2021 Handbook of Florida Water Regulation: Toxic Substances Control Act and the Lautenberg Chemical Safety Act

This handbook is designed to provide a summary of the principal federal and state (Florida) laws that directly or indirectly relate to agriculture. Because these laws are subject to constant revision, portions of the handbook could become outdated at any time. The reader should use it as a means to determine areas in which to seek more information and as a brief directory of agencies that can help answer more specific questions.

A Cumulative Framework for Identifying Overburdened Populations under the Toxic Substances Control Act: Formaldehyde Case Study

Extensive scholarship has demonstrated that communities of color, low-income communities, and Indigenous communities face greater environmental and health hazards compared to communities with more White or affluent people. Low-income, Indigenous, Black, and/or other populations of color are also more likely to lack access to health care facilities, healthy food, and adequate formal education opportunities. Despite the mountains of evidence that demonstrate the existence and significance of the elevated toxic social and environmental exposures experienced by these communities, the inclusion of these factors into chemical evaluations has been scarce. In this paper, we demonstrate a process built with publicly available data and simple geospatial techniques that could be utilized by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) to incorporate cumulative approaches into risk assessments under the Toxic Substances Control Act. The use of these approaches, particularly as they relate to identifying potentially exposed and susceptible subpopulations, would help USEPA develop appropriate risk estimates and mitigation strategies to protect disproportionately burdened populations from the adverse effects of chemical exposures. By utilizing such approaches to inform risk evaluation and mitigation, USEPA can identify and protect those most burdened and impacted by toxic chemicals, and finally begin to close the gap of environmental health inequities.

To Test or Not to Test: Tools, Rules, and Corporate Data in US Chemicals Regulation

When the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) was passed by the US Congress in 1976, its advocates pointed to new generation of genotoxicity tests as a way to systematically screen chemicals for carcinogenicity. However, in the end, TSCA did not require any new testing of commercial chemicals, including these rapid laboratory screens. In addition, although the Environmental Protection Agency was to make public data about the health effects of industrial chemicals, companies routinely used the agency’s obligation to protect confidential business information to prevent such disclosures. This paper traces the contested history of TSCA and its provisions for testing, from the circulation of the first draft bill in the Nixon administration through the debates over its implementation, which stretched into the Reagan administration. The paucity of publicly available health and environmental data concerning chemicals, I argue, was a by-product of the law and its execution, leading to a situation of institutionalized ignorance, the underside of regulatory knowledge.

Deregulatory science: Chemical risk analysis in Trump’s EPA

While critics cast the Trump administration as anti-science, requiring in response vigorous defense of science, analysis of the Trump EPA reveals instead a strategy to develop deregulatory science. In its first 3 years, the Trump EPA introduced and started to implement a variety of new frameworks to remake scientific risk analysis, changing how it assesses exposures, hazards and costs of chemical harms. The article focuses on EPA frameworks associated with the Clean Air Act, Strengthening Transparency in Regulatory Science rule and Toxic Substances Control Act. The new approaches compel the agency to ignore many pathways of exposure and pivotal studies of hazards, include dose-response models that treat pollution as healthful and change how costs and benefits are calculated. Yet it justifies these frameworks in terms of evidence-based decision-making, transparency and the separation of science from politics. According to its political appointees, the Trump EPA stands for scientific integrity, because it is promulgating evidence-based approaches in risk analysis that show regulation to be neither necessary nor appropriate. This is not just rhetoric but represents an effort to engage science to delegitimize environmental regulation. There is continuity between the Trump EPA and past efforts to use science to justify regulatory rollbacks: defending science by demarcating it from non-science is just as much a strategy for deregulation as it is for regulation. A key lesson is that contesting deregulation by declaring it anti-science reflects an impasse, as deregulatory approaches then also seek to take the mantle of science. The alternative to engaging in debate over demarcation is to make explicit the values and interests shaping practices of regulatory science.

Producing Ignorance Through Regulatory Structure: The Case of Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS)

This article examines how ignorance can be produced by regulatory systems. Using the case of contamination from per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS), we identify patterns of institutionalized ignorance in U.S. chemical regulation. Drawing on in-depth interviews and archival research, we develop a chemical regulatory pathway approach to study knowledge and ignorance production through the regulatory framework, the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). Investigating TSCA’s operation, we consider why PFAS were relatively recently recognized as a significant public health threat, despite evidence of their risks in the 1960s. The historical context of TSCA’s enactment, including the mobilization of the chemical industry, contributed to the institutionalization of organizational practices promoting distinct types of ignorance based on stakeholder position: chemical manufacturers who have discretion over knowledge production and dissemination, regulators who operate under selective ignorance, and communities and consumers who experience nescience, or total surprise.