What Do God and Creatures Really Do in an Evolutionary Change? Divine Concurrence and Transformism from the Thomistic Perspective

2019 ◽  
Vol 93 (3) ◽  
pp. 445-482
Author(s):  
Mariusz Tabaczek ◽  

Many enthusiasts of theistic evolution willingly accept Aquinas’s distinction between primary and secondary causes, to describe theologically “the mechanics” of evolutionary transformism. However, their description of the character of secondary causes in relation to God’s creative action oftentimes lacks precision. To some extent, the situation within the Thomistic camp is similar when it comes to specifying the exact nature of secondary and instrumental causes at work in evolution. Is it right to ascribe all causation in evolution to creatures—acting as secondary and instrumental causes? Is there any space for a more direct divine action in evolutionary transitions? This article offers a new model of explaining the complexity of the causal nexus in the origin of new biological species, including the human species, analyzed in reference to both the immanent and transcendent orders of causation.

2021 ◽  
pp. 197-214
Author(s):  
Sarah Chan

In the world of contemporary biotechnology, our thinking about species and moral status is being challenged in new ways. First, the creation of interspecies chimeras, in disrupting the human/non-human species boundary, forces us also to go beyond species boundaries in considering how to determine the moral status of these new beings. Second, the possibility of moral status enhancement (or at least enhancing the capacities that on some accounts give rise to moral status), both for non-human animals and for humans, may lead to members of existing biological species having new moral properties, or perhaps even the creation of new ‘moral species’. This chapter explores normative and conceptual challenges raised by the prospect of crossing both biological and moral ‘species boundaries’. It examines the implications of species transitions in relation to identity, obligations towards existing beings and beings that might be created via the species transition process; and reflects on how this might advance our thinking about moral status.


2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mary T. Silcox ◽  
Keegan R. Selig ◽  
Thomas M. Bown ◽  
Amy E. Chew ◽  
Kenneth D. Rose

The early Eocene of the southern Bighorn Basin, Wyoming, is notable for its nearly continuous record of mammalian fossils. Microsyopinae (?Primates) is one of several lineages that shows evidence of evolutionary change associated with an interval referred to as Biohorizon A. Arctodontomys wilsoni is replaced by a larger species, Arctodontomys nuptus , during the biohorizon interval in what is likely an immigration/emigration or immigration/local extinction event. The latter is then superseded by Microsyops angustidens after the end of the Biohorizon A interval. Although this pattern has been understood for some time, denser sampling has led to the identification of a specimen intermediate in morphology between A. nuptus and M. angustidens , located stratigraphically as the latter is appearing. Because specimens of A. nuptus have been recovered approximately 60 m above the appearance of M. angustidens , it is clear that A. nuptus did not suffer pseudoextinction. Instead, evidence suggests that M. angustidens branched off from a population of A. nuptus , but the latter species persisted. This represents possible evidence of cladogenesis, which has rarely been directly documented in the fossil record. The improved understanding of both evolutionary transitions with better sampling highlights the problem of interpreting gaps in the fossil record as punctuations.


Author(s):  
William J. Abraham

This book builds upon the groundwork laid in the first volume, where it was established that no generic concept of action will suffice for understanding the character of divine actions explicit in the Christian faith. This volume argues that in order to understand divine action rightly, one must begin with the array of specific actions predicated of God in the Christian tradition. The author argues, in a way, that one must do theology in order to analyze properly the concept of divine action. Thus the book offers a careful review and evaluation of the particularities of divine action as they appear in the work of biblical, patristic, medieval, and Reformation-era theologians. Particular attention is given to the divine inspiration of Scripture, creation, incarnation, transubstantiation in the Eucharist, predestination, and divine concurrence. The motive here is not simply to repeat the doctrinal formulations found in the Christian tradition, but to examine them in order to find fresh ways of thinking about these issues for our own time, especially with respect to the contemporary debates about divine agency and divine action.


