Deep Disagreements and Political Polarization

2021 ◽  
pp. 226-243
Author(s):  
Jeroen de Ridder
Keyword(s):  
Political Science ◽  
Feedback Loop ◽  
Social Identities ◽  
Political Polarization ◽  
Empirical Results ◽  
Deep Disagreement ◽  
Deep Disagreements

In deep disagreements, parties disagree about relatively fundamental underlying moral or epistemic principles and therefore see each other as less than fully rational or morally subpar. The chapter argues that deep disagreements lead to both cognitive and practical polarization, especially when they concern matters that are central to people’s social identities: deeply disagreeing parties will think less of each other and tend to treat each other worse. This, in turn, entrenches their disagreement even further, resulting in a vicious feedback loop. Support for the claims made here comes from both conceptual connections between deep disagreement and polarization as well as widely established empirical results in psychology and political science.

La décision de construire le tracé hydro-électrique Chénier-Châteauguay: une analyse cybernétique

1981 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 259-307
Author(s):  
Réjean Landry
Keyword(s):  
Political Science ◽  
Feedback Loop ◽  
The State ◽  
Maximum Intensity ◽  
State Agency ◽  
Institutional Constraints ◽  
Location Information ◽  
Global System ◽  
Empirical Results ◽  
Classical Models

The cybernetic approach used here rests on the concept of the feedback loop. In contrast to the classical models of political science, the perspective adopted here is not oriented toward the construction of a taxonomy, but toward a more advanced formulation of interaction among the elements of a given system. The analysis develops around eight main principal problems: location; information-consultation; institutional constraints; ecology; agriculture; the economy; health; and the controlling agency. Each of these problems is treated as a sub-system of a model which constitutes a simplified replica of the problems which the participants confronted.The major empirical results of this research are as follows: (1) as expected, the various actors did not pursue the same kinds of regulations; (2) contrary to what one might have expected, the perception of the position of Hydro-Quebec articulated by the groups which contested the project did not question the desired impacts of the state agency; (3) contrary to what one might have anticipated, the contesting groups anticipated effects which were opposite to those expected by Hydro for most of the options considered in the analysis; (4) contrary to an intuitive expectation, the conflict of perceptions between Hydro and the opposition groups did not reach maximum intensity on environmental questions; (5) the positions advanced by the opposing groups did not differ radically from positions taken by Hydro—again contrary to expectations; (6) the interconnections of sub-systems may lead to undesirable consequences, contrary to those one might have anticipated intuitively; (7) the behaviour of the global system is less dependent upon the regulation of sub-systems than upon the network of connections among the sub-systems.

Mafalda: Middle Class, Everyday Life, and Politics in Argentina, 1964-1973

2014 ◽  
Vol 94 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-75 ◽  
Author(s):  
Isabella Cosse
Keyword(s):  
Middle Class ◽  
Social Identities ◽  
Political Polarization ◽  
The Political ◽  
Comic Strip ◽  
State Terrorism ◽  
The Everyday ◽  
History Of ◽  
Social Modernization ◽  
Methodological Approaches

Abstract In this article I reconstruct the history of Mafalda, the famous comic strip by the Argentine cartoonist Quino that was read, discussed, and viewed as an emblematic representation of Argentina’s middle class. With the aim of contributing to discussions on the interpretation of the middle class in Argentina and Latin America, I examine the emergence, circulation, and sociopolitical significance of the comic from its first strips in 1964 until Quino stopped producing new installments in 1973, making use of two conceptual and methodological approaches: a perspective situated at the intersection of the everyday and the political, as well as a consideration of humor as a way of exploring social identities. I argue first that Mafalda’s ironic and conceptual humor worked with the contradictions of the middle class as it faced social modernization, cultural and political radicalization, and a weakening democracy. Second, I suggest that the strip contributed to a representation of a heterogeneous middle class marked by ideological differences but nonetheless conceived as one. Third, I claim that such a representation lost its relevance with the political polarization and violence of the 1970s, as portraying a middle class—or a society—united despite differences was no longer feasible in that context. To illustrate this, the article closes by noting that, shortly after Mafalda was discontinued, state terrorism would brutally demonstrate just how little space there was in Argentina for the young, antiestablishment generation depicted in the strip.

