Money Laundering and Tax Crimes in Spain: Doctrine and Jurisprudence

As regulated in Spanish law, money laundering requires a prior illicit activity that has generated the assets that are the subject of laundering. One of the subjects that has been deeply discussed in recent years by certain doctrinal sectors, even with support in various jurisprudential rulings, has been the suitability of crimes against the Public Treasury, especially tax fraud, as the prior offence underlying money laundering. Thus, it has been debated whether the tax offender carrying out one of the activities typified in the Criminal Code (acquiring, possessing, using, converting or transmitting assets) automatically commits a type of money laundering. In that case, it would become an automatic and inevitable consequence of the tax crime itself. If, on the contrary, some other component must be required (essentially through the subjective elements of the unjust) to determine the existence of a second crime, that of money laundering, the prohibition of non-bis in idem confronts us, to a greater or lesser extent. Furthermore, doctrinal approaches and some judgements of the Spanish highest courts have generated a reinterpretation of the criminal law that fits badly with the principles of criminality. Nor is it easy to delineate the assets that are the object of the tax offence that may be subject to laundering, since, by definition, they are assets that were originally in possession of the offending subject and, besides, they are pecuniary obligations. To that extent, the presumption of innocence could, in many cases, determine the exoneration of the suspect.

Walls and Strategic Innovation in Violent Conflict

Governments build walls to curtail a range of illicit activities like immigration, crime, and terrorism. We argue that while physical barriers effectively prevent specific unwanted behavior, they induce actors to respond strategically and develop new tactics, changing the nature of illicit activity and leading to new threats. We test this argument in the context of Israel’s security barrier. Using an instrumental variable unrelated to the underlying threat of attack, we analyze short-term changes in the barrier’s porousness. Terror attacks in Israel are less likely when the barrier is more secure. However, we also observe evidence of changing strategies. Attacks are most likely immediately after the government eases temporary restrictions on movement, suggesting that previously-planned attacks were delayed, not prevented. Furthermore, when the barrier is more secure, terrorists select weapons that are less affected by it and carry out attacks in systematically different locations. Ultimately, walls’ impacts on any challenge depend not just on how well they prevent movement but also on illicit actors’ strategic responses.

Lessons from Weapons Inspections in Iraq and Syria

Weapons inspections in Iraq and Syria have drawn considerable attention from the international community in recent decades. This essay summarizes the key events associated with those inspections and draws upon my personal experience as a UN weapons inspector in both countries to identify lessons learned and future challenges. Those challenges include distrust among non-Western states, the difficulty of detecting much of the illicit activity, disinformation, and deficiencies in inspector training.

Lurking in the bushes: informality, illicit activity and transitional green space in Berlin and Detroit

This paper offers an exploratory overview of different research literatures examining the relationship between urban nature or green space on the one hand, and marginalized, stigmatized, and illicit activities on the other. We situate this discussion within the geographic literature concerning assemblage theory and informality, and apply these concepts to urban green space. We offer some comparative examples from Detroit and Berlin, two cities known for their green space and illicit activity, but with very different histories and cultural contexts. For this purpose, we draw on our own primary research in both Detroit and Berlin, examining how the dynamics of these interactions produce diverse and distinctive urban places in some cases and associations of danger or insecurity in others, sometimes both simultaneously. We utilize diverse methodologies, including qualitative interviews and focus groups, mobile explorations, photography, and sketching to provide examples of spaces as complex assemblages of actors with diverse, emergent potentials. We conclude by contending that green spaces and urban nature belong on the same map as studies of informal and illicit activities, adopting a more fluid conception of the shifting relationship between people and green space in the evolving city.

Walls and Strategic Innovation in Violent Conflict

<div>Governments build walls to curtail a range of illicit activities like immigration, crime, and terrorism. What impact do walls have on the characteristics of illicit activity? We argue that while physical barriers can effectively prevent a narrow category of unwanted behavior, they induce actors to respond strategically and develop new tactics, changing the nature of illicit activity and leading to new threats. We test this argument in the context of Israel's security barrier built to reduce terror attacks. Using an instrumental variable unrelated to the underlying threat of attack, we analyze</div><div>short-term changes in the barrier's porousness. We ?find that terror attacks in Israel are indeed less likely when the barrier is more secure. However, we also observe evidence of</div><div>displacement. Attacks and fatalities are most likely immediately after the government eases temporary restrictions on movement, suggesting that previously-planned attacks were delayed, not prevented. Furthermore, when the barrier is more secure, terrorists substitute weapons that are less affected by the barrier, and carry out attacks in systematically different locations. Ultimately, walls' impacts on any challenge depend not just on how well they prevent movement but also on illicit actors' strategic responses.</div>

Walls and Strategic Innovation in Violent Conflict

<div>Governments build walls to curtail a range of illicit activities like immigration, crime, and terrorism. What impact do walls have on the characteristics of illicit activity? We argue that while physical barriers can effectively prevent a narrow category of unwanted behavior, they induce actors to respond strategically and develop new tactics, changing the nature of illicit activity and leading to new threats. We test this argument in the context of Israel's security barrier built to reduce terror attacks. Using an instrumental variable unrelated to the underlying threat of attack, we analyze</div><div>short-term changes in the barrier's porousness. We ?find that terror attacks in Israel are indeed less likely when the barrier is more secure. However, we also observe evidence of</div><div>displacement. Attacks and fatalities are most likely immediately after the government eases temporary restrictions on movement, suggesting that previously-planned attacks were delayed, not prevented. Furthermore, when the barrier is more secure, terrorists substitute weapons that are less affected by the barrier, and carry out attacks in systematically different locations. Ultimately, walls' impacts on any challenge depend not just on how well they prevent movement but also on illicit actors' strategic responses.</div>