Intuitionism in Meta-Epistemology

This paper is a response to a paper by Alston which attempts to bring out similarities between views in meta-ethics and views in meta-epistemology. Alston contrasts naturalist (generally causal) epistemology with normative epistemology; but there is a further, more revealing contrast concerning the number of basic epistemological principles. Naturalism is a causal form of one-principle theory, but an analogy with ethical intuitionism should allow many coordinate epistemological principles of justification. So the question at issue is the number of ethical, or epistemological, principles. If there are many ethical principles, the question is how they are known. The merits of a Ross-style epistemology with many coordinate principles are stressed, though Ross maintained that moral principles are epistemically useless. Pursuing that line, the possibility of an epistemological particularism emerges. The paper ends with a discussion of the relation between resultance and supervenience

Practical Thought

This is a collection of papers published between 1977 and 2017. The papers focus on moral metaphysics, on holism in the theory of reasons and ethical particularism, on the theory of motivation, and on the development of ethical intuitionism. In moral metaphysics the distinction between resultance and supervenience is taken to have significant consequences. In moral theory the general line is that there are plenty of moral reasons but no moral principles. In the theory of motivation a case is made for the idea that the reasons for which we act are matters of fact, real or supposed. In the history of intuitionism, I try to show the benefits of taking H. A. Prichard seriously.

Has Anyone Ever Been a Non-Intuitionist?

This paper considers the merits of an important argument of Prichard’s against Sidgwick’s claim that nobody has ever been an intuitionist. Prichard tries to turn the tables on that argument, arguing that nobody has ever been a non-intuitionist. This paper tries to adjudicate. One of the hinge points is the question in the philosophy of action where the distinction between an action and its consequences is supposed to lie. If enough of the consequences are sucked up into the action by understanding the latter as the action of causing those consequences, the structure of the debate changes. The discussion generates a much better understanding of ethical intuitionism and of the distinction between intuitionism and consequentialism.

Good’s Irreducibility: The Discordancy Argument and Aristotle

In this paper, I argue that the good is irreducible. I use the term ‘irreducible’ in a way similar to but not identical to G. E. Moore’s usage of ‘indefinable’ as found in Principia Ethica. By ‘irreducible,’ I mean that something cannot be simplified into something other than itself. For my purposes, this is to say that the good is sui generis and cannot be accounted for by anything other than itself. Inspired by what I take to be Moore’s basic insight, I develop my own argument pertaining to the uniqueness of the good. My argument goes partially beyond intuition, and hence beyond Moore, by means of applied intuitions (counterexamples). In the penultimate section, I apply the Discordancy Argument to Aristotle’s ethics, arguing that it is an attestation to the general virtue thesis that what is good does not admit of a reducible deduction. Broadly speaking, I consider the Discordancy Argument and general ethical intuitionism as justification for the Aristotelian idea that good actions are found in concrete particulars and not reducible abstractions, hinting at Aristotle’s affinity for ethical intuitionism. Furthermore, a recent debate surrounding moral ontology (per William Lane Craig and dissenters) is deemed obsolete.

Ethical Deontology

Deontology is usually contrasted with consequentialism (and both with virtue ethics). Whereas consequentialists maintain that the right action is determined solely by its consequences, deontologists deny this and hold that the right action is not determined solely by its consequences. This characterization makes room for the important distinction between moderate deontology (or threshold deontology) and absolutism: Absolutists assert that there are exceptionless moral rules or intrinsically wrong actions that are absolutely wrong and may never be performed, whatever the consequences. Moderate deontologists reject exceptionless moral rules or absolutely wrong actions and regard all moral rules as prima facie rules. A further distinction is between agent-centered deontological theories, which focus upon agents’ duties, and patient-centered (or victim-centered) deontological theories, which focus upon people’s rights. Deontology is associated with the following features which play a more or less significant role in different deontological theories: agent-relativity, especially agent-relative constraints (restrictions), options (prerogatives) and special obligations; priority of the right over the good; definition of the right independently of the good; priority of honoring values over promoting values; intrinsically wrong actions; absolutely wrong actions and exceptionless moral rules; duty for duty’s sake; pluralism of moral rules; respect of persons; non-instrumentalization of persons; human dignity; inviolable rights. Deontologists also maintain the moral relevance of the following distinctions: positive versus negative duties, doing versus allowing (killing versus letting die; see the Oxford Bibliographies article in Philosophy “Doing and Allowing.”), and intention versus foresight and unintended side-effects. Famous deontological moral principles are Kant’s Categorical Imperative, the Pauline Principle (“Evil may not be done for the sake of good”), the principle of double effect (see the bibliography on Bibliographien zu Themen der Ethik) and the principle that the end does not always justify the means. Deontology can take many forms, the most important ones are Kant’s and Kantian ethics (see the Oxford Bibliographies article in Philosophy “Immanuel Kant: Ethics”); Ross’s and Rossian-style moral pluralism, natural law theory, and moral contractualism (see the Oxford Bibliographies article in Philosophy “Moral Contractualism”); libertarianism (in political philosophy); moral particularism (see the bibliography on Bibliographien zu Themen der Ethik); and principlism (in bioethics). Deontology is also often associated with ethical intuitionism (see the Oxford Bibliographies article in Philosophy “Ethical Intuitionism”) although not every deontological theory is grounded in moral intuitions.

Ethical intuitionism and the linguistic analogy

It is a central tenet of ethical intuitionism as defended by W. D. Ross and others that moral theory should reflect the convictions of mature moral agents. Hence, intuitionism is plausible to the extent that it corresponds to our well-considered moral judgments. After arguing for this claim, I discuss whether intuitionists offer an empirically adequate account of our moral obligations. I do this by applying recent empirical research by John Mikhail that is based on the idea of a universal moral grammar to a number of claims implicit in W. D. Ross’s normative theory. I argue that the results at least partly vindicate intuitionism.