Translation Strategies of Chinese and English Trope Sentence

Metaphor is to use a familiar and concrete thing to explain another strange and abstract thing. These two things must be essentially different but have similarities. Trope is an important rhetorical device and expression means in both Chinese and English. How to translate Chinese and English trope sentences properly and accurately is a question that scholars have been discussing. Four commonly used translation strategies: literal translation, free translation, interpretative translation and supplementary translation are introduced in this paper, aiming to provide a reference and guideline to the scholars who are interested in this field.

KONSEP DAN SISTEM NILAI DALAM PERSFEKTIF AGAMA-AGAMA BESAR DI DUNIA

<p><em>Value as a driving force in life, which gives meaning and validation to one's actions. Values held in both intellectual and emotional terms. The combination of these two dimensions determines something that is worth functioning in life. If in giving meaning and validation to an action, it is not small, while not more intellectual, the combination is called the norm or principle. Norms or principles such as faith, justice, brotherhood and others become values that are agreed upon in the patterns of behavior and patterns of thinking of a group, while universal norms are determined, while special and comparable values for each group. Value is the essence that is attached to something that is very important for human life, especially regarding the goodness and acts of kindness of a thing, the value of the meaning of the traits or things that are important or useful for welfare. Value is something abstract, ideal, value is not a concrete thing, not a fact, it is not only a matter of right and wrong that demands empirical proof, it needs social appreciation that is desired, liked, and disliked.</em></p><p><strong>Keywords</strong><strong>: </strong><em>Concepts, Values, Great Religions In The World.</em><em></em></p>

Fiction, semantics of

Taken at face value, ‘Anna Karenina is a woman’ seems true. By using Tolstoi’s name ‘Anna Karenina’ and the predicate ‘is a woman’ we appear to refer to the character Anna and to attribute to her a property which she has. Yet how can this be? There is no actual woman to whom the name refers. Such problems of reference, predication and truth also arise in connection with representational art and with beliefs and other attitudes. Meinong distinguishes the ‘being’ of objects (including fictional objects) from the ‘existence’ of actual objects such as Napoleon. ‘Anna Karenina’ refers to a concrete, particular, nonexistent object that has the property of womanhood. However, Meinong’s distinction seems to many ontologically suspect. Perhaps, then, being is existence and ‘Anna Karenina is a woman’ is actually false because ‘Anna Karenina’ has no referent. Russell in ‘On Denoting’ (1905) agrees. But how can we explain the apparent contrast in truth between this sentence and the unquestionably erroneous ‘Anna Karenina is from Moscow’? Or is it that being is existence but ‘Anna Karenina’ refers to an abstract, not a concrete, thing – an existent, abstract thing that does not have the property of being a woman but has merely the property of being said, by Tolstoi’s novel, to be a woman? Then, however, the meaning of our sentence about Anna no longer parallels that of ‘Emily Dickinson is a woman’. Perhaps, as many argue, we only pretend that ‘Anna Karenina’ refers and that the sentence is true. This position may not adequately explain the intuitions that support Anna Karenina as a genuine object of reference and predication, however.

Capitalism as Religion

This chapter is the first translation into English of Agamben’s essay ‘Capitalism as Religion.’ It develops on Walter Benjamin’s thesis that capitalism is an extreme form of religion by considering the role that money plays in the capitalist cult. Agamben argues that the theological content of capitalism was clarified by the end of the gold standard in 1971 because money no longer refered to a concrete thing whose value it represented, but rather, to credit. The capitalist religion puts money in the place of God and replaces faith in God with faith in credit, which is, ultimately, faith in faith. The chapter concludes by drawing out the destructive implications of this parodic form of Christian faith by considering its relationship to the contemporary hegemony of finance, the development of the spectacle, and the “profound anarchy of the society in which we live.”

Matter, Form and Object: Rejoinder to Sidelle

Aristotelian notions such as matter, form and substance (or object) should be used carefully; not only is the rich tradition in their background marked by variety of interpretation, even Aristotle's own use of these concepts is far from uniform. In his different works, matter, form and (primary) substance display contents that do not always agree. There is reason for believing that in the Metaphysics Zeta the notion of form embodies (or amounts to) essence, and that accordingly something without essence does not qualify as substance. This cannot be generalized or regarded as Aristotle's standard view, however, for in the Physics there are contexts in which the form is not conceived as (or does not embody) essence. There, “the form or shape” is the arrangement of the substance's parts, or the object's shape, in addition to either all or some of its qualities (i.e., the sensible shape). Outside the Metaphysics, substance, too, seems to be a less distinguished entity. In the Physics, and especially in the Categories, substance is anything capable of independent existence, any particular concrete thing that is a bearer of attributes. To the extent that our modern “object” corresponds to Aristotle's primary substance, it has a similar polysemy. While in some contexts it will mean an articulated object belonging to a specific kind, in others it will denote bodies without organized structure, that is, it will have as extension the particular bits and pieces that fill the world. A similar diversity applies to matter. When understood, for example, as a chunk out of which an artist casts her statue, matter is an object (a substratum), a body, itself endowed with a boundary (a form) and a multitude of properties. But matter can be much simpler than that; it can be a plain homoeomere, a mere element, or as in prime matter, may lack every actual attribute. When in my “Matter and Objecthood” I criticized Henry Laycock's views propounded in “Some Questions of Ontology” I found comparable ambiguities transposed to contemporary discourse. In the paper just cited, Laycock examines the ontic status of matter, contrasting it with objects as particular concrete things; throughout his discussion no radical distinction is made between articulated objects and unorganized bodies. In my criticism I employed ‘object’ in the same inclusive sense.