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2019 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 116-130
Author(s):  
Florian Mussgnug

Environmental politics has become inextricably entwined with planetary deep time. This article calls for a reconceptualization of the relation between humans and nonhuman nature. It rejects the ontological singularity of the human, either as a biological species (Homo) or as a planetary super-agent (Anthropos) and argues for a perspective centred on companionship and shared vulnerability. Animal philosophy serves here to counter a growing tendency to generalize and address the human species at large, in the singular. The cultural force of the animal, it is suggested, stems from a productive tension between the abstract singular (‘the Animal’) and the unique specificity of each particular nonhuman other. In the context of Anthropocene Studies, references to Anthropos follow a similar logic. The planetary future of humans cannot be deduced from any specific geopolitical context or expressed through universalizing categories. It must be understood, against the vertiginous backdrop of geological time, as a process of becoming: a complex set of material and semiotic practices shaping open-ended, transformative trajectories


2010 ◽  
Vol 20 (03) ◽  
pp. 805-811 ◽  
Author(s):  
EMILIO HERNÁNDEZ-GARCÍA ◽  
MURAT TUĞRUL ◽  
E. ALEJANDRO HERRADA ◽  
VÍCTOR M. EGUÍLUZ ◽  
KONSTANTIN KLEMM

Many processes and models — in biological, physical, social, and other contexts — produce trees whose depth scales logarithmically with the number of leaves. Phylogenetic trees, describing the evolutionary relationships between biological species, are examples of trees for which such scaling is not observed. With this goal, we analyze numerically two branching models leading to nonlogarithmic scaling of the depth with the number of leaves. For Ford's alpha model, although a power-law scaling of the depth with tree size was established analytically, our numerical results illustrate that the asymptotic regime is approached only at very large tree sizes. We introduce here a new model, the activity model, showing analytically and numerically that it also displays a power-law scaling of the depth with tree size at a critical parameter value.


2003 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 325-339 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katileena Lohtander ◽  
Ilona Oksanen ◽  
Jouko Rikkinen

AbstractGenetic diversity of green algal and cyanobacterial photobionts in Nephroma was examined by using nucleotide sequences of the ribosomal gene cluster. The lichens studied included both bipartite and tripartite species. There was very little variation in green algal-ITS sequences of N. arcticum and N. expallidum. Almost identical sequences were obtained from all thalli analysed and also from two tripartite Peltigera species. On the basis of SSU rDNA data the green algal photobionts of N. arcticum are closely related to the primary photobiont of P. britannica, and also to an endophytic alga of Ginkgo biloba. The SSU rDNA region of lichen-forming cyanobacteria was rather variable. A phylogenetic analysis indicated that the Nostoc specimens formed a monophyletic group and the strains were divided into two main groups. One clade included only cyanobionts of lichens, including those of all bipartite Nephroma species. The second group was genetically more heterogeneous and included mainly cyanobionts of terricolous cyanolichens, including those of both tripartite Nephroma species studied. The distinction between bi- and tripartite Nephroma species is significant as the mycobionts of tripartite species are not monophyletic. It implies that within Nephroma, evolutionary transitions between symbiosis types cannot have been achieved simply via an acquisition or loss of the green algal photobiont. As the Nostoc symbionts of bi- and tripartite species belong to different phylogenetic groups, an evolutionary change in green algal association has required a concurrent change in cyanobiont composition.


2020 ◽  
pp. 174889582098160
Author(s):  
Orlando Goodall

Research and theorisation on crimes against non-human species in rural regions have been conducted with less conceptual refinement than crimes against anthropocentric victims. The dominant conception of ‘wildlife crime’ predominantly advanced by the rational choice school of criminology is a nebulous ‘chaotic concept’. This article disaggregates crimes against common and relatively abundant species from that capacious categorisation and offers the original concept of ‘mundane fauna crime’ as a more precise alternative. The original concept aims to supersede the wildlife crime terminology using realist social relations theory and to offer researchers a rational abstraction to advance aetiological explanations. The additional category of ‘illegal taking’ is offered to complement the central conceptualisation, thus supplanting the terms of ‘wildlife poaching’. The new model is intended to contribute to the advancement of comprehensive theorisation and practically adequate knowledge on mundane fauna crimes in rural regions.


