Optimal Licensing Strategy of Green Technology With Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)

This paper develops a duopoly model to investigate a firm’s green technology licensing strategy with corporate social responsibility (CSR). In our model, licensing is conducted by an inside innovator and the patent holder may take CSR activities under a time-consistent emission tax. The result shows that fixed-fee licensing is always the optimal strategy of the patent holder when there is no CSR. In the CSR case, when the reduction degree of abatement cost coefficient is large, the optimal licensing strategy of the patent holder changes from pure royalty licensing to fixed-fee licensing as the degree of CSR decreases. Furthermore, we find that neither conflict nor consistency always exists between social welfare and firm payoff goals. When the degree of CSR is relatively low, fixed-fee licensing is preferred both by the patent holder and the government. Otherwise, when the degree of CSR is relatively high, the government prefers fixed-fee licensing, while the patent holder prefers royalty licensing. Finally, we analyze the effects of CSR behaviors on environment and social welfare. We show that CSR is beneficial for environment, while it is not always beneficial for social welfare.JEL Classifications: D42; M14; I13

LICENSING BY OUTSIDE INNOVATOR IN HOTELLING MODEL REVISITED

This paper extends Banerjee and Poddar [Banerjee, S and S Poddar (2019). ‘To sell or not to sell’: Licensing versus selling by an outside innovator. Economic Modelling, 76, 293–304] by lifting the cap on per unit royalty rates in the cases of royalty licensing and two-part tariff licensing. We reconsider the optimal technology licensing contract by an outside innovator facing two heterogeneous licensees in a standard Hotelling framework. Our findings show that the optimal licensing policy could be fixed fee to the efficient firm, or two-part tariff to both firms (pure royalty to both firms), or two-part tariff to the efficient firm, depending upon the cost differentials between the firms and the size of innovation.

A case study: How did IoT start-up Distronix change its business model to sustain growth in the pay-per-use economy

Industrial Internet of Things emerged as one of the major technologies enabling Industry 4.0 for industries. Multiple start-ups started working in the Industrial Internet of Things field to support this new industrial revolution. Distronix, one such Industrial Internet of Things start-up of India, started operations in 2014, when companies were not even aware of Industrial Internet of Things. Distronix started executing fixed-fee projects for implementation of Industrial Internet of Things. They also started manufacturing sensors to support large customers end-to-end in their Industry 4.0 journey. With the advent of public cloud, companies started demanding pay-per-use model for the solution Distronix provided. This posed a major challenge to Distronix as they had developed technology skills focusing fixed-fee customized project delivery for their clients. The situation demanded that they change their business model from individual project delivery to creation of product sand-box with pre-registered sensors and pre-defined visualization layer to support use cases for Industrial Internet of Things implementation in multiple industry sectors. It forced Rohit Sarkar, the 26 years old entrepreneur and owner of Distronix, to upgrade capabilities of his employees and transform the business model to support pay-per-use economy popularized by public cloud providers. The case discusses the challenges Rohit faced to revamp their business model in such an emerging technology field, like, to develop new skills of the technical people to support such novel initiative, reorienting sales people towards pay as use model, developing new concept of plug and play modular product, devising innovative pricing, better alliance strategy and finding out a super early adopter.

Supply Chains and Antitrust Governance

Antitrust regulations are meant to promote fair competition in the market, but balancing administrative and legal costs with enforcement can be difficult when multilayered supply chains are involved. The canonical example of this challenge is the landmark Illinois Brick ruling, which limits antitrust damages to only the direct purchasers of a product; for instance, consumers can file antitrust claims against colluding retailers but not against colluding manufacturers—only retailers can file claims against manufacturers. This controversial ruling was meant to reduce legal costs, but it can clearly lead to missed enforcement opportunities. In this paper, we demonstrate how the Illinois Brick ruling interacts with contracts adopted in the supply chain, and we show that otherwise equivalent supply chain arrangements can have markedly different effects. In particular, we find that wholesale price, minimum order quantity, revenue sharing, and quantity discount contracts lead retailers to take legal action against manufacturers in the event of collusive behavior. However, the wholesale price plus fixed fee contract structure (also known as a two-part tariff or slotting fee contract) facilitates collusion among the manufacturers with retailers compensated by the fixed fee and not filing the antitrust litigation. We further demonstrate that collusion is more likely under high demand uncertainty and high competition at the retail level but is less likely under high competition at the manufacturer level. Our paper helps public enforcers identify market conditions conducive to antitrust violations. This paper was accepted by Vishal Gaur, operations management.

Kilka uwag o zwolnieniu z opłaty od skargi na przewlekłość postępowania skarżącego w sprawach z zakresu prawa pracy i ubezpieczeń społecznych. Glosa do uchwały Sądu Najwyższego z dnia 6 września 2006 r. (III SPZP 2/06)

<p>The appropriate system of reimbursement of the costs of proceedings and the institution of exemption from such costs both guarantee the real implementation of the right to court. In connection with the lack of explicit regulation in the Act of 17 June 2004 on complaints about the breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable time in practice, it becomes very important to determine whether it is possible to exempt an authorised entity (the complainant) from a fixed fee of complaint about excessive length of proceedings in matters of labour and social security law. In a resolution of 6 September 2006 (III SPZP 2/06) the Supreme Court stated that a complaint about excessive length of proceedings filed by the insured regarding the appeal examined by the Labour and Social Security Court of fees (Article 96 (1) (4) of the Act of 28 July 2005 on court costs in civil matters). This resolution confirms that in the indicated category of cases there is no obligation to pay the fee, and if it has been paid it is refundable. The position held by the Supreme Court in the above-mentioned resolution shall be accepted. When it comes to conclusion regarding <em>de lege ferenda</em> proposals, there is a need to make appropriate normative changes and introduce to the Act of 17 June 2004 on complaints about the breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable time a suitable regulation that would reflect the right fee exemption, as mentioned above.</p>