scholarly journals Deep disagreement and hinge epistemology

Synthese ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 197 (11) ◽  
pp. 4975-5007
Author(s):  
Chris Ranalli
Keyword(s):  
World Views ◽  
Epistemic Relation ◽  
Entitlement Theory ◽  
Deep Disagreement ◽  
Hinge Epistemology ◽  
Epistemic Theory ◽  
Deep Disagreements ◽  
Rational Evaluation

Abstract This paper explores the application of hinge epistemology to deep disagreement. Hinge epistemology holds that there is a class of commitments—hinge commitments—which play a fundamental role in the structure of belief and rational evaluation: they are the most basic general ‘presuppositions’ of our world views which make it possible for us to evaluate certain beliefs or doubts as rational. Deep disagreements seem to crucially involve disagreements over such fundamental commitments. In this paper, I consider pessimism about deep disagreement, the thesis that such disagreements are rationally irresolvable, and ask whether the Wittgensteinian account of deep disagreement—according to which such disagreements are disagreements over hinge commitments—provides adequate support for pessimism. I argue that the answer to this question depends on what hinge commitments are and what our epistemic relation to them is supposed to be. I argue for two core claims. First, that non-epistemic theories of hinge commitments provide adequate support for pessimism. Nevertheless, such theories have highly implausible consequences in the context of deep disagreement. Secondly, at least one epistemic theory of hinge commitments, the entitlement theory, permits optimism about such disagreements. As such, while hinge epistemology is mainly pessimistic about deep disagreement, it doesn’t have to be.

scholarly journals The Epistemic Value of Deep Disagreements

2018 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 263-292 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirk Lougheed
Keyword(s):  
Argumentation Theory ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Peer Disagreement ◽  
Epistemology Of Disagreement ◽  
Epistemic Peer ◽  
Deep Disagreement ◽  
The Face ◽  
Deep Disagreements

In the epistemology of disagreement literature an underdeveloped argument defending the claim that an agent need not conciliate when she becomes aware of epistemic peer disagreement is based on the idea that there are epistemic benefits to be gained from disagreement. Such benefits are unobtainable if an agent conciliates in the face of peer disagreement. I argue that there are good reasons to embrace this line of argument at least in inquiry-related contexts. In argumentation theory a deep disagreement occurs when there is a disagreement between fundamental frameworks. According to Robert J. Fogelin disagreements between fundamental frameworks are not susceptible to rational resolution. Instead of evaluating this claim I argue that deep disagreements can lead to epistemic benefits, at least when inquiry is in view. Whether rational resolution is possible in cases of deep disagreements, their existence turns out to be epistemically beneficial. I conclude by examining whether this line of argument can be taken beyond research-related contexts.Dans la littérature sur l'épistémologie du désaccord, un argument sous-développé pour une approche non conciliatoire se fonde sur l'idée qu'il y a des bénéfices épistémiques à tirer du désaccord. De tels bénéfices sont impossibles à obtenir si un agent se concilie face au désaccord avec ses pairs, du moins dans les contextes liés à la recherche. Dans la théorie de l'argumentation, un désaccord profond se produit lorsqu'il y a un désaccord entre des propositions cadres. Je soutiens que des désaccords profonds peuvent mener à des avantages épistémiques, du moins dans le contexte de la recherche. Que la résolution rationnelle soit ou non possible en cas de désaccord profond, leur existence s'avère être bénéfique sur le plan épistémologique.

Introduction

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Kevin Vallier
Keyword(s):  
Negative Feedback ◽  
Feedback Loop ◽  
Political Trust ◽  
Political Polarization ◽  
Negative Feedback Loop ◽  
Welfare Programs ◽  
Freedom Of Association ◽  
Social Welfare Programs ◽  
The Right ◽  
Do So

Based on recent research, there is probably a negative feedback loop between falling social and political trust and rising political polarization, which this book calls the distrust-divergence hypothesis. The goal of the book, as outlined in the introduction, is to show how liberal institutions can interrupt the feedback loop through policies that increase trust, and that do so in the right way. They do so by recognizing and protecting a range of basic rights that give rise to trust-generating institutions and practices, such as freedom of association, markets, social welfare programs, and democratic governance. Liberal institutions can thereby increase trust, and reduce the destructive aspects of political polarization as a result.

