Impact of Executive Remuneration and Firm Leverage on Firm Stability: Lessons from European Firms

The aim of this study is to examine the impact of executive remuneration and firms’ leverage on firms’ stability as measured by winsorized Zscore (wZscore). The wZscore measure corresponds to the Altman Zscore, which increases as default risk decreases. To test the study’s hypotheses, a linear regression model is applied to a 6-year panel dataset of 180 listed firms categorized in 10 economic sectors operating in 22 countries from the years 2013 to 2018. The results show that executive remuneration has a significant negative impact on firm stability as measured by wZscore. Additionally, firm leverage has a significant positive impact on firm stability. Beyond the theoretical implications, the findings of this study have some practical implications that are particularly relevant to boards of directors, shareholders, managers, and policymakers. The findings suggest that executives should be offered a proper remuneration package to maintain their firms’ stability along with the capacity of firms’ equity and assets to cope up with unprecedented circumstances and the firms’ long-term debts. Finally, this study offers specific recommendations for how firms can balance their pay and performance in terms of executive remuneration and ensure better leverage to optimize their own and society's sustainable development.

Credit Stimulus, Executive Ownership, and Firm Leverage

We show that executive ownership is a significant driver of the demand for credit following credit expansion policies. Our focus on credit demand is in contrast to most studies that have focused on credit supply factors such as bank capital. Our identification exploits the large and unexpected Chinese credit expansion in 2008. This setting offers a unique advantage as in 2008 the Chinese government had almost complete control over the banking sector and it directed the banks to increase credit supply. Thus, in this setting, demand, rather than supply, largely drives the observed changes in firms’ borrowing. We provide extensive robustness tests to validate our results. This paper was accepted by Kay Giesecke, finance.

The effect of the number of bank relationships on firm leverage: high-risk shift and the curse of mainstream banks

Purpose Firms prefer to have more than one bank relationship to secure the flow of funds for their operations, particularly in bank-based economies. On the other hand, banks lean toward expanding their customer base with firms already in the credit market. The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of the number of bank relationships as a firm-specific determinant of capital structure and to discuss its impact on the banking sector. Design/methodology/approach A two-step system generalized method of the moments estimation method is used in this study. The sample comprises 213 Turkish non-financial, publicly listed firms with a positive shareholder’s value for the 2012–2017 period. Findings The findings show that the number of bank relationships increases the leverage of sample firms while the concentration in the banking sector decreases it. These rather intriguing findings are attributed to an under-the-counter credit policy that causes a high-risk shift and a curse of mainstream banks. Once the mainstream banks allocated credit to the firm, its credibility is consumed by the following banks, which is implied by the significantly negative relationship between bank concentration and firm leverage. This problem is defined as the mainstream bank curse in the study. Originality/value The previous literature focuses on the effects of the number of bank relationships on firm profitability, cost of debt and shareholder wealth. However, its impact on the capital structure has not yet been systematically investigated. To the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to critically analyze the effect of the number of bank relationships on the capital structure. The findings will be of immense benefit to the banking sector and the regulatory bodies.

How does corporate social responsibility affect firm leverage?

PurposeA commitment to social responsibility is indispensable to the sustainable development of a firm, and corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become a key corporate evaluation indicator. CSR's economic consequences have long been a hot topic in academic research. The authors analyze the relationship between CSR and corporate capital structure and also investigate channels through which such links are transmitted.Design/methodology/approachUsing CSR score (CSRS) data published by China's Hexun (hexun.com) from 2010 to 2018, the authors control some influencing variables of the nature and characteristics of enterprises and discover that CSR can effectively improve firm leverage using ordinary least square regression. In addition, the research results remain robust for other CSR proxies, different dimensions of CSR, alternative measures of leverage and endogenous testing.FindingsThe authors discover that CSR can significantly reduce firm leverage. In addition, the research results confirm that investor attention and liquidity are the main channels by which CSR effectively reduces leverage, and other influence channels are worthy of further exploration. After examining the substitution variables and endogenous characteristics of CSR, the results remain robust.Originality/valueRegarding decision-making and governance within companies, the authors conclude that CSR reports not only announce the status of CSR activities to corporate stakeholders but also reveal information on corporate financial decisions. Considering the widespread agency problems in companies, management may take advantage of investor understanding of CSR reports and conceal real information or disclose false information. They distort investors' understanding of the financial policies of financial reports to achieve their self-interests. Hence, companies must reinforce their governance and construct comprehensive monitoring mechanisms for CSR disclosure to protect their investors, establish a strong corporate reputation and facilitate long-term development.