scholarly journals Disagreement and epistemic improvement

Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fernando Broncano-Berrocal ◽  
Mona Simion
Keyword(s):  
Peer Disagreement ◽  
Doxastic Attitude ◽  
Epistemology Of Disagreement ◽  
Normative Framework

AbstractThis paper proposes a methodological turn for the epistemology of disagreement, away from focusing on highly idealized cases of peer disagreement and towards an increased focus on disagreement simpliciter. We propose and develop a normative framework for evaluating all cases of disagreement as to whether something is the case independently of their composition—i.e., independently of whether they are between peers or not. The upshot will be a norm of disagreement on which what one should do when faced with a disagreeing party is to improve the epistemic properties of one’s doxastic attitude or, alternatively, hold steadfast.

scholarly journals The Epistemic Value of Deep Disagreements

2018 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 263-292 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirk Lougheed
Keyword(s):  
Argumentation Theory ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Peer Disagreement ◽  
Epistemology Of Disagreement ◽  
Epistemic Peer ◽  
Deep Disagreement ◽  
The Face ◽  
Deep Disagreements

In the epistemology of disagreement literature an underdeveloped argument defending the claim that an agent need not conciliate when she becomes aware of epistemic peer disagreement is based on the idea that there are epistemic benefits to be gained from disagreement. Such benefits are unobtainable if an agent conciliates in the face of peer disagreement. I argue that there are good reasons to embrace this line of argument at least in inquiry-related contexts. In argumentation theory a deep disagreement occurs when there is a disagreement between fundamental frameworks. According to Robert J. Fogelin disagreements between fundamental frameworks are not susceptible to rational resolution. Instead of evaluating this claim I argue that deep disagreements can lead to epistemic benefits, at least when inquiry is in view. Whether rational resolution is possible in cases of deep disagreements, their existence turns out to be epistemically beneficial. I conclude by examining whether this line of argument can be taken beyond research-related contexts.Dans la littérature sur l'épistémologie du désaccord, un argument sous-développé pour une approche non conciliatoire se fonde sur l'idée qu'il y a des bénéfices épistémiques à tirer du désaccord. De tels bénéfices sont impossibles à obtenir si un agent se concilie face au désaccord avec ses pairs, du moins dans les contextes liés à la recherche. Dans la théorie de l'argumentation, un désaccord profond se produit lorsqu'il y a un désaccord entre des propositions cadres. Je soutiens que des désaccords profonds peuvent mener à des avantages épistémiques, du moins dans le contexte de la recherche. Que la résolution rationnelle soit ou non possible en cas de désaccord profond, leur existence s'avère être bénéfique sur le plan épistémologique.

Disagreement, Deep Time, and Progress in Philosophy

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 285-313
Author(s):  
Kirk Lougheed
Keyword(s):  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Peer Disagreement ◽  
Epistemology Of Disagreement ◽  
Deep Time ◽  
Philosophical Beliefs ◽  
Epistemic Peer ◽  
Contingent Fact ◽  
The Future ◽  
History Of ◽  
Sceptical Conclusion

The epistemology of disagreement examines the question of how an agent ought to respond to awareness of epistemic peer disagreement about one of her beliefs. The literature on this topic, ironically enough, represents widespread disagreement about how we should respond to disagreement. I argue for the sceptical conclusion that the existence of widespread disagreement throughout the history of philosophy, and right up until the present day indicates that philosophers are highly unreliable at arriving at the truth. If truth convergence indicates progress in a field, then there is little progress in philosophy. This sceptical conclusion, however, need not make us give up philosophizing: That we should currently be sceptical of our philosophical beliefs is a contingent fact. We are an intellectually immature species and given the existence of the deep future we have some reason to think that there will be truth-convergence in philosophy in the future.

scholarly journals Desacuerdo entre pares epistémicos en el debate naturaleza-cultura

2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 485-506
Author(s):  
Nahuel Pallitto
Keyword(s):  
Life Sciences ◽  
Peer Disagreement ◽  
Epistemology Of Disagreement ◽  
Epistemic Practices ◽  
Epistemic Peer ◽  
Epistemic Peers

Scientific disagreements constitute valuable resources for reflecting on epistemic peer disagreements. In this essay I engage in the debate whether epistemic peers who disagree should be conciliatory or steadfast by examining how scientists actually react in the so called nature-nurture debate. The main conclusion of the analysis is that, when taking into consideration concrete epistemic practices with peers responding to different epistemic perspectives, scientists have good reasons to be steadfast. At the same time, the theoretical conceptualizations of the epistemology of peer disagreement illuminates certain aspects of the nature-nurture debate, such as its long persistence. Therefore, this article contributes both to the debate over the epistemology of disagreement and to the understanding of a never-ending controversy in the life sciences.

