Ontology

The chapter moves through a brief history of ontology and trends in contemporary analytic ontology before investigating common positions in musical ontology such as Platonism (Kivy, Dodd), compliance theory (Goodman, Elgin), continuant theory (Rohrbaugh, Magnus), and performance theory (Davies, Currie). After evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of each of these, it argues for a version of continuant theory as an account of musical ontology that makes sense of musical practices and intuitions while honouring naturalistic philosophical commitments. Moreover, I suggest that the inherently “shaky” nature of undecidable claims within ontology (musical or otherwise) means that ontological approaches should not take fact-stating as their sole objective. Rather, ontological statements may function both descriptively and prescriptively: as such, ontology possesses a key regulative purpose within our theoretical discourse.

The Paradox of an Absolute Ineffable God of Islam

The laws of logic and two of the broader theories of truth are fundamental components that are responsible for ensuring such an ontology and meaningfulness. In this respect they have persisted as conventional attitudes or modes of thought which most, if not all, of analytic philosophy uses to philosophize. However, despite the conceptual productivity of these components they are unable to account for matters that are beyond them. These matters would include certain theological beliefs, for instance, that transcend the purview of analytic ontology and the meaningfulness it ensues. Any attempt in making rational sense of such beliefs that are insusceptible to these methodological components would conventionally prohibit (restrict) us from rationally believing in them. This is because we would be unable to make sense of such beliefs with the aid of these methodological components. As a result of this, religious beliefs of this particular nature would be deemed irrational. I shall demonstrate this point by applying both of these components to an ab­solutely ineffable God of Islam. This would entail, attempting to make sense of an absolutely ineffable God of Islam in virtue of the laws of logic and two broad categories of truth theories, namely, substantive and insubstantive theories. I hope to establish that applying both of these methodological components in attempting to make sense of an absolutely ineffable God of Islam would not be conceptually viable. It would result in a contradictory notion which I shall allude to as the paradox of ineffability.

Shifting analytic ontology: using I-poems in qualitative longitudinal research

In this article we highlight the way that different qualitative analytic methods implicitly place the interpretive analyst in different sorts of relationship to their interview subject and their data. The process of data analysis constructs an analytic mode of being in relation to the interviewee and their social reality. In particular, we illustrate this point through a detailed consideration of the analytic process involved in producing I-poems from qualitative longitudinal interview data (derived from Gilligan and colleagues’ ‘Listening Guide’), to explore change and continuity in a case study young person’s sense of self over time. We contrast how we understood those changes and continuities through the different analytic angles provided by the gaze of thematic analysis and the voices identified through I-poems.

A New Realistic Spirit

I shall distinguish between two periods of analytic ontology, one semi-idealistic, the other post-idealistic. The former fostered the very idea of a conceptual scheme within which questions of ontology could be formulated and answered in the first place; the latter rejected this idea in favour of the view that ontological inquiry neither presupposes a framework, nor provides the framework for science or everyday speech. Since then, ontology is what it always have been, the systematic study of the most fundamental categories of being, not of thought. Unfortunately, such a category theory becomes aporetic in its search for a solution of the problem of the “temporary intrinsic” (D. Lewis). Experience cannot tell us, whether entities persist by “perduring” or by “enduring.” One can take an alternative route and seek to broaden the conceptual basis of ontology by focussing on “Being” (Sein) in contrast to entities, or being (Seiendes). The controversy on perdurantism and endurantism emerges as a dispute over two conflicting ways of being in time, not of Being itself.

Does Ontology Exist?

Early analytic philosophers like Carnap, Wittgenstein and Ryle regarded ontology as a branch of metaphysics that is either trivial or meaningless. But at present it is generally assumed that philosophy can make substantial discoveries about what kinds of things exist and about the essence of these kinds. My paper challenges this ontological turn. The currently predominant conceptions of the subject, at any rate, do not license the idea that ontology can provide distinctively philosophical insights into the constituents of reality. I distinguish four main sources of analytic ontology—Strawson's descriptive metaphysics, Kripke's realist semantics, the Austro-Australian truth-maker principle, Quine's naturalistic conception of ontology—and indicate briefly why the first three do not rehabilitate ontology. In the remainder, I concentrate on the most influential and promising position. Quinean ontology seeks to bring out and reduce the ontological commitments of our best scientific theories through logical paraphrase. Against this programme, I argue that Quine's conception of ontological commitment is inadequate, and that his logical paraphrase cannot contribute to the exploration of reality, but at most to the clarification of our conceptual framework.