Impact of Executive Remuneration and Firm Leverage on Firm Stability: Lessons from European Firms

The aim of this study is to examine the impact of executive remuneration and firms’ leverage on firms’ stability as measured by winsorized Zscore (wZscore). The wZscore measure corresponds to the Altman Zscore, which increases as default risk decreases. To test the study’s hypotheses, a linear regression model is applied to a 6-year panel dataset of 180 listed firms categorized in 10 economic sectors operating in 22 countries from the years 2013 to 2018. The results show that executive remuneration has a significant negative impact on firm stability as measured by wZscore. Additionally, firm leverage has a significant positive impact on firm stability. Beyond the theoretical implications, the findings of this study have some practical implications that are particularly relevant to boards of directors, shareholders, managers, and policymakers. The findings suggest that executives should be offered a proper remuneration package to maintain their firms’ stability along with the capacity of firms’ equity and assets to cope up with unprecedented circumstances and the firms’ long-term debts. Finally, this study offers specific recommendations for how firms can balance their pay and performance in terms of executive remuneration and ensure better leverage to optimize their own and society's sustainable development.

CEOs’ International Work Experience and Compensation

In this paper, we study the effect a CEO’s international work experience has on his or her compensation. By combining human capital theory with a resource dependence and a resource-based perspective, we argue that international work experience translates into higher pay. We also suggest that international work experience comprises several dimensions that affect CEO compensation: duration, timing and breadth of stays abroad. With data from Europe’s largest stock market firms, we provide evidence that the longer the international work experiences and the more numerous they are, the higher a CEO’s compensation. While, based on our theoretical arguments, we expect to find that later international work experiences pay off for CEOs, our empirical analysis shows that earlier international work experiences are particularly valuable in terms of compensation. In addition, our data support the argument that maturity allows a CEO to take advantage of the skills, knowledge and competencies obtained via international experience—and to receive a higher payoff. With our study, we improve the understanding of how different facets of a CEO’s background shape executive remuneration.

The Influence of ‘Say on Pay’ on Excessive Executive Compensation in the UK and the US

Along with the separation of ownership and control in modern companies, the agency problem between shareholders and managers has become a core issue in corporate law. In recent decades, there was a trend of increasing executive compensation in many countries, which led to shareholders’ dissatisfaction and social concerns about the income gap. Since directors did not effectively solve the problem of excessive executive remuneration, many countries introduced the advisory shareholder vote on the remuneration report (‘Say on Pay’). It is a new mechanism that allows shareholders to vote on executive remuneration. After it was first introduced in the UK, many other countries including the US adopted ‘Say on Pay’ to relieve the problem of excessive executive remuneration. However, there is an ongoing debate about whether ‘Say on Pay’ has a meaningful influence on excessive executive compensation. Some believe that shareholder voting results lead directors to create better executive remuneration plans. Others argue that ‘Say on Pay’ contributes little to solving this problem. It is therefore essential to analyse the effects of ‘Say on Pay’ on solving the excessive executive remuneration problem in the UK and the US. This essay will analyse several arguments related to the influence of ‘Say on Pay’ on excessive executive compensation in order to demonstrate the reasons why ‘Say on Pay’ contributes little to solving the excessive executive remuneration problem in the UK and the US.