The Causes and Consequences of the Neo-Brandeisian Antitrust Movement in the United States

The recent appointments of Timothy Wu as Special Assistant to the U.S. President for Technology and Competition Policy and Lina Khan, a member of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, two prominent advocates for a fundamental shift in U.S. antitrust policy, and the introduction of federal and state legislation to change how antitrust is applied signal a realistic possibility of a fundamental change of direction in the course of U.S. antitrust. The shift advocated by these self-described “Brandeisians” goes beyond the reform proposals advocated by the Post-Chicago School movement. Whereas the Post-Chicago School movement, which was based primarily on industrial organization theory, advocated for change while recognizing the primacy of economic theory in the application of antitrust law, the Neo-Brandeisians argue that economic considerations should only be part of the substantive antitrust analysis and not necessarily the determinative factor. For many Europeans, and in particular Germans familiar with legal history, the ideas advanced by the Neo-Brandeisians will be familiar. Louis Brandeis, whose writings and opinions serve as the intellectual compass of the Neo-Brandeisians, was himself influenced by the Freirechtsbewegung and their skepticism of a wertfreie jurisprudence. Borrowing from post-modernist philosophy, the Neo-Brandeisians recognize that the dominant legal doctrines reflect the prevailing power structures in society. In their view, the fact that U.S. antitrust law relies heavily on economic theory does not allow it to claim value neutrality. The more radical members of this movement consequently argue that other values beyond economics should be considered in the application of U.S. antitrust law by the courts and antitrust agencies. In this article we attempt to introduce this movement to a European audience and assess its possible impact on the direction of U.S. antitrust.

Computational Antitrust: An Introduction and Research Agenda

Computational antitrust is a new domain of legal informatics which seeks to develop computational methods for the automation of antitrust procedures and the improvement of antitrust analysis. The present article first introduces it, then explores how agencies, policymakers, and market participants can benefit from it. Against this background, it sets out a research agenda for the years ahead in view of providing answers to the challenges created by computational antitrust, and better understand its limits.