Refleksja jako źródło autorytetu. Podmiotowość moralna w świetle argumentu konstytutywizmu Korsgaard

The authority of reflection. Moral agency in the light of Korsgaard’s constitutive arguments: In this paper I address the question as to whether Christine Korsgaard’s account of normative relations between the moral agent and the ends of her actions which constitutes her practical identity avoids falling into the trap of being just another abstract theory in moral philosophy. Proponents of constitutive arguments for the normative authority of reasons for action offer a promising approach to this meta‐ethical question by arguing that the normative authority of reasons is found within the practice of reasoning itself (in agency itself). In two constitutive arguments for the normativity of rational requirements, Korsgaard attempts first to argue that “the normative question” does not consist in looking merely for an explanation of moral practices but in asking “What justifies the claims that morality makes on us?”, and secondly to establish that the reason why ethical standards make claims on us is that they represent commands which are constitutive of having a self (the cost of violating ethical standards is the loss of practical identity). Korsgaard deals with these two arguments using her own modified version of the reflective endorsement method. She claims that the reflective structure of human consciousness establishes the normative relation we have to ourselves and that this is a relation of authority (that is the source of obligation). I argue that Korsgaard’s account of action as self‐constitution (the constitution of a practical sense of identity) fails to arrive at establishing the authority of reflection. I draw on the discussed claim that reasoned authority for our actions comes from reflective scrutiny (the test of reflection). Viewing the Kantian model of practical reason which lies at the basis of Korsgaard’s approach, I suggest the possibility of applying the Aristotelian model of practical reason as an useful framework for the reflective endorsement strategy.

Myślenie krytyczne w ujęciu psychopedagogicznym — w kierunku poznawczej samodzielności i odpowiedzialności jednostki

Critical thinking in terms of psycho‐pedagogy: towards individual cognitive independence and responsibility: The paper is devoted to the methods of recognition and development of critical thinking. In the initial part synthetically are presented the views of researchers connected with an education perspective (the definition and features of critical thinking). Within this aspect crucial appears the question: why are we afraid of criticism? What are the reasons why we do not apply it in contact with the cultural message, with the opinions and actions of people? For relatively seldom is it used as a support in discussion, in making decisions and choices. In an attempt to answer such formulated problems presented is an outline of the author’s classification for inhibitors that prevent or hinder the application of critical thinking. Here the main claim is that in the modern world of news excess and the chaos of values, critical thinking as a manifestation of cognitive self‐reliance and responsibility should become the competence characterizing each individual. Hence, the author formulates some recommendations concerning pedagogical practice. They are implied from the author’s concept of constructive criticism, the adopted the principles and methods supporting critical thinking.

Radykalność filozofii. Rozważania wokół książki Pawła Kłoczowskiego Rewolucja kartezjańska i inne szkice

The radical nature of philosophy. Reflections on Paweł Kłoczowski’s book Cartesian revolution and other sketches: This paper offers a polemical discussion on Paweł Kłoczowski’s recently published book concerning the so‐called Cartesian revolution and other issues in social and political philosophy. The author presents Kłoczowski as the ideological heir of Leszek Kołakowski (1927–2009), and simultaneously a virtuoso of Polish philosophical essay writing. She demonstrates how topical, and at the same time timeless, are those problems considered by Kłoczowski. In doing so, she examines the inspirations of Kłoczowski and highlights some of his arguments: ones seemingly still stimulating triggers for our thinking.

Psychoanaliza i patriarchalizm. Uwagi na temat emancypacyjnego przesłania teorii Freuda w kontekście dziejów psychoanalizy w Polsce 1900–1939

Psychoanalysis and patriarchalism. Comments on the emancipation claim of Freud’s theory within the history of psychoanalysis in Poland 1900–1939: The article is a polemic with how Eli Zaretsky captures the role of Freud’s psychoanalysis in transforming the self-knowledge of modern societies in his Secrets of the soul. According to Zaretsky, in Central European countries, Poland included, psychoanalysis then served in the democratization of social life and led to the destruction of the patriarchal order; while in Western countries it became medicated, becoming a tool of social control. The author considers both of these claims to be problematic. In the first case, this is due to the limited social impact of Freud’s theory until 1939, in the second, basing this theory on patients’ personal unconscious, it supported their release from the influence of tradition and served them in making free life decisions. This was because in the period up to 1939, in the countries of Central Europe, the second industrial revolution was not as advanced as in the developed countries of Western Europe and the United States. So only in these last countries has psychoanalysis become socially popular and one has witnessed the dynamic development of the psychoanalytic movement.

