comprehensive immigration reform
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2021 ◽  
pp. 109-134
Author(s):  
Neilan S. Chaturvedi

Chapter 5 looks at the behind-the-scenes maneuvering by senators on three bills debated and voted on in 2013: the debt-ceiling bill known commonly as “No Budget, No Pay,” the “Gang of Eight” comprehensive immigration reform bill, and an agriculture bill. It looks at interview data collected in 2013 from legislative directors for nineteen senators examining responses to how much time and effort legislators put into each bill and their overall satisfaction of the outcome. While conventional wisdom would expect to see moderates prioritize the No Budget No Pay Act and the immigration bill, spending most of their time and resources on these bills and report satisfaction with each bill’s final content and legislative process, I find that on average, moderate respondents were less likely to report satisfaction with the overall outcome of the legislative process, despite the time and effort put into the process.


2021 ◽  
pp. 135-162
Author(s):  
Neilan S. Chaturvedi

Chapter 6 looks at the behind-the-scenes influence senators exerted on three bills debated and voted on in 2013: the debt-ceiling bill known commonly as “No Budget, No Pay,” the “Gang of Eight” comprehensive immigration reform bill, and an agriculture bill. It looks at interview data collected in 2013 from legislative directors for nineteen senators examining responses that answer the question of whether back-room dealing is how moderates use their power. That is to say, do legislators consider moderate preferences in an effort to build a large enough coalition to pass legislation? Interview data suggest that while leaders do try to protect moderates, coalitions are built with the opposing side, not with centrists. Indeed, legislators rarely view moderates as the most powerful senators in the Senate, and are seldom lobbied for their vote.


2021 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 56-60
Author(s):  
Ryan I. Logan

Abstract Religious conviction has played a prominent role in many activist movements throughout the United States. In this article, I detail one social justice organization’s enactment of activism called la fe en acción (faith in action). This approach was nuanced from being simply “activism” but one that, according to participants, was more strategic and longer lasting. La fe en acción served as the central strategy utilized by this organization in order to garner public and political support for comprehensive immigration reform. A crucial component within this approach included the sharing of testimonios (testimonials) of participants. While this form of activism was intended to garner the participation of all people—including undocumented immigrants—for some, structural vulnerability hindered their ability to participate. Overall, I explore the positive and negative aspects of this approach as elaborated from data gathered during attempts to garner support for comprehensive immigration reform in 2013.


Significance The move follows the Senate's failure again yesterday to agree on spending priorities and immigration, the same policy disagreements which prevented a spending deal being passed by midnight on January 19. This has thrown the federal government into its first shutdown since 2013. Impacts Trump's support for "comprehensive immigration reform" may not hold. If US economic growth continues, this may push up illegal immigration, absent security enhancements. Challenges from the state governments over immigration reforms are possible. If Republicans are seen as anti-immigrant, gaining non-traditional constituencies' votes, including minorities, will be hard.


Author(s):  
A. A. Filippenko

By the beginning of the XXI century, the US had about 12 million illegal aliens and the immigration reform was evidently much needed. The Immigration Act of 1990 was significantly outdated and required revision. Additional regulations that passed in the 1990-s had to be systematized. The White House and the president George W. Bush inclined to the comprehensive immigration reform that would include an amnesty for the certain part of the illegal aliens. Some lawmakers were ready to strike a deal, but than happened the 9/11 tragedy. Immigration reform was shelved and turned into a matter of national security. Immigration reform bills were taken into consideration only in conjunction with boarder security bills. Edward Kennedy was very much aware of the issue's complexity and the need for reform; he did all he could to reach a compromise with his fellow Republicans. John McCain became his closest ally in the reform. Democrats made considerable concessions, while moderate Republicans were willing to meet them halfway, but the conservatives would not let the Congress adopt a new legislation, calling any attempt at comprehensive immigration reform an amnesty for the criminals. During the 107-110 Congresses the immigration reform was thoroughly worked through from both sides, but the proposed bills rarely got to the floor and never passed both Houses. Even though the time has passed, suggestions offered and deals reached during the Bush presidency did not lose the edge and any new immigration legislation is going be based on the 2002-2008 bills.


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