Morality Reconstructed

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Pettit
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Ethical Judgments ◽  
Moral Semantics ◽  
Moral Metaphysics ◽  
Bona Fide ◽  
In Virtue Of

If morality could plausibly have emerged in the manner described, then various lessons follow for ethics. In moral metaphysics, that ethics presupposes only a naturalistic basis and that the desire to be moral can be associated with the desire to live up to the persona we each project in speaking for ourselves in avowals and pledges. In moral semantics, that ethical judgments may be true or false, and that ethical terms may ascribe bona fide properties, despite having a wholly naturalistic base. In moral epistemology, that our ability to make judgments of desirability and responsibility, as well as other moral judgments, depends on our being immersed in practices like those of avowal and pledging. In moral psychology, that moral judgments are closely tied up with desire and that they are effective in motivating us, not in their own right, but in virtue of the robustly attractive desiderata that they rely on for support. And in moral theory or normative ethics, that it is perfectly understandable why in the ordinary world, moral thinkers should divide on issues like that between consequentialist and non-consequentialist approaches.

Beyond Point-and-Shoot Morality: Why Cognitive (Neuro)Science Matters for Ethics

2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 141-172 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua D. Greene
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Experimental Research ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Dual Process Theory ◽  
Process Theory ◽  
Bright Future

Abstract In this article I explain why cognitive science (including some neuroscience) matters for normative ethics. First, I describe the dual-process theory of moral judgment and briefly summarize the evidence supporting it. Next I describe related experimental research examining influences on intuitive moral judgment. I then describe two ways in which research along these lines can have implications for ethics. I argue that a deeper understanding of moral psychology favors certain forms of consequentialism over other classes of normative moral theory. I close with some brief remarks concerning the bright future of ethics as an interdisciplinary enterprise.

The Problem of the Criterion and Coherence Methods in Ethics

1988 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael R. Depaul
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Inquiry ◽  
Theory Construction ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
The Past ◽  
Problem Of The Criterion

The resurgence of interest in systematic moral theory over the past ten to fifteen years has brought to the fore debates concerning issues in moral epistemology, in particular, questions regarding the correct method for moral inquiry. Much of the controversy has focused on John Rawls’ method of reflective equilibrium. One merit claimed for this coherence method is that it transcends the traditional two tiered approach to moral inquiry according to which one must choose as one's starting points either particular moral judgments or general moral principles. Several of Rawls’ prominent critics have charged that Rawls’ loosely assembled rabble of starting points are not epistemically hefty enough to hoist a moral theory upon their shoulders. Perhaps unwittingly, these critics cling to the two level conception of theory construction, for they both defend general principles as the only appropriate starting points for theory construction and insist upon viewing Rawls as one working within the two tiered conception who opts for more particular judgments as starting points.

scholarly journals Naturalizing, Normativity, and Using What “We” Know in Ethics

2000 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 75-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margaret Urban Walker
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Naturalized Epistemology ◽  
Current Discussion ◽  
Epistemology Of Science

The provenance of “naturalized epistemology,” so called, is too recent for the hand of Quine not to be still heavily upon it. But like its older relative, “naturalism,” it is an idea rich enough to be coveted, and protean enough to be claimed, by diverse comers with different things in mind. While Quine's version of naturalized epistemology of science inevitably furnishes the backdrop for current discussion of naturalizing moral epistemology, it is important to pause over what “naturalized epistemology” can and should mean in ethics. To what extent is Quine's example of an epistemologyofscience that helps itselfto sciencethe model for understanding knowledge of and in morality? Does it require a view of moral knowledge as reducible to, or in a fundamental way furnished by, science? Or a view of moral theory as sciencelike in some way? I argue that the appropriate analogy is instead a holistic and reflexive epistemology of morality that helps itself to moral judgments and standards seen as answerable to the experience of the kinds of shared lives they make possible and necessary. This approach neither privileges nor rejects wholesale what scientific inquiries might have to say.

