potential competition
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Author(s):  
Michael A. Salinger

AbstractThe new U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Vertical Merger Guidelines focus on how vertical mergers are likely to affect static pricing incentives. While vertical mergers can create incentives to increase prices, they can also provide incentives to decrease prices. Which of the possible outcomes is likely to occur depends on details that are generally difficult to measure. Potential competition between dominant firms, the theory of potential harm to competition that the 1984 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines stressed, remains a more compelling rationale for blocking vertical mergers than the likely effect on static pricing incentives.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wenchao Deng ◽  
Shanlin Wang ◽  
Xianhui Wan ◽  
Zhenzhen Zheng ◽  
Nianzhi Jiao ◽  
...  

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Enrique Jimenez Schwarzkopf ◽  
Omar E Cornejo

PRDM9 drives recombination hotspots in some mammals, including mice and apes. Non-functional orthologs of PRDM9 are present in a wide variety of vertebrates, but why it is functionally maintained in some lineages is not clear. One possible explanation is that PRDM9 plays a role in ensuring that meiosis is successful. During meiosis, available DNA may be a limiting resource given the tight packaging of chromosomes and could lead to competition between two key processes: meiotic transcription and recombination. Here we explore this potential competition and the role that PRDM9 might play in their interaction. Leveraging existing mouse genomic data, we use resampling schemes that simulate shuffled features along the genome and models that account for the rarity of features in the genome, to test if PRDM9 influences interactions between recombination hotspots and meiotic transcription in a whole genome framework. We also explored possible DNA sequence motifs associated to clusters of hotspots not tied to transcription or PRDM9. We find evidence of competition between meiotic transcription and recombination, with PRDM9 appearing to relocate recombination to avoid said conflict. We also find that retrotransposons may be playing a role in directing hotspots in the absence of other factors.


2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 196-200
Author(s):  
Uğur Akgün ◽  
◽  
Oliver Latham ◽  

On 4 August 2020, after a Phase 2 investigation, the Competition and Markets Authority cleared Amazon's proposed minority investment in Deliveroo. The CMA's original concern had been that the investment could damage competition by discouraging Amazon from re-entering restaurant food delivery in the UK and altering its competitive incentives in respect of online delivery of ‘convenience’ groceries. However, the CMA concluded that whilst it was likely that, absent the transaction, Amazon would have re-entered, it was not sufficiently likely that the transaction would have had a material impact on Amazon's incentives to re-enter or its approach following re-entry. Therefore, the transaction would not have resulted in a substantial reduction in potential competition. This article provides some background on the case and analyses the competitive effect of minority shareholdings between potential (as opposed to existing) competitors and discusses some broader factors in the assessment of potential competition concerns.


2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 26-36
Author(s):  
Pedro Caro de Sousa ◽  
Chris Pike

2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 112-127
Author(s):  
Joe Williams ◽  
Stephen Wisking

Loss of potential, rather than actual, competition as a theory of harm in merger control has been a hot topic in competition policy debate. The UK's Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) does not face the same jurisdictional constraints that have prevented some of its peer agencies from investigating transactions which give rise to loss of potential competition concerns, and it has adopted a number of recent merger decisions in this area, in many cases after the conclusion of a detailed Phase 2 review. This article outlines the applicable legal framework and explores the CMA's recent decisional practice by reference to three categories of transaction potentially giving rise to a loss of potential competition where the concern is that absent the transaction: (1) one party would have been a market entrant; (2) one or both parties would have become a greater competitive constraint on the other; and/or (3) there was an alternative purchaser which would have made the target more competitive. It then summarizes the CMA's approach to assessing such transactions, including its intention, ability and incentive framework. It concludes by setting out the case for revision to the CMA's Merger Assessment Guidelines to reflect explicitly its approach to these types of transactions.


Author(s):  
Rex Ahdar

Merger control has been marked by two major changes to both procedural and substantive law; the mandatory pre-merger notification regime was becoming increasingly burdensome for both businesses and the Commission. In 1990, the pre-merger notification system was abruptly abolished in favour of a voluntary notification system. The so-called “strike down” system already existed in Australia, but the change was probably due less to harmonization and more to some effective lobbying by big business. Regarding the substantive test, the “dominance” standard proved to be highly permissive. Few mergers were halted and the presence of very large market shares post-merger could still be overcome by an unduly generous view of the likelihood of new entry disciplining the merged firm. An idealized version of potential competition (contestability theory) held sway. In 2001, the test in s 47 was changed to the SLC threshold in an effort to toughen up the law. Horizontal mergers, increasing the likelihood of collusion (due to increased market concentration), could now be caught. Yet it is doubtful that the sterner test actually resulted in more mergers being prohibited. This chapter briefly explores the experience of vertical and conglomerate mergers as well as a new section (s 47A) that addresses overseas mergers that have effects upon New Zealand markets.


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