International safeguards for the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel – why, what and how

The objectives of international safeguards are the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons (or for other purposes), and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection for states with comprehensive safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Following these objectives, several studies have focused on the developments of concepts and methods for safeguarding final disposal facilities as well as on identifying the most feasible technologies that could potentially be deployed for verifying final disposal programmes (IAEA, 1998, 2010, 2018). These activities were coordinated through Member State Safeguards Support Programmes, including the joint tasks on the development of “Safeguards for Geological Repositories” (SAGOR, 1994–2004) and on the “Application of Safeguards to Geological Repositories” (ASTOR, 2005–2017). SAGOR performed a diversion path analysis for spent fuel disposal facilities, determined safeguards technical objectives and identified potential safeguards measures to meet those objectives. ASTOR supported the IAEA in assessing how safeguards measures could be effectively implemented and provided recommendations with respect to developing such measures. Specific verification technologies were developed under other Member State Support Programme tasks. A summary report on the progress and status of safeguards for spent fuel encapsulation plants and geological repositories was completed by ASTOR in 2017. ASTOR also identified areas and actions that need to be accomplished to support safeguards implementation in final disposal facilities, such as (1) establish performance requirements for the design of safeguards technologies relevant to geological disposal of spent fuel, (2) determine specific information needs of states and operators regarding safeguards implementation for geological disposal of spent fuel and develop appropriate guidance, (3) determine specific information needs of IAEA inspectors and analysts and develop a guidance document that provides recommendations for implementing safeguards for a geological repository system under the state-level concept and (4) develop and test appropriate safeguards equipment (IAEA, 2017; Moran et al., 2018). While several measures and technologies related to verifying the geological disposal of spent fuel have been used by the IAEA at other facilities or are in development or testing, other technologies still need to be developed and tested. In addition, ASTOR identified the need for approaches to how information about disposed spent fuel and high-level nuclear waste should be managed, handled, organized, archived, read, interpreted and secured for the long term (for centuries after repository closure and beyond), including an international standard for states and facility operators on information management, data-retention methods and timescales for preserving safeguards data for geological repositories. The presentation will introduce the objectives of international nuclear material safeguards for the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel, highlight the current status of developments and discussions in terms of approaches and technologies for safeguarding geological repositories, and give an outlook on implementing safeguards for final disposal in Germany.

The Most Powerful Protections

In this chapter, it is elaborated how ISDS treaties give extraordinarily broad and powerful protections to foreign investors, but not to others, many of whom are far more vulnerable. The protections go well beyond those available for victims of torture, for example, who rely on relatively weak international safeguards to protect them from abuse by states and corporations alike. The treaties establish these protections without creating corresponding responsibilities for foreign investors. Often, they allow foreign investors to avoid courts and adjust their nationalities to access ISDS, while closing the ISDS process to all but the investor and the sued country’s government. For most people, the best hope for protection, even if a faint one, lies with the institutions of their own country, the very institutions that ISDS is used to intimidate and constrain.

The FPIC Principle Meets Land Struggles in Cambodia, Indonesia and Papua New Guinea

Social and environmental safeguards are now commonplace in policies and procedures that apply to certain kinds of foreign investment in developing countries. Prominent amongst these is the principle of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC), which is commonly tied to policies and procedures relating to investments that have an impact on ‘indigenous peoples’. This paper treats international safeguards as a possible manifestation of what Karl Polanyi called the ‘double movement’ in the operation of a capitalist market economy. Our concern here is with the way that the FPIC principle has been applied in struggles over the alienation of land and associated natural resources claimed by indigenous peoples or customary landowners in three developing countries—Cambodia, Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. Case studies of recent land struggles in these countries are used to illustrate the existence of a spectrum in which the application of the FPIC principle may contribute more or less to the defence of customary rights. On one hand, it may be little more than a kind of ‘performance’ that simply adds some extra value to a newly created commodity. On the other hand, it may sometimes enable local or indigenous communities and their allies in ‘civil society’ to mount an effective defence of their rights in opposition to the processes of alienation or commodification. The paper finds that all three countries have political regimes and national policy frameworks that are themselves resistant to the imposition of social and environmental safeguards by foreign investors or international financial institutions. However, they differ widely in the extent to which they make institutional space for the FPIC principle to become the site of a genuine double movement of the kind that Polanyi envisaged.