The differentiated role of organizational ambidexterity and organizational innovation in the subsidiary reverse knowledge transfer process

Purpose This paper underscores how organizational ambidexterity and organizational innovation play differentiated roles in the subsidiary reverse knowledge transfers (RKT). The authors argue that both organizational ambidexterity and organizational innovation play a positive but differentiated role in the RKT process in that the former positively influences subsidiary knowledge creation, whereas the latter positively influences subsidiary knowledge transfers. Design/methodology/approach Data were collected from 289 foreign subsidiaries operating in Brazil. Hypotheses were developed and tested by applying partial least squares structural equation modeling. Findings The results supported the hypotheses and showed that organizational ambidexterity promotes knowledge creation, and that organizational innovation facilitates knowledge transfers. Research limitations/implications The paper offers implications with regard to drivers of subsidiary investments and actions of subsidiary managers vis-à-vis the subsidiary objectives of knowledge creation and/or transfers. Originality/value Showing the different roles of organizational ambidexterity and organizational innovation, this paper reveals some underlying mechanisms of the RKT process and contributes by explaining the competitive heterogeneity of subsidiaries, with impacts on subsidiary management’s evolutionary and resource dependence perspective.

Reverse the Lens, Set Focus on the Followers: A Theoretical Framework of Resource Dependence, Upward Influence, and Leadership

Leadership theories predominantly focus on the top-down managerial influence on employees. Recent theoretical developments, however, have accentuated the call for scholarly attention on holistic models comprising both leadership and followership. In the present study, the author developed a theoretical framework of upward influence and leadership construction by drawing on resource dependence theory. Specifically, the author proposed a novel outlook illuminating upward influence in hierarchical relationships whereby employees, as the hosts of tacit resources, inculcate interdependent relationships with their managers. Considering the dependence of employees and managers on each other for tangible and intangible resources, relationships with a (a) power imbalance and (b) joint or embedded dependence emerge. The author further explained the role of leadership construction in power-imbalanced and embedded relationships and elaborated on organizational and team structural boundary conditions. By revitalizing upward influence, the proposed theoretical framework offered new insights into leadership and followership literature, with the potential to change the conversation from a foundational thesis assuming the managerial capacity to lead and bestow resources on their subordinates to a two-way resource-dependence perspective, which has been scarcely considered in contemporary management research.

Global Value Chain Governance and Power Asymmetry between Lead Firms and Suppliers: Case of Apple’s Global Value Chain and the State of Its Governance

The purpose of this paper is to elucidate modern production systems in which coordination and control among companies have become widespread globally. In particular, the authors aim to test the Global Value Chain (GVC) governance theory empirically with a focus on the state of Apple’s GVC governance. More specifically, the authors attempt to determine whether the relationships theoretically explained in Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon (2005) can be observed in Apple’s GVC and contribute toward understanding Apple’s state of coordination. This study shows the state of coordination in Apple’s GVC does not necessarily correspond to the theoretical types. Simply put, the three determinants do not reflect the state of coordination in Apple’s GVC. This paper adopts augmenting and complementary explanations from the resource-dependence perspective to elucidate Apple’s GVC governance by empirically illustrating how Apple’s GVC governance are achieved through the accompanying asymmetric power relationships between the company and its suppliers.