mixing functions
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2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 27
Author(s):  
Hanifah Nabighah Kultsum ◽  
Oom Rohmah Syamsudin

<p><strong>Abstract: </strong>This study aims to determine: (1) The type of code-switching and code-mixing used, (2) The function of code-switching and code-mixing used by teachers and students, (3) The reason teachers and students use code-switching and code-mixing. This research was conducted using a qualitative descriptive method. Data collection in this study was carried out by observation, questionnaire, and interview and then analyzed and describing the results. The results show: (1) The types of code-switching and code-mixing often used are the type of intrasentential code-switching is 50.7%. Furthermore, the type of code-mixing alternation is 46.2%. (2) The code-switching and code-mixing functions used by teachers and students are as easy communication as is 42.5%. (3) Teachers and students use code-switching and code-mixing to facilitate communication in class and understand the material presented by the teacher.</p><p><strong>Keywords: </strong>Code Switching, Code Mixing, EFL Class.<strong></strong></p>


Author(s):  
Donghoon Chang ◽  
Nilanjan Datta ◽  
Avijit Dutta ◽  
Bart Mennink ◽  
Mridul Nandi ◽  
...  

Authenticated encryption schemes are usually expected to offer confidentiality and authenticity. In case of release of unverified plaintext (RUP), an adversary gets separated access to the decryption and verification functionality, and has more power in breaking the scheme. Andreeva et al. (ASIACRYPT 2014) formalized RUP security using plaintext awareness, informally meaning that the decryption functionality gives no extra power in breaking confidentiality, and INT-RUP security, covering authenticity in case of RUP. We describe a single, unified model, called AERUP security, that ties together these notions: we prove that an authenticated encryption scheme is AERUP secure if and only if it is conventionally secure, plaintext aware, and INT-RUP secure. We next present ANYDAE, a generalization of SUNDAE of Banik et al. (ToSC 2018/3). ANYDAE is a lightweight deterministic scheme that is based on a block cipher with block size n and arbitrary mixing functions that all operate on an n-bit state. It is particularly efficient for short messages, it does not rely on a nonce, and it provides maximal robustness to a lack of secure state. Whereas SUNDAE is not secure under release of unverified plaintext (a fairly simple attack can be mounted in constant time), ANYDAE is. We make handy use of the AERUP security model to prove that ANYDAE achieves both conventional security as RUP security, provided that certain modest conditions on the mixing functions are met. We describe two simple instances, called MONDAE and TUESDAE, that conform to these conditions and that are competitive with SUNDAE, in terms of efficiency and optimality.


Author(s):  
Nilanjan Datta ◽  
Atul Luykx ◽  
Bart Mennink ◽  
Mridul Nandi

The authenticated encryption scheme COLM is a third-round candidate in the CAESAR competition. Much like its antecedents COPA, ELmE, and ELmD, COLM consists of two parallelizable encryption layers connected by a linear mixing function. While COPA uses plain XOR mixing, ELmE, ELmD, and COLM use a more involved invertible mixing function. In this work, we investigate the integrity of the COLM structure when unverified plaintext is released, and demonstrate that its security highly depends on the choice of mixing function. Our results are threefold. First, we discuss the practical nonce-respecting forgery by Andreeva et al. (ASIACRYPT 2014) against COPA’s XOR mixing. Then we present a noncemisusing forgery against arbitrary mixing functions with practical time complexity. Finally, by using significantly larger queries, we can extend the previous forgery to be nonce-respecting.


2017 ◽  
Vol 74 (5) ◽  
pp. 1495-1511 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephan R. de Roode ◽  
Harm J. J. Jonker ◽  
Bas J. H. van de Wiel ◽  
Victor Vertregt ◽  
Vincent Perrin

Abstract Large-eddy simulation (LES) models are widely used to study atmospheric turbulence. The effects of small-scale motions that cannot be resolved need to be modeled by a subfilter-scale (SFS) model. The SFS contribution to the turbulent fluxes is typically significant in the surface layer. This study presents analytical solutions of the classical Smagorinsky SFS turbulent kinetic energy (TKE) model including a buoyancy flux contribution. Both a constant length scale and a stability-dependent one as proposed by Deardorff are considered. Analytical expressions for the mixing functions are derived and Monin–Obukhov similarity relations that are implicitly imposed by the SFS TKE model are diagnosed. For neutral and weakly stable conditions, observations indicate that the turbulent Prandtl number (PrT) is close to unity. However, based on observations in the convective boundary layer, a lower value for PrT is often applied in LES models. As a lower Prandtl number promotes a stronger mixing of heat, this may cause excessive mixing, which is quantified from a direct comparison of the mixing function as imposed by the SFS TKE model with empirical fits from field observations. For a strong stability, the diagnosed mixing functions for both momentum and heat are larger than observed. The problem of excessive mixing will be enhanced for anisotropic grids. The findings are also relevant for high-resolution numerical weather prediction models that use a Smagorinsky-type TKE closure.


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