The argument from correlation to cause in science communication

The main activity within popularized science communication is the expert‐to‐layman transferral of scientific knowledge. Correlative connections have proven to be a problematic concept to adequately communicate and form a relatively common source for the misrepresentation of scientific knowledge. Depending on the strength of the causal claim, such an inferential step can be considered an “argument from correlation to cause”. This paper reconstructs the argumentative pattern that is typical for these arguments and proposes a number of critical questions for their evaluation. Finally, an analysis is presented of a natural example of reasoning from correlational evidence to cause within the context of popularized science.

Cantor’s paradise from the perspective of non‐revisionist Wittgensteinianism

Cantor’s paradise from the perspective of non‐revisionist Wittgensteinianism: Ludwig Wittgenstein is known for his criticism of transfinite set theory. He forwards the claim that we tend to conceptualise infinity as an object due to the systematic confusion of extension with in‐ tension. There can be no mathematical symbol that directly refers to infinity: a rule is the only form by which the latter can appear in our symbolic operations. In consequence, Wittgenstein rejects such ideas as infinite cardinals, the Cantorian understanding of non‐denumerability, and the view of real numbers as a continuous sequence of points on a number line. Moreover, as he understands mathematics to be an anthropological phenomenon, he rejects set theory due to its lack of application. As I argue here, it is possible to defend Georg Cantor’s theory by taking a standpoint I call quietistic conventionalism. The standpoint broadly resembles Wittgenstein’s formalist middle period and allows us to view transfinite set theory as a result of a series of definitions established by arbitrary decisions that have no ontological consequences. I point to the fact that we are inclined to accept such definitions because of certain psycho‐ logical mechanisms such as the hypothetical Basic Metaphor of Infinity proposed by George Lakoff and Rafael E. Núñez. Regarding Wittgenstein’s criterion of applicability, I argue that it presupposes a static view of science. Therefore, we should not rely on it because we are unable to foresee what will turn out to be useful in the future.

Myślenie krytyczne: kilka uwag historycznych i teoretycznych

Critical thinking: some historical and theoretical remarks: In the paper, I defend a version of critical thinking. Firstly, I reconstruct the historical context surrounding the emergence of the critical thinking movement. There are various important intuitions and concepts of critical thinking — ones authored by John Dewey, Robert H. Ennis, Richard W. Paul, among many others — that have played an important role in understanding this type of thinking. Many definitions of critical thinking constitute concise and overly narrow formulas and fail to help us understand the subject, consequently I propose my own definition. By critical thinking I mean analytical, evaluative and argumentative cognitive functions. Next I discuss the basic dialogical context in which critical thinking develops and analyse the most important elements of critical thinking such as: analysis, evaluation and argumentation. I see critical thinking to be an important and valuable form of thinking. However, I do not argue in favour of critical thinking as the primary educational ideal. Rather, it plays an instrumental and supportive role in thinking, acting and life.

Sherlock Holmes introduces critical thinking

Sherlock has been admired in medical and criminal investigative education for his detection abilities. What makes him such an iconic figure is his “science of deduction and analysis”. Are there critical thinking traits in Sherlock Holmes’ method which can be used for instruction? Can Holmes be considered an exemplar of critical thinking? The argument here is that Holmes’ methods overlap with educational outcomes of critical thinking courses. A teaching activity designed to allow an exploration of the detective’s abilities in an introductory class is described here.

Krytyka filozoficzna w Europie i na świecie wobec globalizacji i terroryzmu

ŹRÓDŁO PRZEKŁADU: Poulain, J. (2011). La critique philosophique en Europe et dans le monde face à la mondialisation et aux terrorismes. Cahiers critiques de philosophie, 11, 195–206.