Nietzsche and Contemporary Ethics

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Robertson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Value Theory ◽  
Critical Assessment ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Ethical Thought ◽  
Normative Authority ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Principal Parts

Nietzsche is one of the most subversive ethical thinkers of the Western canon. This book offers a critical assessment of his ethical thought and its significance for contemporary moral philosophy. It develops a charitable but critical reading of his thought, pushing some claims and arguments as far as seems fruitful while rejecting others. But it also uses Nietzsche in dialogue with, so to contribute to, a range of long-standing issues within normative ethics, metaethics, value theory, practical reason, and moral psychology. The book is divided into three principal parts. Part I examines Nietzsche’s critique of morality, arguing that it raises well-motivated challenges to morality’s normative authority and value: his error theory about morality’s categoricity is in a better position than many contemporary versions; and his critique of moral values has bite even against undemanding moral theories, with significant implications not just for rarefied excellent types but also us. Part II turns to moral psychology, attributing to Nietzsche and defending a sentimentalist explanation of action and motivation. Part III considers his non-moral perfectionism, developing models of value and practical normativity that avoid difficulties facing many contemporary accounts and that may therefore be of wider interest. The discussion concludes by considering Nietzsche’s broader significance: as well as calling into question many of moral philosophy’s deepest assumptions, he challenges our usual views of what ethics itself is—and what it, and we, should be doing.

Kant's Contribution to Moral Epistemology

PARADIGMI ◽  
2012 ◽  
pp. 69-77
Author(s):  
Carla Bagnoli
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Moral Cognition ◽  
Ontological Commitments ◽  
First Order

This paper argues that the most innovative aspect of Kant's ethical theory is not afirst-order normative ethics, even though the importance and long-lasting mark ofKant's ethics of autonomy cannot be questioned. Rather, it consists in a constructivistaccount of moral cognition. This claim may be perplexing in more than one way, sinceconstructivism is often characterized both as a first-order account of moral judgmentsand as a retreat from epistemological and ontological commitments. This characterizationis misleading in general, and mistaken for Kant's constructivism in particular.Kant's constructivism is a methodological claim about the authority and productivefunction of reason and an epistemological claim about the nature of moral cognitions.

Introduction

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Simon Robertson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Value Theory ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Ethical Thought ◽  
Ethical Project

This opening chapter explains the book’s overarching aims, themes, structure, and approach. The book’s aim is to critically assess Nietzsche’s ethical thought and its significance for contemporary (broadly analytic) moral philosophy. It does this in two main ways: by developing a charitable but critical reconstruction of his ethics; and by using Nietzsche to contribute to a range of longstanding issues within normative ethics, metaethics, value theory, practical reason, and moral psychology. The chapter locates Nietzsche’s ethical project in his ‘revaluation of all values’, outlining a variety of interpretive and philosophical puzzles this raises. It then gives a chapter-by-chapter overview of the book’s topics and direction, and addresses some methodological matters bearing on its interpretive and philosophical ambitions.

The Moral Psychology of AI and the Ethical Opt-Out Problem

2020 ◽  
pp. 109-126
Author(s):  
Jean-François Bonnefon ◽  
Azim Shariff ◽  
Iyad Rahwan
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Public Perception ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Psychological Science ◽  
Opt Out ◽  
Moral Domains ◽  
Self Driving Cars

This chapter discusses the limits of normative ethics in new moral domains linked to the development of AI. In these new domains, people have the possibility to opt out of using a machine if they do not approve of the ethics that the machine is programmed to follow. In other words, even if normative ethics could determine the best moral programs, these programs would not be adopted (and thus have no positive impact) if they clashed with users’ preferences—a phenomenon that can be called “ethical opt-out.” The chapter then explores various ways in which the field of moral psychology can illuminate public perception of moral AI and inform the regulations of such AI. The chapter’s main focus is on self-driving cars, but it also explores the role of psychological science for the study of other moral algorithms.