Deep Disagreement, Hinge Commitments, and Intellectual Humility

Episteme ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Drew Johnson
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Humility ◽  
Deep Disagreement ◽  
Hinge Epistemology ◽  
Deep Disagreements ◽  
To Come

Abstract Why is it that some instances of disagreement appear to be so intractable? And what is the appropriate way to handle such disagreements, especially concerning matters about which there are important practical and political needs for us to come to a consensus? In this paper, I consider an explanation of the apparent intractability of deep disagreement offered by hinge epistemology. According to this explanation, at least some deep disagreements are rationally unresolvable because they concern ‘hinge’ commitments that are unresponsive to rational considerations. This explanation, if correct, seems to have troubling implications for how we should respond to deep disagreement. If my position on a topic is not responsive to rational considerations, then what choice have I but to dogmatically hold to that position, and simply dismiss the views of those with whom I disagree? I address this problem by identifying an attitude of intellectual humility that is appropriate to have towards one's hinge commitments, and suggest that this attitude provides the basis for a non-rational, constructive way to resolve deep disagreement.

scholarly journals Revisiting Deep Disagreement

2005 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dale Turner ◽  
Larry Wright
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Resolution ◽  
Informal Logic ◽  
Deep Disagreement ◽  
Deep Disagreements ◽  
Radical Claim

Argument-giving reasons for a view-is our model of rational dispute resolution. Fogelin (1985) suggests that certain "deep" disagreements cannot be resolved in this way because features of their context "undercut the conditions essential to arguing" (p. 5). In this paper we add some detail to Fogelin's treatment of intractable disagreements. In doing so we distinguish between his relatively modest claim that some disputes cannot be resolved through argument and his more radical claim that such disputes are beyond rational resolution. This distinction, along with some ofthe detail we add to Fogelin's treatment, sheds some useful light on the project of informal logic.

scholarly journals The missing link: Studying political leadership from the followers’ perspective

Politics ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 026339572110562
Author(s):  
Rudolf Metz
Keyword(s):  
Political Science ◽  
Political Leadership ◽  
Democratic Politics ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Leadership Studies ◽  
Research Directions ◽  
Empirical Results ◽  
Future Research Directions ◽  
Research Gap

Recent political developments suggest that political followership has played increasingly vital roles in modern democratic politics. However, scholarship seemingly lacks proper conceptual and methodological tools for analysing why and how citizens follow their leaders, and what the role of this relationship is in personalised politics and political leadership. Addressing the research gap, this article turns to generic leadership studies for help and introduces its follower-centric models into the field of political science. This venture opens with a review and comparison of some of the different perspectives about political followers in the scholarship on political leadership and personalisation, taking account of their limitations. It then moves on to assess follower-centric models and their empirical results, focusing on observers’ perceptions about the characteristics and behaviours of leaders in the attribution of leadership. Based on these models, the article offers a balanced perspective about leader–follower relations. Recommendations for future research directions are presented in the concluding sections.

Dalton and Putnam: Teaching Political Polarization to Generation Z Students

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-5
Author(s):  
Mark K. McBeth ◽  
Jules Belyea ◽  
Andrew Perry
Keyword(s):  
Political Science ◽  
Cognitive Biases ◽  
Political Polarization ◽  
Science Classrooms ◽  
Robert Putnam ◽  
Generation Z ◽  
Generational Politics ◽  
Survey Results ◽  
Approach To Teaching ◽  
Micro Level

ABSTRACT Political polarization and generational politics are important topics in contemporary political science classrooms. This article presents an approach to teaching political polarization in an introduction to politics course. Coauthored by two Generation Z students from the course and their Boomer Generation professor, the article provides conflicting views of young people and politics as found in the work of Robert Putnam and Russell Dalton. The article presents survey data on affective and issue political polarization from the course, including discussion by the two student coauthors of the survey results interpreting their generation’s political polarization. The course approaches the introductory politics course using cognitive psychology concepts including confirmative bias, motivated reasoning, and other cognitive biases. Teaching from this micro-level perspective helps students to reflect on their own political biases. The article provides concepts and readings for political science professors to use in replicating the course.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document