Earnings Management and Corporate Governance in Family Firms

Earnings management and corporate governance relationships are examined for a sample of 49 Portuguese listed firms considering an unbalanced panel for the period 2002-2017, using panel corrected standard errors models and considering the family ownership effect. Empirical findings reveal that there is a positive relationship between corporate board independence and earnings management and that the presence of women on board decreases earnings management practices. Results are consistent with the hypothesis that earnings management practices are lower in family firms than in non-family firms. Size, being audited by the Big 4 companies, return on assets, loss, and the existence of an audit committee on board influence positively earnings management, but leverage, age, and ownership control are negatively related to earnings management. Results indicate that further auditing and control is necessary for Portuguese listed companies leading to strict recommendations to be followed by policymakers regarding control of these firms.

Mere Ownership Effect Is Equally Pronounced in Material and Immaterial Objects

The mere ownership effect is an increase in the subjective value of owned objects compared to identical but non-owned objects. We tested whether the effect differs in magnitude between material and immaterial objects (e.g., information). Three hundred participants played an incentivized detective game in which they had to connect clues to identify a murderer. Their task was to evaluate the usefulness of the clues they or their partners were endowed with. Despite the fact that the immaterial clues were rated as more useful than the material ones, we found the mere ownership effect to be similarly strong for the material and the immaterial clues.

Mere ownership effect is equally pronounced in material and immaterial objects

The mere ownership effect is an increase in the subjective value of owned objects compared to identical but non-owned objects. We tested whether the effect differs in magnitude between material and immaterial objects (e.g., information). Three hundred participants played an incentivized detective game in which they had to connect clues to identify a murderer. Their task was to evaluate the usefulness of the clues they or their partners were endowed with. Despite the fact that the immaterial clues were rated as more useful than the material ones, we found the mere ownership effect to be similarly strong for the material and the immaterial clues.

Effect of Blockholder Ownership on the Related Party Transactions to the Financial Industries

This study aimed to find out blockholder ownership effect on tunnelling or propping related party transactions. Sample researchs were 82 financial industries that listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange in 2017-2019 with 246 observations as panel data. Based on panel data regression test, this study found blockholder ownership had positive effects on tunnelling related party transactions that proxied by related party transactions related to accounts receivable and related party transactions related to assets other than account receivables. Meanwhile, blockholder ownership had no effect on propping related party transactions that proxied by related party transactions related to accounts payable and liabilities other than accounts payable. The study also found blockholder ownership effect on tunnelling related party transactions was bigger than propping. These findings were appropriate with the relevant agency theory about blockholder ownership effect on related party transactions which had the potency on the emergence of agency conflict among the shareholders.

Government Ownership Effect on Staffing Level and Financial Performance

It has always been believed that government ownership would lead to bad financial performance and overstaffing in any organization. This study aims to examine the effect of government ownership on staffing level and the financial performance of Kuwaiti bank over the period 2010-2018. Using the financial data of ten banks listed at Kuwait stock exchange (KSE), results shows that there was s statistically significant direct relation between government ownership and overstaffing and statistically significant inverse relation between government ownership and the financial performance of banks measured by return on assets (ROA). On the other hand results show that there was no relation between overstaffing and the financial performance of Kuwaiti banks.