Cartesian Physics

Chapter 2 argues that Descartes’ physics is compatible with the Thomistic theory of divine concurrence. Descartes holds that God preserves bodies in existence, continually recreating them in different positions over time. Section 2.1 argues that it follows that (on Descartes’ view) God causes all the motions that occur in the world. Some of Descartes’ interpreters take Descartes’ physics to imply that mere bodies do not have any motive force or power, that is, any ability either to move themselves, or to cause motion in other bodies. Descartes’ physics thus seems to imply body–body occasionalism. Yet sections 2.2 and 2.3 show that Descartes is not committed to this conclusion. Instead, section 2.3 argues that Descartes thinks that bodies are “secondary causes” of motion that have active causal powers. Section 2.4 shows how this concurrentist reading of Descartes’ physics is consistent with his conception of body as extended substance.

The Doctrine of Occasionalism

Chapter 1 explains the doctrine of occasionalism. Section 1.1 unpacks the occasionalist claim that God is the only efficient cause, by explaining the concept of an efficient cause, as it was typically understood in medieval and early modern texts. Section 1.2 contrasts occasionalism with a theory of divine providence developed by Thomas Aquinas, which says that God “concurs” with the actions of created substances. Section 1.3 clarifies the difference between occasionalism and the Thomistic theory of divine concurrence using the notion of a causal power: According to this analysis, occasionalism entails that created substances do not have intrinsic active causal powers. Malebranche expresses this claim by saying that created beings are “occasional causes” that merely “give occasion” to God’s actions. However, section 1.4 argues that there is also a Scholastic tradition that uses terms such as “occasion” and “occasional cause” to refer to a type of true efficient cause.

What Do God and Creatures Really Do in an Evolutionary Change? Divine Concurrence and Transformism from the Thomistic Perspective

Many enthusiasts of theistic evolution willingly accept Aquinas’s distinction between primary and secondary causes, to describe theologically “the mechanics” of evolutionary transformism. However, their description of the character of secondary causes in relation to God’s creative action oftentimes lacks precision. To some extent, the situation within the Thomistic camp is similar when it comes to specifying the exact nature of secondary and instrumental causes at work in evolution. Is it right to ascribe all causation in evolution to creatures—acting as secondary and instrumental causes? Is there any space for a more direct divine action in evolutionary transitions? This article offers a new model of explaining the complexity of the causal nexus in the origin of new biological species, including the human species, analyzed in reference to both the immanent and transcendent orders of causation.

Continuance through Time

This final chapter concerns questions of the continuity of existence through time. There are various difficulties: if substances produce their own states, how is this compatible with divine concurrence? And if creation is continuous and yet their states are instantaneous, how does Leibniz avoid reducing monadic duration to a discontinuous aggregate of states? It is argued that a solution to these profound difficulties requires a recognition that monadic states are actually discrete and of finite duration, each containing other smaller states to infinity; yet they are physically continuous, in that each state issues by degrees from the preceding one, and there is no assignable instant at which change does not occur. It is also explained how momentaneous states and forces are to be understood in terms of Leibniz’s foundation for the differential calculus.

Divine Conservation, Concurrence, and Occasionalism

Occasionalism is the doctrine that relegates all real causal efficacy exclusively to God. This paper will aim to elucidate in some detail the metaphysical considerations that, together with certain common medieval theological axioms, constitute the philosophical steps leading to this doctrine. First, I will explain how the doctrine of divine conservation implies that we should attribute to divine power causal immediacy in every natural event and that it rules out mere conservationism as a model of the causal relation between God and nature. This leaves concurrentism and occasionalism as the only compatible options. Then I will explain the argument that since no coherent conception of divine concurrence is possible, occasionalism emerges as the only model of the causal relation between God and nature compatible with the doctrine of divine conservation.

Divine Agency and Divine Action, Volume II

This book builds upon the groundwork laid in the first volume, where it was established that no generic concept of action will suffice for understanding the character of divine actions explicit in the Christian faith. This volume argues that in order to understand divine action rightly, one must begin with the array of specific actions predicated of God in the Christian tradition. The author argues, in a way, that one must do theology in order to analyze properly the concept of divine action. Thus the book offers a careful review and evaluation of the particularities of divine action as they appear in the work of biblical, patristic, medieval, and Reformation-era theologians. Particular attention is given to the divine inspiration of Scripture, creation, incarnation, transubstantiation in the Eucharist, predestination, and divine concurrence. The motive here is not simply to repeat the doctrinal formulations found in the Christian tradition, but to examine them in order to find fresh ways of thinking about these issues for our own time, especially with respect to the contemporary debates about divine agency and divine action.

Divine Concurrence and Human Freedom in Luis de Molina

Here the author interacts with the work of Luis de Molina and his views on divine concurrence. He argues that Molina’s work centers on the potential role of specific divine assistance in the performance of human actions in relation to salvation and predestination. He also argues Molina is motivated by explicitly theological concerns for the integrity of divine aseity, perfection, love, and mercy. He also claims that Molina’s efforts to sustain a genuine place for human action in salvation, providence, predestination, and reprobation have significant implications for understanding the nature of divine knowledge. The author suggests that Molina’s conception of divine concurrence through merit ought to be revised for contemporary concerns about the integrity of human action, along with patient attention to the language of causality with respect to salvation that one finds in the Augustinian–Pelagian debates.

Nicolaus Taurellus on Forms and Elements

ArgumentThis article examines the conception of elements in the natural philosophy of Nicolaus Taurellus (1547–1606) and explores the theological motivation that stands behind this conception. By some of his early modern readers, Taurellus may have been understood as a proponent of material atoms. By contrast, I argue that considerations concerning the substantiality of the ultimate constituents of composites led Taurellus to an immaterialist ontology, according to which elements are immaterial forms that possess active and passive potencies as well as motion and extension. In Taurellus's view, immaterialism about elements provides support for the theological doctrine of creationex nihilo. As he argues, the ontology of immaterial forms helps to explicate a sense in which creatures are substances, not accidents of the divine substance. In particular, he maintains that immaterial forms stand in suitable relations of ontological dependence to God: creation dependence (since forms would not exist without the divine act of creation), but neither subsistence dependence (since forms continue to exist without continued divine agency) nor activity dependence (since forms are active without requiring divine concurrence).