free exercise of religion
Recently Published Documents


TOTAL DOCUMENTS

68
(FIVE YEARS 14)

H-INDEX

6
(FIVE YEARS 0)

Religions ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (12) ◽  
pp. 682
Author(s):  
Emily R. Gill

Religious values neither wholly threaten nor wholly reinforce the stability of liberal democracy. This depends upon how they may be interpreted and applied. The recent influence of Christian nationalists, who would promote a specific interpretation of Christianity as the only legitimate basis for public policy, and of those who would elevate religious liberty above all other rights, does not promote pluralism. Although people should be able to live out their religious commitments, it is the state, not individuals or private organizations, that must draw the line between the free exercise of religion and the civil rights of those who may be adversely affected by the religious exercise of others. First, religious rights may threaten other rights, particularly when reinforced with public funds. Second, religion makes valuable contributions to pluralism when it protects the conscientious beliefs and practices of individuals and of minority religious groups. Finally, concerning LGBT civil rights, individual religious believers should be accommodated as much as possible, but their organizations should be required to arrange for others without objections to provide services that are sought. Religion’s greatest contribution occurs when it is allied with movements that enhance individual rights, including but not limited to the free exercise of religion.


2019 ◽  
Vol 73 (4) ◽  
pp. 866-877
Author(s):  
David Golemboski

Embedded in U.S. legal frameworks governing the free exercise of religion is a criterion that has received surprisingly little theoretical attention: sincerity. Only those professions of belief that are sincere warrant legal accommodation. Nearly all of the existing literature on sincerity focuses on judicial “tests,” or evidentiary frameworks, for judging sincerity. This paper, in contrast, interrogates the notion of sincerity itself, developing a conception of what properly constitutes a sincere profession of belief. That conception includes three elements: genuineness, nonopportunism, and intelligibility. I then consider a fourth potential component of sincerity, vigilance, which concerns a believer’s consistency in living in accordance with their belief. A number of authors have recently proposed judicial tests requiring some sufficient degree of vigilance, but I argue that a vigilance criterion is incompatible with the fundamental values and objectives that underwrite the commitment to religious liberty in liberal political orders.


2019 ◽  
pp. 315-343
Author(s):  
Gabriella D'Agostini

In the last few years, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has begun to target religious institutions—specifically churches—as a means to find and arrest undocumented immigrants. This technique is in legal tension with the First Amendment rights of free exercise of religion and free association. It is unclear, however, how these legal rights protect those most affected by this targeting tactic: undocumented immigrants. Undocumented immigrants may lack standing to challenge ICE’s tactics on their own and may require the help of related parties to protect their interests. This Note explores a potential solution to the ambiguity surrounding undocumented immigrants’ protection under the First Amendment. Specifically, this Note argues that while undocumented immigrants may be barred from filing suits challenging the constitutionality of ICE raids on religious institutions, U.S. citizens who worship alongside these immigrants can and should bring such suits and demand injunctions to end the practice. These citizens not only have the undisputed legal rights to bring such potential claims but also may use those rights to provide a legal and practical shield for undocumented immigrants who seek to attend church without government intrusion.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document