scholarly journals Resolution of Deep Disagreement: Not Simply Consensus

2020 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 359-382
Author(s):  
Leah Henderson
Keyword(s):  
Common Ground ◽  
Central Concern ◽  
Deep Disagreement ◽  
Rational Argumentation ◽  
Deep Disagreements ◽  
Alternative Reading

Robert Fogelin has argued that in deep disagreements, resolution cannot be achieved by rational argumentation. In response, Richard Feldman has claimed that deep disagreements can be resolved in a similar way to more everyday disagreements. I argue that Feldman’s claim is based on a relatively superficial notion of “resolution” of a disagreement whereas the notion at stake in Fogelin’s argument is more substantive. Furthermore, I argue that Feldman’s reply is based on a particular reading of Fogelin’s argument. There is an alternative reading, which takes the central concern to be the role of common ground in argumentation. Engaging with this version of Fogelin’s argument is also a worthwhile endeavour.

Putting the Madhyamaka Trick in Context: A Contextualist Reading of Huntington’s Interpretation of Madhyamaka

2014 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-124
Author(s):  
Michael Dorfman
Keyword(s):  
Fifteenth Century ◽  
Common Ground ◽  
Correspondence Theory ◽  
The Body ◽  
Rational Analysis ◽  
At Command ◽  
Rational Argumentation ◽  
Logical Fallacies ◽  
Key Terms

In a series of works published over a period of twenty five years, C.W. Huntington, Jr. has developed a provocative and radical reading of Madhyamaka (particularly Early Indian Madhyamaka) inspired by ‘the insights of post- Wittgensteinian pragmatism and deconstruction’ (1993, 9). This article examines the body of Huntington’s work through the filter of his seminal 2007 publication, ‘The Nature of the M?dhyamika Trick’, a polemic aimed at a quartet of other recent commentators on Madhyamaka (Robinson, Hayes, Tillemans and Garfield) who attempt ‘to read N?g?rjuna through the lens of modern symbolic logic’ (2007, 103), a project which is the ‘end result of a long and complex scholastic enterprise … [which] can be traced backwards from contemporary academic discourse to fifteenth century Tibet, and from there into India’ (2007, 111) and which Huntington sees as distorting the Madhyamaka project which was not aimed at ‘command[ing] assent to a set of rationally grounded doctrines, tenets, or true conclusions’ (2007, 129). This article begins by explicating some disparate strands found in Huntington’s work, which I connect under a radicalized notion of ‘context’. These strands consist of a contextualist/pragmatic theory of truth (as opposed to a correspondence theory of truth), a contextualist epistemology (as opposed to one relying on foundationalist epistemic warrants), and a contextualist ontology where entities are viewed as necessarily relational (as opposed to possessing a context-independent essence.) I then use these linked theories to find fault with Huntington’s own readings of Candrak?rti and N?g?rjuna, arguing that Huntington misreads the semantic context of certain key terms (tarka, d???i, pak?a and pratijñ?) and fails to follow the implications of N?g?rjuna and Candrak?rti’s reliance on the role of the pram??as in constituting conventional reality. Thus, I find that Huntington’s imputation of a rejection of logic and rational argumentation to N?g?rjuna and Candrak?rti is unwarranted. Finally, I offer alternate readings of the four contemporary commentators selected by Huntington, using the conceptual apparatus developed earlier to dismiss Robinson’s and Hayes’s view of N?g?rjuna as a charlatan relying on logical fallacies, and to find common ground between Huntington’s project and the view of N?g?rjuna developed by Tillemans and Garfield as a thinker committed using reason to reach, through rational analysis, ‘the limits of thought.’

Showing, Expressing, and Figuratively Meaning

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mitchell Green
Keyword(s):  
Perspective Taking ◽  
Figurative Language ◽  
Common Ground ◽  
Linguistic Meaning ◽  
Psychological State ◽  
Proper Understanding ◽  
Speaker Meaning

We first correct some errors in Lepore and Stone’s discussion of speaker meaning and its relation to linguistic meaning. With a proper understanding of those notions and their relation, we may then motivate a liberalization of speaker meaning that includes overtly showing one’s psychological state. I then distinguish this notion from that of expression, which, although communicative, is less cognitively demanding than speaker meaning since it need not be overt. This perspective in turn enables us to address Lepore and Stone’s broadly Davidsonian view of figurative language, which rightly emphasizes the role of imagination and perspective-taking associated with such language, but mistakenly suggests it is sui generis relative to other types of pragmatic process, and beyond the realm of communication. Figurative utterances may influence conversational common ground, and may be assessed for their aptness; they also have a characteristically expressive role that a Davidsonian view lacks the resources to explain.

The Quaker, the Primitivist, and the Progressive: Three Cultural Brokers in New Mexico's Quest for Multicultural Harmony

2010 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 243-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lynne M. Getz
Keyword(s):  
Native American ◽  
New Mexico ◽  
Common Ground ◽  
Cultural Background ◽  
Cultural Brokers ◽  
Fertile Ground ◽  
Good Will

New Mexicans pride themselves on their ability to bridge multicultural divides. Part of what we are urged to understand as “enchanting” about the Land of Enchantment is its diverse cultural background. Native American, Hispano, and Anglo have existed side by side, at times with remarkable harmony and good will, for nearly two centuries. The Land of Enchantment is not altogether a fantasy. Many New Mexicans have shown an uncanny ability to bridge ethnic divides and find common ground in the interstices between cultures. The soil of New Mexico seems to be fertile ground indeed for producing cultural brokers. Margaret Connell Szasz admits that living in New Mexico makes her particularly attuned to the role of the cultural broker.