2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 99-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ignacio Silva

Contemporary debates on divine action tend to focus on finding a space in nature where there would be no natural causes, where nature offers indeterminacy, openness, and potentiality, to place God’s action. These places are found through the natural sciences, in particular quantum mechanics. God’s action is then located in those ontological ‘causal-gaps’ offered by certain interpretations of quantum mechanics. In this view, God would determine what is left underdetermined in nature without disrupting the laws of nature. These contemporary proposals evidence at least two unexamined assumptions, which frame the discussion in such a way that they portray God as acting as a secondary cause or a ‘cause among causes’. God is somewhat required to act within these ‘gaps’, binding God to the laws of nature, and placing God’s action at the level of secondary causes. I suggest that understanding God’s action, following Thomas Aquinas, in terms of primary and secondary causation could help dissolve this difficulty. Aquinas moves away from this objection by suggesting to speak of an analogical notion of cause, allowing for an analogical understanding of God’s causality in nature. With a radically different understanding of the interplay between secondary causes and God, Aquinas manages to avoid conceiving God as a cause among causes, keeping the distinctive transcendent character of God’s causality safe from objections.


Author(s):  
Mary Jane West-Eberhard

Heterochrony is evolutionary change in the timing of expression of a phenotype trait, that transfers expression of the trait from one life stage or behavioral or physiological phase to another—”the shifting of characters from one part of an ontogeny to another” (Valentine, 1977b, p. 260) or simply “the displacement of characters in time” (Gould, 1977, p. 225). A clear fossil example occurs in monograptids, where there is a temporal shift in the onset of a modified morphology, a life-history modification that is recorded in the structure of the body (figure 13.1). Heterochrony can occur at any level of organization, including the molecular level, where evolutionary changes in the timing of gene expression have been demonstrated, for example, in echinoids and a fibronectin gene of amphibians (Collazo, 1994). Some recent authors (e.g., McKinney and McNamara, 1991; Reilly et al., 1997) define heterochrony as any change in the timing of regulatory events. Most novel traits qualify as heterochrony by this regulatory-timing definition, since virtually all evolutionary change involves change in the timing of developmental events. This regulatorytiming definition of heterochrony leads to a classification of evolutionary change termed panheterochrony by McKinney and McNamara (1991)—a classification of evolutionary transitions that lumps all evolutionary change under the heading of heterochrony. “Because all developmental events occur along a time line, any significant change is likely to result in a heterochrony at some level” (Raff, 1992, p. 211). As expressed by Barbara McClintock in a staff meeting at Cold Spring Harbor Laboratories, “If I could control the time of gene action, I could cause a fertilized snail egg to develop into an elephant. Their biochemistries are not all that different; it's simply a matter of timing”. I will adhere to a classification that divides the effects of regulatory change into their different kinds of effects on phenotypes, in keeping with the general emphasis on phenotypes in this book.


2020 ◽  
pp. 43-86
Author(s):  
Andrew R. Platt

Chapter 2 argues that Descartes’ physics is compatible with the Thomistic theory of divine concurrence. Descartes holds that God preserves bodies in existence, continually recreating them in different positions over time. Section 2.1 argues that it follows that (on Descartes’ view) God causes all the motions that occur in the world. Some of Descartes’ interpreters take Descartes’ physics to imply that mere bodies do not have any motive force or power, that is, any ability either to move themselves, or to cause motion in other bodies. Descartes’ physics thus seems to imply body–body occasionalism. Yet sections 2.2 and 2.3 show that Descartes is not committed to this conclusion. Instead, section 2.3 argues that Descartes thinks that bodies are “secondary causes” of motion that have active causal powers. Section 2.4 shows how this concurrentist reading of Descartes’ physics is consistent with his conception of body as extended substance.


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