Conflicting Higher and Lower Order Evidences in the Epistemology of Disagreement about Religion

2010 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-89
Author(s):  
James Kraft
Keyword(s):  
Lower Order ◽  
Peer Disagreement ◽  
Epistemology Of Disagreement ◽  
Epistemic Peer

This paper concentrates on the issue of what happens to the confidence one has in the justification of one's belief when one discovers an epistemic peer with conflicting higher and/or lower order evidences. Certain symmetries surface during epistemic peer disagreement, which tend to make one less confident. The same happens in religious disagreements. Mostly externalist perspectives are considered. The epistemology of ordinary disagreements and that of religious ones behave similarly, such that principles used in the former can be seen to apply also in the latter.

THE COMMUTATIVITY OF EVIDENCE: A PROBLEM FOR CONCILIATORY VIEWS OF PEER DISAGREEMENT

Episteme ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-95 ◽  
Author(s):  
Georgi Gardiner
Keyword(s):  
Peer Disagreement ◽  
Doxastic Attitude ◽  
The Way

AbstractConciliatory views of peer disagreement hold that when an agent encounters peer disagreement she should conciliate by adjusting her doxastic attitude towards that of her peer. In this paper I distinguish different ways conciliation can be understood and argue that the way conciliationism is typically understood violates the principle of commutativity of evidence. Commutativity of evidence holds that the order in which evidence is acquired should not influence what it is reasonable to believe based on that evidence. I argue that when an agent encounters more than one peer, and applies the process of conciliation serially, the order she encounters the peers influences the resulting credence. I argue this is a problem for conciliatory views of disagreement, and suggest some responses available to advocates of conciliation.

scholarly journals HIGHER-ORDER EPISTEMIC ATTITUDES AND INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY

Episteme ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 205-223 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allan Hazlett
Keyword(s):  
Higher Order ◽  
Epistemic Status ◽  
Doxastic Attitude ◽  
Epistemology Of Disagreement ◽  
Intellectual Humility ◽  
Alternative Approach ◽  
Epistemic Attitudes ◽  
Doxastic Attitudes ◽  
Necessary Connections ◽  
Proper Response

AbstractThis paper concerns would-be necessary connections between doxastic attitudes about the epistemic statuses of your doxastic attitudes, or ‘higher-order epistemic attitudes’, and the epistemic statuses of those doxastic attitudes. I will argue that, in some situations, it can be reasonable for a person to believe p and to suspend judgment about whether believing p is reasonable for her. This will set the stage for an account of the virtue of intellectual humility, on which humility is a matter of your higher-order epistemic attitudes. Recent discussions in the epistemology of disagreement have assumed that the question of the proper response to disagreement about p concerns whether you ought to change your doxastic attitude towards p. My conclusion here suggests an alternative approach, on which the question of the proper response to disagreement about p concerns the proper doxastic attitude to adopt concerning the epistemic status of your doxastic attitude towards p.

Religious Disagreement, Religious Experience, and the Evil God Hypothesis

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirk Lougheed
Keyword(s):  
Religious Experience ◽  
Religious Beliefs ◽  
Religious Believer ◽  
Religious Experiences ◽  
Peer Disagreement ◽  
Epistemic Peer ◽  
Religious Disagreement

Conciliationism is the view that says when an agent who believes P becomes aware of an epistemic peer who believes not-P, that she encounters a (partial) defeater for her belief that P. Strong versions of conciliationism pose a sceptical threat to many, if not most, religious beliefs since religion is rife with peer disagreement. Elsewhere (Removed) I argue that one way for a religious believer to avoid sceptical challenges posed by strong conciliationism is by appealing to the evidential import of religious experience. Not only can religious experience be used to establish a relevant evidential asymmetry between disagreeing parties, but reliable reports of such experiences also start to put pressure on the religious sceptic to conciliate toward her religious opponent. Recently, however, Asha Lancaster-Thomas poses a highly innovative challenge to the evidential import of religious experience. Namely, she argues that an evil God is just as likely to explain negative religious experiences as a good God is able to explain positive religious experiences. In light of this, religious believers need to explain why a good God exists instead of an evil God. I respond to Lancaster-Thomas by suggesting that, at least within the context of religious experience, (i) that the evil God hypothesis is only a challenge to certain versions of theism; and (ii) that the existence of an evil God and good God are compossible.

