Disagreement and epistemic improvement

This paper proposes a methodological turn for the epistemology of disagreement, away from focusing on highly idealized cases of peer disagreement and towards an increased focus on disagreement simpliciter. We propose and develop a normative framework for evaluating all cases of disagreement as to whether something is the case independently of their composition—i.e., independently of whether they are between peers or not. The upshot will be a norm of disagreement on which what one should do when faced with a disagreeing party is to improve the epistemic properties of one’s doxastic attitude or, alternatively, hold steadfast.

The "doubt-whether" puzzle

The English predicate doubt is known to exhibit a distinctive selectional restriction: it is compatible with declarative as well as whether- complements but is incompatible with constituent wh-complements. The interpretation of a whether-complement under doubt is also puzzling, as ⌜doubt whether p⌝ is almost—but not completely—synonymous with ⌜doubt that p⌝. I will argue that these behaviors of doubt can be given a semantic account, by making use of the mechanisms of HIGHLIGHTING and EXHAUSTIFICATION. Doubt expresses an existential doxastic attitude toward the negation of the highlighted content of the complement while having pre- suppositions that are sensitive to the ordinary content of the complement. Given that ⌜that p⌝ and ⌜whether p⌝ are equivalent in the highlighted con- tent but non-equivalent in the ordinary content, the semantics explains fine-grained differences in interpretations between ⌜doubt whether p⌝ and ⌜doubt that p⌝. Furthermore, given the lack of a stronger scalemate, the interpretation of ⌜doubt that/whether p⌝ undergoes strengthening due to exhaustification, akin to the behavior of ‘scaleless’ modals reported in the literature.

Evidential nihilism

A considerable literature has grown up around the claim of Uniqueness, according to which evidence rationally determines belief. It is opposed to Permissivism, according to which evidence underdetermines belief. This paper highlights an overlooked third possibility, according to which there is no rational doxastic attitude. I call this 'Nihilism'. I argue that adherents of the other two positions ought to reject it but that it might, nevertheless, obtain at least sometimes.

A Non-Doxastic Fear of Hell: On the Impact of Negative Factors for an Agnostic Religious Commitment

On the standard view, an agnostic might commit non-doxastically to religion because she wants to receive some goods, which might be either natural or supernatural in kind. I broaden the picture by showing how the agnostic must also take negative factors into account. Negative mundane factors should be avoided as far as possible by the agnostic, and in extreme cases, even at the price of giving up supernatural goods. Negative supernatural factors, like eternal torment, work differently. An agnostic who considers an eternity of suffering in hell a live possibility might rationally make a religious commitment in order to avoid it. Non-doxastic religion is commonly conceived as requiring a pro-attitude. If fear can have the impact I suggest, we must broaden the picture to allow for a negatively based commitment as well. To make explicit the kind of attitude relevant here, I offer an analysis of fear as a rational, non-doxastic attitude.

WORKING PAPER SERIES: INNOVATION ENABLERS

In this paper, we consider the value of knowledge in an innovation context and deliberate a contrary perspective from existing empiricisms to bring about better innovation efficiency within multi-agent arenas. To do this, we consider why, if innovation is key for developmental trajectories in a healthcare environment, and despite the resource utilised to examine its characteristics, the transfer of knowledge within healthcare, practitioner or organisational innovation domains remains a problematic event.We reflect on this duality with a doxastic attitude and draw on modal maps as underpinning structures to present a critique. Furthermore, we draw from these qualitative descriptions of conditional maps as a natural extension of contemporary KBF (Knowledge Belief Frame) models. Thus, from an innovation context, we can deliberate the parallelism between an agent who establishes belief in real time propositions, and a formal system from which they derive the proposition and reality. Uniquely, in doing so we build a legitimate frame of reference by highlighting managerial parallelisms, which synthesise key epistemic doyennes and, efficaciously underpin the plausibility of logical associations and decision-making drawn from a first-person architype of belief.

: Attributes within a Knowledge transfer scenario

In this short paper, we discuss a dialectic methodology surrounding theinterpretation of knowledge transfer, and the conditional elements whichcan be seen to support the concept of a unity of knowledge. We discuss adiffering standpoint to knowledge and knowledge value, based on theknowledge transfer practitioner’s perspective, but still in a business context.We ask why, if knowledge is vital for business success and competitiveadvantage, the transfer of knowledge is rarely a simple unproblematic event.Further, that the creation of knowledge before transfer is recognised as asignificant factor in determining a starting point for analogous scrutiny, andoften under a premise of doxastic attitude. This discussion therefore aims tosynthesise current literature and research into an elemental epistemicprincipal of FIGURATION DYNAMICS, and in doing so, may help focuscongruent knowledge transfer theories.

The Cognitive Aspect of Christian Faith and Non-doxastic Propositional Attitudes

Summary In the recent discussion, several authors have argued for the claim that propositional faith need not be doxastic, but also can be “non-doxastic”. Notable proponents of this view are William Alston, Robert Audi, Daniel Howard-Snyder, and J. L. Schellenberg. In this paper, I focus on Christian faith and consider whether its cognitive aspect can be understood solely in terms of Alston’s and others’ non-doxastic accounts. I argue for a negative answer. In my view, the cognitive aspect of Christian faith calls for, as a minimum, “a sub-doxastic attitude”. As there is no shared terminology on this topic, a proportion of this paper deals with conceptual clarifications.

INTRASPECIES IMPERMISSIVISM

The Uniqueness thesis says that any body of evidence E uniquely determines which doxastic attitude is rationally permissible regarding some proposition P. Permissivists deny Uniqueness. They are charged with arbitrarily favouring one doxastic attitude out of the set of attitudes they regard as rationally permissible. Simpson (Episteme, 2017) claims that an appeal to differences in cognitive abilities can remove the arbitrariness. I argue that it can't. Impermissivists face a challenge of their own: The problem of fine distinctions. I suggest that meeting this challenge requires impermissivists to loosen up at higher levels – when comparing belief-forming systems that differ in the fineness of their doxastic outputs. This more relaxed take on Uniqueness is a kind of ‘intraspecies impermissivism’.

Philosophy

Sarah Broadie writes on ‘The Knowledge Unacknowledged in the Theaetetus’ for Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy. Her paper makes two main claims: first, that Plato in the Theaetetus rejects the ‘additive’ picture for knowledge, namely, that knowledge is true judgement with something else (e.g. an account); and second, that in the Theaetetus true judgement relies on prior knowledge, especially if that knowledge is arrived at methodically. Thus, true judgement is not necessary for knowledge and sometimes knowledge is necessary for true judgement. Broadie's argument, roughly, is that, in the Theaetetus, true judgement is already a high-level epistemic achievement. She has a number of pieces of evidence for this. The first is Theaetetus 189e4–190a6, where Socrates stresses that a judgement is an assertion that results from a soul having a silent, internal debate. Broadie infers from this that a judgement involves reasons even if those reasons are not good reasons; judgement, for Plato, is more than a mere doxastic attitude (95–6). This already looks unfriendly to the additive picture. Once I have a judgement I have reasons, and when I have a true judgement, I have good reasons. If I have good reasons then what I have is reliable and secure. So, what more could I add to upgrade this cognitive achievement to make it knowledge? Broadie goes on to explore the alternative to the additive picture given in the Sophist and the Statesman. There it turns out that there may be topics that simply cannot be captured by the additive picture: cases where there must be knowledge of an object in the absence of true judgements about that object. This is Broadie's knowledge unacknowledged.