Fiscal Policy and Optimal Taxation in Sierra Leone: Testing for Tax Smoothing Hypothesis

This paper empirically investigate whether the budget imbalances in Sierra Leone over the review period is consistent with optimal tax policy. The procedure involves testing if tax smoothing hypothesis hold for Sierra Leone. In this regard, three different empirical approaches were performed. Firstly, I examine the random walk property of the tax rate. The null hypothesis of non-stationarity of tax rate could not be rejected, which implies the tax rate follows random walk. Second, I examined whether changes in tax rate is predictable by regressing changes in tax rate by its own lagged values. The result shows that tax rate is unpredictable, as changes in tax cannot be determined by its lagged values. Finally, a VAR model was employed to examine whether tax rate can be predicted by its own lagged values together with changes in the government spending rate and the growth rate of real GDP. The results indicate that all the variables employed were found not be significant is predicating the tax rate. Overall, all the empirical estimations support the existence of tax smoothing over the sample period and that the budget inbalances over the review period is consistent with optimal tax policy.

Are Large Deficits and Debt Dangerous?

The traditional view of large deficits and debt is that they are harmful, save in recession/early recovery, for tax smoothing or to fund productive public investment, as they crowd out private investment and lower future income, and taken to extremes, can cause inflation, even a financial crisis. Blanchard (2019) concludes they may have no fiscal cost and increase welfare. I present evidence of a debt problem, policies necessary to contain it, effects on recovery, interest rates, and long-run growth. There are several serious issues with Blanchard's reading of key data and modeling assumptions, the changing of which would reverse his conclusions.

The Motive to Borrow

Governments issue debt for good and bad reasons. While the good reasons—intertemporal tax smoothing, fiscal stimulus, and asset management—can explain some of the increases in public debt observed in recent years, they cannot account for all of the observed changes. Bad reasons for borrowing are driven by political failures associated with intergenerational transfers, strategic manipulation, and common pool problems. These political failures are a major cause of overborrowing and budgetary institutions and fiscal rules can play a role in mitigating the tendency to overborrow. While it is difficult to establish a clear causal link from high public debt to low growth, it is likely that some countries might be paying a price in terms of lower growth and greater output volatility because of excessive debt accumulation.

DEBT STABILIZATION IN A NON-RICARDIAN ECONOMY

In models with a representative infinitely lived household, tax smoothing implies that the steady state of government debt should follow a random walk. This is unlikely to be the case in overlapping generations (OLG) economies, where the equilibrium interest rate may differ from the policy maker's rate of time preference. It may therefore be optimal to reduce debt today to reduce distortionary taxation in the future. In addition, the level of the capital stock in these economies is likely to be suboptimally low, and reducing government debt will crowd in additional capital. Using a version of the Blanchard-Yaari model of perpetual youth, with both public and private capital, we show that it is optimal in steady state for the government to hold assets. However, we also show how and why this level of government assets can fall short of both the level of debt that achieves the optimal capital stock and the level that eliminates income taxes. Finally, we compute the optimal adjustment path to this steady state.

Interpreting the Reagan Deficits

This chapter examines the large net-of-interest deficits in the U.S. federal budget that have marked the administration of Ronald Reagan. It explains the fiscal and monetary actions observed during the Reagan administration as reflecting the optimal decisions of government policymakers. The discussion is based on an equation whose validity is granted by all competing theories of macroeconomics: the intertemporal government budget constraint. The chapter first considers the government budget balance and the optimal tax smoothing model of Robert Barro before analyzing monetary and fiscal policy during the Reagan years: a string of large annual net-of-interest government deficits accompanied by a monetary policy stance that has been tight, especially before February 1985, and even more so before August 1982. Indicators of tight monetary policy are high real interest rates on government debt and pretax yields that exceed the rate of economic growth.