La política migratoria de Ecuador hacia Colombia Entre la integración y la “contención“

2011 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 45-77 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcela Ceballos Medina
Keyword(s):  
Immigration Policy ◽  
Forced Migration ◽  
Two Dimensions ◽  
Politique Publique ◽  
Political Agenda ◽  
The Political ◽  
South American ◽  
Internal Armed Conflict ◽  
Normative Framework ◽  
South American Region

This article examines Ecuadoran policy toward the forced migration of Colombians to Ecuador. It identifies the main changes in Ecuadoran immigration policy, including asylum, for the period 1996-2008. To do this, the author examines two dimensions of immigration policy: the normative framework and political practices (implementation of the normative framework). The article tries to answer the following questions: What are the main changes in Ecuadoran immigration policy toward Colombian forced migration? How can we explain those changes? The author suggests that the policy oscillates between regional or binational integration and border contention. The variables that explain those changes are: (1) the magnitude of Colombian migration; (2) the transnational dynamics of the internal armed conflict along the Colombia-Ecuador border and the political context in Ecuador; and (3) the international relations of Colombia and Ecuador and the political agenda of the South American region.Spanish El propósito del artículo es examinar la respuesta del Estado ecuatoriano a las migraciones forzadas de colombianos hacia ese país, identificando los principales cambios en la política de inmigración (incluida la política de asilo y refugio) de Ecuador durante el periodo 1996- 2008. Para ello, se observan dos dimensiones de la política migratoria ecuatoriana: 1) el marco normativo y 2) las prácticas políticas para la implementación de las normas. La autora se propone responder a las preguntas ¿Cuáles son los principales cambios en la política migratoria del Estado ecuatoriano hacia las migraciones colombianas? ¿Cómo se explican esos cambios? Concluye que la política migratoria de Ecuador hacia las migraciones colombianas oscila entre una posición integracionista y abierta a la inmigración y una política de cierre de fronteras y contención del conflicto armado dentro del territorio colombiano. Las variables que explican dichos cambios son: 1) el creciente flujo de migrantes colombianos hacia Ecuador, 2) las dinámicas transnacionales del conflicto armado colombiano en la frontera y el contexto político al interior del Ecuador, y 3) las relaciones político-diplomáticas entre los dos países y la agenda política en la región suramericana.French Cet article examine la politique de l'Équateur concernant l'immigration forcée de Colombiens vers ce pays. Il identifie les changements principaux effectués dans la politique d'immigration équatorienne (en incluant la politique publique d'asile) pour la période 1996-2008. Dans ce but, l'auteur examine deux dimensions de la politique publique d'immigration : 1) le cadre normatif, et 2) les pratiques politiques (la mise en œuvre du cadre normatif). L'auteur souhaite répondre aux questions suivantes : quels sont les changements principaux dans la politique d'immigration équatorienne concernant les migrations colombiennes forcées ? Comment pouvons-nous expliquer ces changements ? L'hypothèse est que la politique d'immigration de l'Équateur oscille entre l'intégration régionale ou binationale et le contrôle des frontières. Les variables perme ant d'expliquer ces changements sont : 1) l'ampleur des migrations colombiennes vers l'Équateur ; 2) les dynamiques transnationales du conflit armé interne au niveau de la frontière colombo-équatorienne et le contexte politique en Équateur ; et 3) les relations internationales entre la Colombie et l'Équateur ainsi que l'agenda politique de la région sud-américaine.

Introduction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kubo Mačák
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Research Methodology ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Normative Framework ◽  
Comprehensive Examination

This chapter introduces the central aim of this book: to provide a comprehensive examination of the notion, process, and effects of internationalization of armed conflicts in international law. It presents a brief research overview, outlining the scope of the enquiry, the research methodology, and the structure of the book. It then lays out the conceptual and normative framework for the rest of the book. To that end, it first justifies the need for the present study by confirming the continuing distinction between international and non-international armed conflicts in international law. Then, it puts forward a conception of internationalization that expresses the legal transformation from a non-international to an international armed conflict.

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