Evidential nihilism
Abstract A considerable literature has grown up around the claim of Uniqueness, according to which evidence rationally determines belief. It is opposed to Permissivism, according to which evidence underdetermines belief. This paper highlights an overlooked third possibility, according to which there is no rational doxastic attitude. I call this 'Nihilism'. I argue that adherents of the other two positions ought to reject it but that it might, nevertheless, obtain at least sometimes.
1988 ◽
Vol 62
(03)
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pp. 411-419
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1967 ◽
Vol 28
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pp. 207-244
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1967 ◽
Vol 28
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pp. 177-206
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1999 ◽
Vol 173
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pp. 249-254
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1976 ◽
Vol 32
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pp. 577-588
1971 ◽
Vol 29
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pp. 244-245
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