TREATY INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND THE CHARLOTTETOWN ACCORD: THE MESSAGE IN THE BREEZE

TREATY INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND THE CHARLOTTETOWN ACCORD: THE MESSAGE IN THE BREEZE

BEYOND THE FLIGHT FROM CONSTITUTIONAL LEGALISM: RETHINKING THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL POLICY POST-CHARLOTTETOWN

A decade after the demise of the Charlottetown Accord in 1992,1 one of the most visible features of federal-provincial relations is the replacement of constitutional with non-constitutional policy instruments to secure many of the same ends — what I term the “flight from constitutional legalism.” Instead of constitutional amendments, the instrument of choice is the non-legal, intergovernmental accord. The leading examples are the Social Union Framework Agreement2 and the Agreement on Internal Trade,3 which in differing levels of detail set out both a normative framework and an institutional architecture to manage the Social Union and the Economic Union, respectively.

THE HARD CASE OF DEFINING “THE MÉTIS PEOPLE” AND THEIR RIGHTS: A COMMENT ON R. V. POWLEY

Section 35(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982 refers to “the Métis people” as one of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada whose existing Aboriginal and treaty rights are guaranteed by section 35(1).1 The subsequent First Ministers Conference on Aboriginal Constitutional Reform in the 1980s and the Charlottetown Accord in 1992 proved inadequate to the task of addressing the substantive content of these constitutional provisions. The unenviable task of defining a people and their rights has now fallen to the courts. The challenge facing them is the hard case of Canadian Aboriginal law.

Compromise and Public Debate in Processes of Constitutional Reform: the Canadian Case

In this article, I concentrate on one central issue that has arisen since the 1987 Meech Lake Accord and the 1992 Charlottetown Accord failed to secure sufficient popular support to allow their ratification. Many theorists have argued that there exists an unavoidable disjunction between the kind of compromise agreement that can come out of complex intergovernmental negotiations and the type of outcome that a majority of citizens might be made to support. Any agreement produced by formal talks can be presumed to have involved significant logrolling and be made of various, mutually dependent, sets of compromises. Such a composite agreement, it is argued, has but little chance to stand the test of public debate and attract sufficient popular support to ensure ratification. In the present article, I want to revisit the story of the failed Charlottetown Accord to show the ways that the risks of disjunction can be alleviated. More specifically, I attempt to show that referendums, if properly integrated in the process, can have positive effects both on the negotiations themselves and on the ability of the parties concerned to rise to the challenge of public justification.

Constitutional Paralysis: Why Canadian Constitutional Initiatives Are Doomed to Fail

The primary lesson to be learned from the failed Charlottetown Accord is that substantive constitutional reform in Canada is not possible, and will not be for some time. This claim is structurally grounded—a reflection of inherent limitations to successful constitutional negotiations. Specifically, it contends that the requirement of mass input/legitimization of constitutional bargaining in deeply divided societies is incompatible with successful constitution making. There are two reasons for this conclusion. First, mass legitimization serves to undermine effective elite accommodation. The degree of compromise necessary to forge a constitutional agreement at the elite level among different societal groups alienates too many mass supporters of each group. As a result, elites cannot deliver the support of their constitutional constituents. Second, constitution making, by virtue of providing certain groups with almost perpetual special privileges, provides an incentive for groups to seek constitutional status. Mass input into the constitutional process lowers the costs associated with seeking constitutional status, thereby facilitating the creation of new constitutional orientations. In this article, a theoretical argument about the incompatibility of consociational constitutionalism and mass input/legitimization is developed. This argument applies to the Canadian context, detailing the prevailing “mega-constitutional” orientations (MCOs) in Canada, emphasizing their inherent irreconcilability. Based on evidence from the Charlottetown referendum campaign, empirical support is provided for the argument developed. Finally, the conclusion summarizes the findings and forecasts failure for constitutional initiatives, in Canada and elsewhere, where consociational constitutionalism occurs in tandem with the requirement of mass input/legitimization.Résumé. La première leçon à tirer de l'échec de l'Accord de Charlottetown, c'est qu'une réforme constitutionnelle en profondeur n'est pas possible, et ce pour un avenir prévisible. Cette prémisse s'appuie sur des éléments structured, reflétant des limites inhérentes aux négotiations constitutionnelles. Plus précisément, cela présume que l'exigence de légitimation par les masses du marchandage constitutionnel dans des sociétés profondément divisées représente un obstacle majeur pour le succès des négotiations. On invoquera deux motifs pour justifier cette conclusion. D'abord, la légitimation populaire contribue à empêcher les accommodements entre les élites. L'ampleur des compromis nécessaires à l'émergence d'un accord au niveau des élites entre différents groupes sociaux aliène trop de citoyens dans chacun des groupes. Conséquemment, les élites ne peuvent garantir l'appui de leurs mandants. En deuxième lieu, le bricolage constitutionnel, qui procure à certains groupes des privilèges sociaux perpétuels, encourage les groupes à rechercher un statut constitutionnel. La participation des masses au processus diminue les coûts associés à la quête de statut constitutionnel, facilitant ainsi la création de nouvelles orientations constitutionnelles. Cet article propose une argumentation théorique à propos de l'incompatibilité entre le constitutionnalisme consociationnel et la légitimation par la participation populaire. La thèse est appliquée au cas canadien, approfondissant les orientations macro-constitutionnelles dominantes ou pas, et en en faisant ressortir l'irréconciliabilité. En s'appuyant sur l'expérience référendaire d'octobre 1992, l'article étoffe ensuite concrètement l'argumentation. Par-delà le résumé des principaux résultats, la conclusion prédit l'àchec des initiatives constitutionnelles, au Canada et ailleurs, partout où le constitutionnalisme consociationnel sera accompagné par l'exigence d'une légitimation par la participation populaire.