Society and the moral semantics of the COVID-19 pandemic: a social systems approach

PurposeIn a context of critical transition such as the COVID-19 pandemic, moral semantics take a prominent role as a form of self-description of society. However, they are not usually observed, but rather assumed as self-evident and necessarily “good.” The purpose of the article is to summarize the theory of morality from the social systems' perspective and illustrate with concrete examples the polemogenous nature of moral communication.Design/methodology/approachThis article presents an analysis of the role of morality in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, from the perspective of Niklas Luhmann’s social systems theory. Applying the method of second-order observation, it describes three cases of moral semantics disseminated via mass media and social media, and it examines their connection with the structural situation of subsystems of society during the pandemic crisis (particularly healthcare, politics and science).FindingsSecond-order observation of moral communication demonstrates to be fruitful to describe the conditions and consequences in which moralization of communication occurs, particularly in a situation of critical transition around the healthcare crisis. The three examples examined, namely, the hero semantics directed to healthcare workers, the semantics of indiscipline and the controversies around pseudo-sciences and conspiracy theories, show how they are based on social attribution of esteem and disesteem, how they try to answer to troublesome situations and contradictions that seem difficult to cope, and how they are close related to the emergence of conflicts, even when they seem positive oriented and well intentioned.Originality/valueThis paper is an attempt to test the usefulness of Luhmann's theory of society to understand the ongoing COVID-19 crisis and particularly the role of moral communication in concrete examples.

In Defence of Moral Realism: Examining Harry J. Gensler’s Critique of Cultural Relativism and Subjectivism

This paper will explore the nature of morality by providing a critique of cultural relativism and subjectivism and then arguing that moral realism provides a more coherent account of the nature of morality. The claim that moral realism provides a more coherent account of the nature of morality than cultural relativism or subjectivism is based on the arguments from moral progress, moral disagreement and moral semantics; and moral experience.

Psycholinguistic Meaning of the Concept of “Faith”

The article presents the results of a free associative experiment aimed at studying the verbalized concept of “faith” in the ordinary linguistic consciousness. The sample consisted of 487 people, speakers both of Russian and Ukrainian languages (15-67 years old) in an equal ratio of male and female. The article provides an analysis of the frequencies of the first reaction to the word-stimulus “faith” and the five reactions together, and the results of the clustering of high-frequency associations. The psycholinguistic meaning of the concept of faith was considered by us as an ordered unity of all the semantic components of the lexeme “faith”, which are really connected with this sound form in the consciousness of the speakers of the Russian and Ukrainian languages. The study showed that the concept of “faith” is expressed in the nuclear psycholinguistic meaning “hope”. The results of the experiment suggest that the associative field of the concept “faith” is represented by theological (religious) and moral semes, reflected in the peripheral psycholinguistic meanings – “love”, “religion”, “God”, “church” and many other meanings of the extreme periphery. It was shown that faith represents the “female name”, which acts as a detotat of females, which also explains the high frequency of personalized reactions. The etymological analysis of the lexeme “faith” allowed us to correlate the primary meanings of this concept with its meanings in the content of the modern ordinary consciousness and to conclude that some of the original meanings of faith remained (“trust”, “confidence”, “oath”, “verity”, “religion”, “deity”), and some of the meanings have been lost. In general, our results are confirmed in the works of both foreign and domestic scientists devoted to the analysis and description of the concept of “faith”, which is characterized by several semantic levels, ambivalence, high-frequency associates of theological and moral semantics, the presence of metaphorical and emotive values.

Morality Reconstructed

If morality could plausibly have emerged in the manner described, then various lessons follow for ethics. In moral metaphysics, that ethics presupposes only a naturalistic basis and that the desire to be moral can be associated with the desire to live up to the persona we each project in speaking for ourselves in avowals and pledges. In moral semantics, that ethical judgments may be true or false, and that ethical terms may ascribe bona fide properties, despite having a wholly naturalistic base. In moral epistemology, that our ability to make judgments of desirability and responsibility, as well as other moral judgments, depends on our being immersed in practices like those of avowal and pledging. In moral psychology, that moral judgments are closely tied up with desire and that they are effective in motivating us, not in their own right, but in virtue of the robustly attractive desiderata that they rely on for support. And in moral theory or normative ethics, that it is perfectly understandable why in the ordinary world, moral thinkers should divide on issues like that between consequentialist and non-consequentialist approaches.

Rationalist Metaphysics, Semantics, and Metasemantics

Rationalism offers an account of moral properties as a subset of the properties which serve to rationalize right actions, and these properties are fit to be the referents of our moral terms. That fitness can be exploited in constructing an externalist theory of reference determination for these terms. The resulting externalist theory draws support from standard responses to Moral Twin-Earth scenarios. The relevance of these responses to moral semantics has recently been vigorously challenged by Dowell and by Schroeter and Schroeter. The social character of meaning relations, which can explain the openness of questions about an analysis, may thereby also make Twin-Earth judgements beside the point. But the resources available to translators go beyond semantic competence and it is these resources that nonetheless make the Moral Twin-Earth responses relevant.