Predicting the Future with a Scale-Invariant Temporal Memory for the Past

In recent years, it has become clear that the brain maintains a temporal memory of recent events stretching far into the past. This letter presents a neutrally inspired algorithm to use a scale-invariant temporal representation of the past to predict a scale-invariant future. The result is a scale-invariant estimate of future events as a function of the time at which they are expected to occur. The algorithm is time-local, with credit assigned to the present event by observing how it affects the prediction of the future. To illustrate the potential utility of this approach, we test the model on simultaneous renewal processes with different timescales. The algorithm scales well on these problems despite the fact that the number of states needed to describe them as a Markov process grows exponentially.

Retrieval context determines whether event boundaries impair or enhance temporal order memory

Meaningful changes in context create "event boundaries", segmenting continuous experience into distinct episodes in memory. A foundational finding in this literature is that event boundaries impair memory for the temporal order of stimuli spanning a boundary compared to equally spaced stimuli within an event. This seems surprising in light of intuitions about memory in everyday life, where the order of within-event experiences (did I have coffee before the first bite of bagel?) often seems more difficult to recall than the order of events per se (did I have breakfast or do the dishes first?). Here, we aimed to resolve this discrepancy by manipulating whether stimuli carried information about their encoding context during retrieval, as they often do in everyday life (e.g., bagel-breakfast). In Experiments 1 and 2, we show that stimuli inherently associated with a unique encoding context produce a "flipped" order memory effect, whereby temporal memory was superior for cross-boundary than within-event item pairs. In Experiments 3 and 4, we added context information at retrieval to a standard laboratory event memory protocol where stimuli were encoded in the presence of arbitrary context cues (colored frames). We found that whether temporal order memory for cross-boundary stimuli was enhanced or impaired relative to within-event items depended on whether the context was present or absent during the memory test. Taken together, we demonstrate that the effect of event boundaries on temporal memory is malleable, and determined by the availability of context information at retrieval.

Segmentation of semantic and perceptual boundaries affects associative memory and risk of false memories

Temporally structured sequences of experiences, such as narratives or life events, are segmented in memory into discrete situational models. In segmentation, contextual shifts are processed as situational boundaries that temporally cluster items according to the perceived contexts. As such, segmentation enhances associative binding of items within a situational model. One side effect of enhanced associative processing is increased risk of false recollections for not-presented, semantically related items. If so, do boundaries facilitate false recollections, or does segmentation protect against them? In two experiments, we introduced situational shifts in word sequences in the form of semantic and perceptual boundaries, with semantic relatedness between words or the frame color around a word changing on a regular basis. After encoding, we tested participants’ associative memory performance and false recollection rates. In Experiment 1, color boundaries occurred synchronously or asynchronously to semantic boundaries. We found better associative recognition, but also more false recollections, for synchronous than asynchronous boundaries. In Experiment 2, color boundaries occurred synchronous to semantic boundaries or were absent entirely. We found that false recollection rates elicited by semantic boundaries increased when color boundaries were absent. We also tested associative memory performance using a non-semantic, temporal memory task. We found better temporal memory performance for semantic boundaries, as well as a negative correlation between increased false recollection rates and better temporal memory performance for semantic lists, but not for random lists. We discuss implications for false memory theories and segmentation of narrative materials in false memory research.

Foraging efficiency in temporally predictable environments: is a long-term temporal memory really advantageous?

Cognitive abilities enabling animals that feed on ephemeral but yearly renewable resources to infer when resources are available may have been favoured by natural selection, but the magnitude of the benefits brought by these abilities remains poorly known. Using computer simulations, we compared the efficiencies of three main types of foragers with different abilities to process temporal information, in spatially and/or temporally homogeneous or heterogeneous environments. One was endowed with a sampling memory, which stores recent experience about the availability of the different food types. The other two were endowed with a chronological or associative memory, which stores long-term temporal information about absolute times of these availabilities or delays between them, respectively. To determine the range of possible efficiencies, we also simulated a forager without temporal cognition but which simply targeted the closest and possibly empty food sources, and a perfectly prescient forager, able to know at any time which food source was effectively providing food. The sampling , associative and chronological foragers were far more efficient than the forager without temporal cognition in temporally predictable environments, and interestingly, their efficiencies increased with the level of temporal heterogeneity. The use of a long-term temporal memory results in a foraging efficiency up to 1.16 times better ( chronological memory) or 1.14 times worse ( associative memory) than the use of a simple sampling memory. Our results thus show that, for everyday foraging, a long-term temporal memory did not provide a clear benefit over a simple short-term memory that keeps track of the current resource availability. Long-term temporal memories may therefore have emerged in contexts where short-term temporal cognition is useless, i.e. when the anticipation of future environmental changes is strongly needed.