Talking Fingers: An Interview Study of Pianists' Views on Fingering

1997 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Clarke ◽  
Richard Parncutt ◽  
Matti Raekallio ◽  
John Sloboda
Keyword(s):  
Motor Skill ◽  
Common Ground ◽  
Procedural Knowledge ◽  
Contemporary Music ◽  
Declarative Knowledge ◽  
Standard Approach ◽  
Primary Determinant ◽  
Role Of Teachers ◽  
Technical Considerations

Seven professional pianists were interviewed to gather their views on various aspects of piano fingering. The issues covered included technical considerations, the influence of interpretation and composers' markings on fingering, the effects of different Performance circumstances, and the role of teachers in determining fingering strategies. An analysis of the participants' responses revealed both a considerable amount of common ground in their attitudes to these matters, and some strikingly different attitudes. Five primary themes emerged: i) while Standard fingerings form the basis for these performers' strategies, a greater use of Standard fingerings in sight-read as opposed to rehearsed or memorised performance was predicted by the participants; ii) those performers with a deeper involvement in, and earlier exposure to, contemporary music considered themselves to have a less Standard approach to fingering; iii) physical considerations not only represent constraints on fingering, but also offer opportunities to employ positively pleasurable fingerings which may be highly idiosyncratic; iv) while interpretation is universally regarded as the primary determinant of finger choice, attitudes range from a refusal to contemplate a fingering until musical matters have been resolved to the belief that a Single best fingering can be found onto which interpretative choices are mapped; v) the participants appear to have good declarative knowledge of the more abstract and Strategic aspects of their approach to fingering, and essentially procedural knowledge of what they do in any particular circumstance, as found in previous research on motor skill.

scholarly journals Taking common ground into account: Specifying the role of the mentalizing network in communicative language production

PLoS ONE ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (10) ◽  
pp. e0202943 ◽  
Author(s):  
Flora Vanlangendonck ◽  
Roel M. Willems ◽  
Peter Hagoort
Keyword(s):  
Language Production ◽  
Common Ground

scholarly journals Speak with one voice! Towards an ecumenical ethics applicable to the church-state dialogue in South Africa

2016 ◽  
Vol 72 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Koos Vorster
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Common Ground ◽  
Ethical Concern ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Ethics ◽  
Points Of View ◽  
The Government ◽  
Moral Discourses ◽  
The Church

This research deals with the question of whether an ecumenical ethics can be developed in South Africa that at least will be applicable in the field of political ethics and that can assist the various ecclesiastical traditions to ‘speak with one voice’ when they address the government on matters of Christian ethical concern. The research rests on the recognition of the variety of ethical persuasions and points of view that flow from the variety of hermeneutical approaches to Scripture. However, within this plethora of ethical discourses, an ‘overlapping’ ethics based on a proposed set of minimum theological ideas can be pursued in order to reach at least an outline of an applicable ecumenical political ethics conducive to the church–state dialogue in South Africa today. The article concludes that a ‘minimum consensus’ on the role of revelation in the moral discourses is possible and is enriched by traditional ideas such as creation and natural law, the reign of God and Christology, and it can provide a suitable common ground for an ecumenical ethics applicable to the moral difficulties in the political domain in South Africa today.

Young children use shared experience to interpret definite reference

2014 ◽  
Vol 42 (5) ◽  
pp. 1146-1157 ◽  
Author(s):  
DANIEL SCHMERSE ◽  
ELENA LIEVEN ◽  
MICHAEL TOMASELLO
Keyword(s):  
Common Ground ◽  
Definite Article ◽  
Shared Experience ◽  
Joint Actions ◽  
Indefinite Article ◽  
Shared Experiences ◽  
Communicative Intention ◽  
Linguistic Categories ◽  
Referential Choice

AbstractWe investigated whether children at the ages of two and three years understand that a speaker's use of the definite article specifies a referent that is in common ground between speaker and listener. An experimenter and a child engaged in joint actions in which the experimenter chose one of three similar objects of the same category to perform an action. In subsequent interactions children were asked to get ‘the X’ or ‘a X’. When children were instructed with the definite article they chose the shared object significantly more often than when they were instructed with the indefinite article in which case children's choice was at chance. The findings show that in their third year children use shared experiences to interpret the speaker's communicative intention underlying her referential choice. The results are discussed with respect to children's representation of linguistic categories and the role of joint action for establishing common ground.

scholarly journals Deep disagreement and hinge epistemology

Synthese ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 197 (11) ◽  
pp. 4975-5007
Author(s):  
Chris Ranalli
Keyword(s):  
World Views ◽  
Epistemic Relation ◽  
Entitlement Theory ◽  
Deep Disagreement ◽  
Hinge Epistemology ◽  
Epistemic Theory ◽  
Deep Disagreements ◽  
Rational Evaluation

Abstract This paper explores the application of hinge epistemology to deep disagreement. Hinge epistemology holds that there is a class of commitments—hinge commitments—which play a fundamental role in the structure of belief and rational evaluation: they are the most basic general ‘presuppositions’ of our world views which make it possible for us to evaluate certain beliefs or doubts as rational. Deep disagreements seem to crucially involve disagreements over such fundamental commitments. In this paper, I consider pessimism about deep disagreement, the thesis that such disagreements are rationally irresolvable, and ask whether the Wittgensteinian account of deep disagreement—according to which such disagreements are disagreements over hinge commitments—provides adequate support for pessimism. I argue that the answer to this question depends on what hinge commitments are and what our epistemic relation to them is supposed to be. I argue for two core claims. First, that non-epistemic theories of hinge commitments provide adequate support for pessimism. Nevertheless, such theories have highly implausible consequences in the context of deep disagreement. Secondly, at least one epistemic theory of hinge commitments, the entitlement theory, permits optimism about such disagreements. As such, while hinge epistemology is mainly pessimistic about deep disagreement, it doesn’t have to be.

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