Coda

This brief concluding chapter argues that Buddhist ethics constitutes a distinctive voice in ethical theory. While Buddhist ethical thought is distinct in both form and content from any of the major Western metaethical systems, it is supplementary to, rather than inconsistent with them. Buddhist ethics encourages us to look at the subjective, phenomenological side of ethics, and to foreground ethical perception and experience in our account of moral cultivation, as opposed to actions, rules, and consequences. By examining Buddhist ethical theory in conjunction with Western ethical theory, we can discover new questions that make our ethical debate richer than before.

Process drama in Chinese education: Possibilities and challenges in governmental policy papers and the curriculum of moral education

The article explores the potential of applying process drama in moral education in Chinese schools. By conducting a thematic review of the current national curriculum and policy documents from both historical and contemporary perspectives, the interconnection between the role of art and moral cultivation in China is discussed. Through an analysis of the national curriculum, the article suggests that applying process drama in school education can contribute to learning in the curriculum areas of both aesthetic and moral education. However, the existing commingling of concepts and definitions influences the actual drama practices in China. Consequently, a discussion of terminology is brought in, as well as an argument for the need to include drama as a discrete subject in schools, in addition to its function as a method for educational purposes. A process drama sample from the author’s drama praxis is included. The overall aim of the article is to contribute to an extended understanding of educational drama and theatre in a Chinese context and to gain new insights into possibilities and challenges for the future implementation of drama in education in China.

Political implications of compassion in Mencius

This paper examines Mencius’ view on compassion in the political realm by proposing that Mencius defends compassionate governance by reconciling the two extremes of Yangist self-love and Mohist universal love. This paper proposes a reading of two famous stories, namely, the story of a young child on the verge of falling into a well, and the story of King Xuan of Qi sparing an ox as paradigmatic cases for understanding Mencius’ account of compassion in the political realm. This paper argues that Mencius succeeds in his defense of governance with compassion against the other two extremes of self-love and altruism. To provide an argument for compatibility with egoism or self-love, this paper offers an analysis of Mencius’ idea of the ruler sharing pleasure with his people instead of denying pleasure for himself. In this sense, a good ruler does not need to sacrifice his self-interest. To counter the demand of universal love of the Mohists, Mencius develops a position that the Confucian ideal ruler, while not sacrificing his self-interests, those interests need to be guided and directed by a proper process of moral cultivation of his compassionate heart so that he can readily share his pleasures with all the peoples in his kingdom. These readings indicate Mencius’ expanded argument for political implications of compassion in the moral universe of the Confucian school.

The Body of the Buddha

Buddhist discussions of the body, particularly in South Asia, encode a number of ambiguities and conceptual tensions. A pervasive trope in this literature characterizes bodies as foul, oozing fluids, prone to offensive smells, decaying and causing pain, and as containing a range of disgusting substances within a bag of skin, including urine, feces, mucus, and bile. People are warned of the dangers of emotional investment in their bodies because this leads to inevitable suffering and loss. On the other hand, beautiful bodies are proof of past or present moral cultivation and of success in religious practice. The most exalted bodies—surpassing those of all other beings, even gods—are those of buddhas, and their perfect physiques proclaim their supreme attainments.

Self-Cultivation as the Basis of Person Making: A Confucian Perspective Illustrated by a Case Study of Zeng Guofan

As a model of self-cultivation in accordance with the Confucian theory of Xinxing-Gongfu (心性-功夫论), Zeng Guofan (1811–1872), a well-renowned Confucian scholar and successful minister of the Qing Dynasty (1636–1912) in China, is a prime exemplar of ‘self-cultivation as the basis of person-making’ (修身为本). Considerable historical data proves he consciously strove to perfect himself in a systemic way. By examining his Diaries, Family Letters, and Reading Records, this study identifies that he had three interrelated practices of self-cultivation: (a) The establishment of the moral self. With the proposition that ‘if you are not a sage, you are a beast’, Zeng advocated improving one’s character through self-reflection, self-blame, self-discipline and self-encouragement. (b) Individual moral practice and the learning of moral knowledge. Zeng believed that one could strengthen one’s moral cultivation by keeping a diary, meditating, reading Confucian classics, extracting and reciting famous quotes from former sages, writing essays and practicing calligraphy. (c) The construction of family and cultural community. Zeng’s experience provides illustration that cultural communities can be constructed through the process of a father delivering life experiences to his children, friends and colleagues, and that self-criticism can be used in the service of self-enhancement in Confucian psychology.

Defensive over Climate Change? Climate Shame as a Method of Moral Cultivation

The climate crisis is an enormous challenge for contemporary societies. Yet, public discussions on it often lead to anger, mocking, denial and other defensive behaviours, one prominent example of which is the reception met by the climate advocate Greta Thunberg. The paper approaches this curious phenomenon via shame. It argues that the very idea of anthropogenic climate change invites feelings of human failure and thereby may also entice shame. The notion of “climate shame” is introduced and distinguished from “climate guilt”. Whereas climate guilt prioritises the flourishing of the environment and is focused on actions and morality, climate shame is concerned with human identity and selfhood. The paper then explores whether shame is a morally destructive or constructive emotion. Making use of both psychological and philosophical literature on shame, it argues that although shame faces many challenges that question its usefulness in moral pedagogy, these challenges can be met with “moral maturity”—moreover, following a utilitarian approach, the overall benefits of climate shame can justify its costs to individuals. My argument is that climate shame holds the potential of being a highly effective moral psychological method of persuasion, capable of inviting wholesale critical reflection on current, environmentally damaging practices and cultivation of more virtuous ways of co-existing with the rest of the natural world and other species.