Practical Identity, Contingency and Humanity

Aim of this paper is to support the view that all human practical identities are contingent by arguing against the view that there is at least one necessary practical identity shared by all human beings, namely Humanity. The view that Humanity is a necessary practical identity is explicitly defended by Christine M. Korsgaard (Korsgaard, C. M. 1996. The Sources of Normativity, edited by O. O’Neill. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Korsgaard, C. M. 2009. Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity. New York: Oxford University Press) and indirectly by Marya Schechtman (Schechtman, M. 2014. Staying Alive: Personal Identity, Practical Concerns, and the Unity of a Life. New York: Oxford University Press). Korsgaard understands Humanity both in terms of pure self-legislation, and as deep sociality. In the first case, Humanity as self-legislation faces what I call ‘Existential dilemma’: either Humanity has specific content, typical of contingent practical identities, but stops being necessary for all human beings; or Humanity is emptied of its content and is conceived of as necessary self-legislation, but stops being a practical identity. In the second case, i.e., Humanity as deep sociality, Korsgaard confuses the necessary natural fact that human beings are social creatures, with contingent contexts of human socialization, which are the true sources of specifically human practical identities. I articulate this confusion in the guise of what I call ‘Nature/Nurture dilemma’, which also applies to the morally neutral account of human personhood advocated by Schechtman (Schechtman, M. 2014. Staying Alive: Personal Identity, Practical Concerns, and the Unity of a Life. Oxford University Press). In conclusion, I address the worry that without the necessary practical identity of Humanity we might not be able to extend our practical and moral concerns to distant fellow human beings by sketching an alternative path to extend such concerns.

Practical Identity and Duties of Love

This paper defends the view that we have special relationship duties that do not derive from our moral duties. Our special relationship duties, I argue, are grounded in what I call close relationships. Sharing a close relationship with another person, I suggest, requires that both people conceive of themselves as being motivated to promote the other’s interests. So, staying true to oneself demands being committed to promoting the interests of those with whom we share a close relationship. Finally, I show that the proposed account of special relationship duties circumvents two problems facing self-conception accounts of special relationship duties.

Refleksja jako źródło autorytetu. Podmiotowość moralna w świetle argumentu konstytutywizmu Korsgaard

The authority of reflection. Moral agency in the light of Korsgaard’s constitutive arguments: In this paper I address the question as to whether Christine Korsgaard’s account of normative relations between the moral agent and the ends of her actions which constitutes her practical identity avoids falling into the trap of being just another abstract theory in moral philosophy. Proponents of constitutive arguments for the normative authority of reasons for action offer a promising approach to this meta‐ethical question by arguing that the normative authority of reasons is found within the practice of reasoning itself (in agency itself). In two constitutive arguments for the normativity of rational requirements, Korsgaard attempts first to argue that “the normative question” does not consist in looking merely for an explanation of moral practices but in asking “What justifies the claims that morality makes on us?”, and secondly to establish that the reason why ethical standards make claims on us is that they represent commands which are constitutive of having a self (the cost of violating ethical standards is the loss of practical identity). Korsgaard deals with these two arguments using her own modified version of the reflective endorsement method. She claims that the reflective structure of human consciousness establishes the normative relation we have to ourselves and that this is a relation of authority (that is the source of obligation). I argue that Korsgaard’s account of action as self‐constitution (the constitution of a practical sense of identity) fails to arrive at establishing the authority of reflection. I draw on the discussed claim that reasoned authority for our actions comes from reflective scrutiny (the test of reflection). Viewing the Kantian model of practical reason which lies at the basis of Korsgaard’s approach, I suggest the possibility of applying the Aristotelian model of practical reason as an useful framework for the reflective endorsement strategy.

Defending Duties to the Self, Part 2

This chapter argues that a person can owe second-personal duties to herself at a moment, rather than merely across time. At a single moment, a person occupies multiple perspectives, associated with different practical identities. The good associated with one of her practical identities can conflict with the good associated with another practical identity, and her ends adopted from the standpoint of one identity can conflict with her ends adopted by another. Because of this, a person can make demands on herself from the perspective of one practical identity to another, pertaining to the protection of her wellbeing and ends, just as she might make demands on another person. Such demands can generate second-personal duties, which require that a person treat herself a particular way in the present. Since some duties owed to the self cannot be waived due to their relationship to the individual’s identity, the waivability objection is answered.

Identidade prática e normatividade: considerações sobre o problema a partir de Heidegger e Korsgaard

The purpose of this article is to present Martin Heidegger's and Christine Korsgaard's conceptions about the normative problem and the practical identity problem. The work goes through a brief reconstruction of the debate raised by Mark Okrent and Steven Crowell in relation to the thesis of normativity and agency in Korsgaard, recognizing that despite the possible approximations, Heidegger's interpretation would be more pertinent to address the problems. First, it presents how Heidegger interprets and elucidates the existential possibilities based on the structure of comprehension and what he calls in-order-to. Then, Korsgaard's theory is presented, already recognizing the approximations and distances with the Heideggerian elucidations. Finally, the critics made to Korsgaard by Okrent and Crowell and the possible interpretive advantage over the normative questions of the problem of personal identity constituted from practical terms are reconstructed.

Irony, Disruption and Moral Imperfection

Irony has a suspicious moral reputation, especially in popular media and internet culture. Jonathan Lear (2011) introduces a proposal which challenges this suspicion and identifies irony as a means to achieve human excellence. For Lear, irony is a disruptive uncanniness which arises from a gap between aspiration and actualisation in our practical identity. According to Lear, such a disruptive experience of ironic uncanniness reorients us toward excellence, because it passionately propels us to really live up to that practical identity. However, Lear’s understanding of irony is idiosyncratic and his proposal overlooks that disruption often results from value incompatibility between different practical identities. The disruption which follows from value incompatibility does not inherently reorient us toward excellence. The point is exactly that achieving excellence in one practical identity is sometimes incompatible with excellence in the other. Pace Lear, I do not identify this disruptive experience as a central example of irony. Instead, I consider irony a virtuous coping strategy for such disruption, because it introduces the necessary distance from our moral imperfection to sustain practical deliberation and maintain good mental health. Such virtuous irony negotiates a golden mean between too little disruption (complete insensitivity toward one’s imperfection) and too much disruption (a complete breakdown of practical deliberation and mental health). I argue that ironic media in popular culture provide a rich source of such virtuous irony, which I demonstrate through analysis of satirical examples.

Weakness of Will and Practical Identity

In this article, I develop an Augustinian response to some contemporary philosophical proposals concerning the problem of weakness of will. I argue that many philosophers tend to cast the problem in terms of irrationality, focusing on psychological components such as judgment, desire, and resolution. In contrast, I contend that weakness of will has more to do with the absence of a coherent conception of practical identity and with a misleading conception of practical identity that overestimates the agent’s normative and motivational capacities. I claim that the irrationality of the weak-willed agent is at best a symptom, rather than the ultimate source, of weakness of will which cannot be properly understood without first addressing the deficiency of our internal resources relative to our willing and doing.