgementsNo funding.

“Capgras” Delusions Involving Belongings, Not People, and Evolving Visual Hallucinations Associated with Occipital Lobe Seizures

Capgras syndrome is characterized by the delusional belief that a familiar person has been replaced by a visually similar imposter or replica. Rarely, the delusional focus may be objects rather than people. Numerous etiologies have been described for Capgras to include seizures. Similarly, visual hallucinations, both simple and complex, can occur secondary to seizure activity. We present, to our knowledge, the first reported case of visual hallucinations and Capgras delusions for objects that developed secondary to new onset occipital lobe epilepsy. We then discuss the possible underlying neurologic mechanisms responsible for the symptomatology.