The Cyclical Behavior of Unemployment and Wages under Information Frictions

I propose a new mechanism for sluggish wages based on workers’ noisy information about the state of the economy. Wages do not respond immediately to a positive aggregate shock because workers do not (yet) have enough information to demand higher wages. The model is robust to two major criticisms of existing theories of sluggish wages and volatile unemployment, namely, that wages are flexible for new hires and the flow opportunity cost of employment (FOCE) is pro-cyclicality. The model generates volatility in the labor market as well as wage and FOCE elasticities with respect to productivity, consistent with the data. (JEL E24, E32, J24, J31, J63)

Information Frictions, Internet, and the Relationship between Distance and Trade

We examine how the adoption of information communication technology affects bilateral trade. The context is a public program in Norway that rolled out broadband access points leading to plausibly exogenous variation in the availability and adoption of broadband by firms. We find that broadband makes trade patterns more sensitive to distance and economic size. These results are consistent with a model of trade with variable elasticity of demand. The model predicts that adoption of a technology that lowers information frictions enlarges the choice set of exporters and importers. This makes demand more elastic with respect to trade costs and thus distance. (JEL D83, F14, L86, O33)

Queueing Systems with Rationally Inattentive Customers

Problem definition: Classical models of queueing systems with rational and strategic customers assume queues to be either fully visible or invisible, while service parameters are known with certainty. In practice, however, people only have “partial information” on the service environment, in the sense that they are not able to fully discern prevalent uncertainties. This is because assessing possible delays and rewards is costly, as it requires time, attention, and cognitive capacity, which are all limited. On the other hand, people are also adaptive and endogenously respond to information frictions. Methodology: We develop an equilibrium model for a single-server queueing system with customers having limited attention. Following the theory of rational inattention, we assume that customers optimize their learning strategies by deciding the type and amount of information to acquire and act accordingly while internalizing the associated costs. Results: We establish the existence and uniqueness of a customer equilibrium when customers allocate their attention to learn uncertain queue lengths and delineate the impact of service characteristics. We provide a complete spectrum of the impact of information costs on throughput and show numerically that throughput might be nonmonotone. This is also reflected in social welfare if the firm’s profit margin is high enough, although customer welfare always suffers from information costs. Managerial implications: We identify service settings where service firms and social planners should be most cautious for customers’ limited attention and translate our results to advisable strategies for information provision and service design. For example, we recommend firms to avoid partial hindrance of queue-length information when a low-demand service is not highly valued by customers. For a popular service that customers value reasonably highly, however, partial hindrance of information is particularly advisable. Academic/practical relevance: We propose a microfounded framework for strategic customer behavior in queues that links beliefs, rewards, and information costs. It offers a holistic perspective on the impact of information prevalence (and information frictions) on operational performance and can be extended to analyze richer customer behavior and complex queue structures, rendering it a valuable tool for service design.

Labor Supply Responses to Learning the Tax and Benefit Schedule

Despite the implications for policy, empirical evidence on the relative importance of factors that shape labor supply responses is missing. This paper helps fill this gap and quantifies the role of information frictions versus other frictions by combining notches in the Norwegian welfare system and quasi-experimental variation in access to information about the slope and location of kinks. While we estimate a frictionless elasticity of 0.3, overall frictions attenuate this elasticity by about 70 percent. We find the information letter increased the earnings elasticity from 0.06 to 0.15, implying that information frictions account for at least 30 percent of total attenuation. (JEL D83, H24, I38, J22, J28, J31)

The Impact of ISO 14001 environmental standards on exports

Analyses that examine the role of international standards on export performance has been concentrated on quality certifications. Very little is known about the impact of environmental certifications on exports. In this paper we employ firm-level data from Ecuador to assess the impact of the ISO 14001 environmental certification on export outcomes. The results show that holding an ISO 14001 increases the likelihood of becoming an exporter by 0.31 percentage points (equivalent to 4%), and that this positive effect is concentrated among large firms. We did not find evidence that the environmental certification has a causal impact on the level or the growth rate of exports. Consequently, the results suggest that the ISO 14001 certification is most useful in reducing information frictions, allowing firms to initiate export transactions.

Financial Statement Complexity and Bank Lending

Recent evidence suggests that investors struggle to process complex financial disclosures. Relative to equity and public debt investors, banks have unique advantages in acquiring information and can impose contractual terms to mitigate information frictions. We investigate whether financial statement complexity is associated with firms' reliance on bank financing and the terms of bank loans. We focus on two aspects of complexity, the length of financial reports and the complexity of financial reporting rules. We document that both aspects of complexity are positively associated with firms' reliance on bank financing (i.e., level of debt and new financing). This result is consistent with banks' superior information processing capabilities. Next, we document that banks ameliorate information frictions using loan contractual terms that depend on the source of complexity. Overall, banks are an attractive source of financing for firms with complex disclosures, but banks also increase screening and monitoring for relatively complex borrowers.