The Cognitive Aspect of Christian Faith and Non-doxastic Propositional Attitudes

Author(s):  
Dan-Johan Sebastian Eklund

Summary In the recent discussion, several authors have argued for the claim that propositional faith need not be doxastic, but also can be “non-doxastic”. Notable proponents of this view are William Alston, Robert Audi, Daniel Howard-Snyder, and J. L. Schellenberg. In this paper, I focus on Christian faith and consider whether its cognitive aspect can be understood solely in terms of Alston’s and others’ non-doxastic accounts. I argue for a negative answer. In my view, the cognitive aspect of Christian faith calls for, as a minimum, “a sub-doxastic attitude”. As there is no shared terminology on this topic, a proportion of this paper deals with conceptual clarifications.

1994 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gordon D. Fulton

This essay studies an important scene in the literature of European contact with non-Europeans, Robinson Crusoe's conversion of his man Friday to Christianity, drawing on recent discussion of dialogue within ethnography, and paying particular attention to the presentation of speech. It argues that when Crusoe finds Friday more than a match for him in dialogue he turns away from dialogue, to theological reverie focused on himself and to narrative report of their conversation, fashioning an account in which Christian faith and colonial dominance support each other in the establishment of Crusoe's island kingdom.


2018 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 585-592
Author(s):  
DANIEL HOWARD-SNYDER

AbstractIn my contribution to the symposium on Teresa Morgan's Roman Faith and Christian Faith, I set the stage for three questions. First, in the Graeco-Roman view, when you put/maintain faith in someone, is the cognitive aspect of your faith compatible with scepticism about the relevant propositions? Second, did some of the New Testament authors think that one could put/maintain faith in God while being sceptical about the relevant propositions? Third, in her private writings, Saint Teresa of Calcutta described herself as living by faith and yet not believing; even so, by all appearances, she was an exemplar of faith in God. Would people during the period of your study tend to see her as an exemplar of faith in God?


2006 ◽  
Vol 72 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-94
Author(s):  
Elisabetta Sacchi

According to Frege a proposition—or, in his terms, a thought—is an abstract structured entity constituted by senses which satisfies, at least, the three following properties: it can be semantically assessed as true or as false, it is the object of so called propositional attitudes and it can be grasped. What Frege meant by 'grasping' is the peculiar way in which we can have epistemic access to propositions. The possibility for propositions to be grasped is put by Frege as a warrant for their existence: to challenge their graspability would amount to jeopardise their ontological reality. But is it true, as Frege uncritically maintained, that the "graspability requirement" is satisfied as far as propositions (as he conceived them) are concerned? This is the topic of the present work. A negative answer to the above mentioned question has been given in recent time by the representatives of what has come to be labelled the "cognitive turn" in analytical philosophy. People such as Fodor and Johnson-Laird patently denied the possibility for propositions, conceived Frege, to be accessed by the grasping relation. What grounds their position is, to put it roughly, the following train of thought: in order for something to be the target of the grasping relation it must enter the mind. Nothing which is different from a mental entity can enter the mind. Therefore, what can be grasped must be mental. The upshot of this move implies, among other things, the rejection of that radical anti-psychologism which was characteristic of the forefathers of the analytical tradition. In our work we shall try to resist their conclusion by showing that it is not necessary to zero the distinction between propositions and mental entities in order to provide an adequate account of the grasping relation. What one has to give up, instead, is only Frege's late Platonism of the "third realm" which, in our view, is a wholly unnecessary and dispensable accretion of his picture. For, as we shall show, if Platonism is in place it is difficult to provide an account of the grasping relation which makes no use of the "representationalist hypothesis" — i.e. of the hypothesis that mediate our access to whatever can be given to us. But representationalism, once in place, makes the theoretical role of the notion of sense dispensable or purely additional.