Moral epistemology

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ralph Wedgwood
Keyword(s):  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Thinking ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Factual Proposition ◽  
The Way

Epistemology is the study of knowledge and justified belief. So moral epistemology is the study of what would be involved in knowing, or being justified in believing, moral propositions. Some discussions of moral epistemology interpret the category of ‘moral propositions’ broadly, to encompass all propositions that can be expressed with terms like ‘good’ or ‘bad’ or ‘ought’. Other discussions have focused on a narrower category of moral propositions – such as propositions about what rights people have, or about what we owe to each other. According to so-called noncognitivists, one cannot strictly speaking know (or be justified in believing) a moral proposition in the same sense in which one can know (or be justified in believing) an ordinary factual proposition. Other philosophers defend a cognitivist position, according to which it is possible to know or be justified in believing moral propositions in the very same sense as factual propositions. If one does know any moral propositions, they must presumably be true; and the way in which one knows those moral truths must provide access to them. This has led to a debate about whether one could ever know moral truths if a realist conception of these truths – according to which moral truths are not in any interesting sense of our making – were correct. Many philosophers agree that one way of obtaining justified moral beliefs involves seeking ‘reflective equilibrium’ – that is, roughly, considering theories, and adjusting one’s judgments to make them as systematic and coherent as possible. According to some philosophers, however, seeking reflective equilibrium is not enough: justified moral beliefs need to be supported by moral ‘intuitions’. Some hold that such moral intuitions are a priori, akin to our intuitions of the self-evident truths of mathematics. Others hold that these intuitions are closely related to emotions or sentiments; some theorists claim that empirical studies of moral psychology strongly support this ‘sentimentalist’ interpretation. Finally, moral thinking seems different from other areas of thought in two respects. First, there is particularly widespread disagreement about moral questions; and one rarely responds to such moral disagreement by retreating to a state of uncertainty as one does on other questions. Secondly, one rarely defers to other people’s moral judgments in the way in which one defers to experts about ordinary factual questions. These two puzzling features of moral thinking seem to demand explanation – which is a further problem that moral epistemology has to solve.

Reply to Comments

2019 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 287-300
Author(s):  
Allen Buchanan ◽  
Russell Powell
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Progress ◽  
Evolutionary Explanation ◽  
The Core ◽  
Use Of Data ◽  
The Social ◽  
Core Elements

Abstract Commentators on The Evolution of Moral Progress: A Biocultural Theory raise a number of metaethical and moral concerns with our analysis, as well as some complaints regarding how we have interpreted and made use of the contemporary evolutionary and social sciences of morality. Some commentators assert that one must already presuppose a moral theory before one can even begin to theorize moral progress; others query whether the shift toward greater inclusion is really a case of moral progress, or whether our theory can be properly characterized as ‘naturalistic’. Other commentators worry that we have uncritically accepted the prevailing evolutionary explanation of morality, even though it gives short shrift to the role of women or presupposes an oversimplified view of the environment in which the core elements of human moral psychology are thought to have congealed. Another commentator laments that we did not make more extensive use of data from the social sciences. In this reply, we engage with all of these constructive criticisms and show that although some of them are well taken, none undermine the core thesis of our book.

Butler's Theory of Moral Judgment

1978 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
pp. 199-225
Author(s):  
Roger A. Shiner
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Main Interest

It is something of a commonplace of Butlerian interpretation that the main interest and achievements of Butler's moral philosophy are in normative ethics, and not metaethics. He wishes to bring moral enlightenment to citizens and not, to philosophers, epistemological enlightenment. Nonetheless for that he makes a number of remarks which, if we were collecting for some bizarre purpose metaethical forms of words, we would note down and include in our collection. Thus he makes some progress towards the development of a moral epistemology, a theory of moral judgment. My purpose here is to assess those steps, and to see how far the structure which results can be called a theory. I have the impression that much of the reluctance among scholars to allow that Butler does have a theory of moral judgment is caused by the metaethical blinkers that they themselves wear; what is in fact the beginnings of an unfashionable and unconventional theory is seen as unsophisticated confusion. But I shall not overdo praise of Butler. I shall suggest that Aristotle does a somewhat better job of developing this type of theory.

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