1999 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-120
Author(s):  
Theodor Jørgensen

From the Public Defence of Bent Christensen’s Dissertation for the Doctorate, »About Grundtvig ’s Vidskab«By Theodor JørgensenBy way of introduction, the thesis of the dissertation is briefly presented, viz. that, according to Grundtvig, the commitment to life inherent in the Christian faith has a cognitive aspect which he develops in a universal-historical vidskab view, but which he later abandons - if not in principle, at least in reality - in favour of a concentration on his church programme on one hand and his programme for the enlightenment of the people on the other. According to Bent Christensen, the reason was of an apologetic and strategic character in that Grundtvig wanted to overcome the isolation in which he found himself in his relations with his age in his first long phase of work.This thesis is partially contested in the article. As an objective reason for this development it is pointed out that Grundtvig recognized the unattainableness of a united Christian culture and prepared himself for the pluralism of modernity. This rendered it necessary to seek out the possibility for interaction between people with different opinions in essential areas of popular life as well as Christian life. This is why the idea of freedom plays an increasingly important role for Grundtvig. His thinking moves more and more in an elliptic direction with the universal and the local or particular as the two focal points. It is true that the two focal points are sometimes brought into relation with each other by means of the notion of the Chosen People, in which there is an inherent danger of an ethnocentric nationalism which Grundtvig does not always escape. The article further points to the necessity of a study of Grundtvig’s attitude to the theories of science of his age. An immanent interpretation such as that presented in Bent Christensen’s dissertation is not sufficient.


2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 103-143
Author(s):  
Norbert Feinendegen

Although Lewis describes his intellectual journey to the Christian faith in Surprised by Joy and The Pilgrim's Regress, the actual steps of his progress from Atheism to Theism are still a matter of controversy. Based on Lewis' letters, his diary All My Road Before Me and recently published sources (in particular ‘Early Prose Joy’), this paper gives an outline of the main steps of Lewis' philosophical progress during the 1920s. The first part sketches the five main stages Materialism, Realism, Absolute Idealism, Subjective Idealism, and Theism, and submits a proposal for their dating. The second part describes these stages in greater detail and discusses the reasons that urged Lewis to adopt a new philosophical position at a particular time. It will become apparent that a thorough philosophical understanding of these stages is an indispensable prerequisite for any serious effort to establish a chronology of Lewis' intellectual progress during these years.


2017 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 237-256
Author(s):  
Joseph Bosco Bangura

Sierra Leone has seen the rise of Charismatic movements that are bringing about greater levels of co-operation with the state. This new church development aims at renewing the Christian faith and projecting a more proactive role towards public governance. This ecclesial development shows that African Pentecostal/Charismatic theology appears to be moving away from the perceived isolationist theology that once separated the church from involvement with the rest of society. By reapplying the movement's eschatological beliefs, Charismatics are presenting themselves as moral crusaders who regard it as their responsibility to transform public governance. The article probes this relationship so that the Charismatic understanding of poverty, prosperity, good governance and socio-economic development in Sierra Leone can be more clearly established.


Author(s):  
Thomas C. Berg

By now, it is a commonplace of the American religious scene that the majority of the nation's white Protestant Christians are split into “two parties.” The ideological dividing line runs between “mainline” denominations—Methodists, Presbyterians, Episcopalians—and a bevy of conservative denominations and groups, but it also cuts through the mainline itself, which contains a substantial contingent of conservatives.Among the two parties' numerous disagreements, theological and political, few have run deeper and longer than their difference over the meaning and importance of evangelism, the activity of “proclaiming the gospel” to those outside the Christian community. Is the church's prime call in this regard to seek conversions to the Christian faith, or is it to show the love of Christ by working for charitable goals and social justice? A well-known 1973 study of Presbyterian clergy found that the greatest polarization between self-described “conservatives” and “liberals” came over the relative priority of evangelism and social action. Indeed, the fight over these goals was an important (though by no means the only) factor precipitating the “split” early in this century.


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