scholarly journals Hinges, Deep Disagreement and Fixed Points in the Argumentation Logic

2021 ◽  
pp. 112-116
Author(s):  
Elena Lisanyuk
Keyword(s):  
Fixed Points ◽  
Basic Principles ◽  
On Certainty ◽  
Deep Disagreement ◽  
Argumentation Analysis ◽  
Deep Disagreements

In his treatise ‘On Certainty’ (1969) L. Wittgenstein compared the propositions ex- pressing basic principles to the hinges enabling both doubting and justifying knowledge. In 1985 Robert Fogelin proposed the conception of deep disagreement in argumentation analysis and in his description of it he referred to the hinges. We continue Wittgenstein’s hinges metaphor and compare pulling and pushing the door of knowledge to adopting contrary standings about principal issues, which can result in the deep disagreements. We suggest looking at the hinges enabling those door moves as at the fixed points in the extension semantic of the argumen- tation logic. Interpreting the hinges as the fixed points allows viewing rejected arguments as isolated deadlocks of the deep disagreements, or anti-extensions, and opens a possibility for a compromise on the basis of certain extensions. В трактате «О достоверности» (1969) Л. Витгенштейн сравнил предложения, выражающие ключевые принципы знаний людей, с дверными петлями, без которых невозможно ни обосновывать знание, ни сомневаться в нём. В 1985 году Роберт Фогелин предложил понятие глубокого несогласия для анализа аргументации и, описывая его свойства, сослался на дверные петли Витгенштейна. Если продолжить метафору дверных петель Витгенштейна, то, если дверь познания толкают или тянут, это ведет к глубоким разногласиям по принципиальным вопросам. В русле этого мы предлагаем посмотреть на дверные петли как на неподвижные точки в семантике расширения логики аргументации. Это позволяет рассматривать отклоненные аргументы как изолированные тупики глубоких разногласий и открывает возможность для компромисса на основе определённых расширений.

scholarly journals Deep disagreement and hinge epistemology

Synthese ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 197 (11) ◽  
pp. 4975-5007
Author(s):  
Chris Ranalli
Keyword(s):  
World Views ◽  
Epistemic Relation ◽  
Entitlement Theory ◽  
Deep Disagreement ◽  
Hinge Epistemology ◽  
Epistemic Theory ◽  
Deep Disagreements ◽  
Rational Evaluation

Abstract This paper explores the application of hinge epistemology to deep disagreement. Hinge epistemology holds that there is a class of commitments—hinge commitments—which play a fundamental role in the structure of belief and rational evaluation: they are the most basic general ‘presuppositions’ of our world views which make it possible for us to evaluate certain beliefs or doubts as rational. Deep disagreements seem to crucially involve disagreements over such fundamental commitments. In this paper, I consider pessimism about deep disagreement, the thesis that such disagreements are rationally irresolvable, and ask whether the Wittgensteinian account of deep disagreement—according to which such disagreements are disagreements over hinge commitments—provides adequate support for pessimism. I argue that the answer to this question depends on what hinge commitments are and what our epistemic relation to them is supposed to be. I argue for two core claims. First, that non-epistemic theories of hinge commitments provide adequate support for pessimism. Nevertheless, such theories have highly implausible consequences in the context of deep disagreement. Secondly, at least one epistemic theory of hinge commitments, the entitlement theory, permits optimism about such disagreements. As such, while hinge epistemology is mainly pessimistic about deep disagreement, it doesn’t have to be.

scholarly journals The Epistemic Value of Deep Disagreements

2018 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 263-292 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirk Lougheed
Keyword(s):  
Argumentation Theory ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Peer Disagreement ◽  
Epistemology Of Disagreement ◽  
Epistemic Peer ◽  
Deep Disagreement ◽  
The Face ◽  
Deep Disagreements

In the epistemology of disagreement literature an underdeveloped argument defending the claim that an agent need not conciliate when she becomes aware of epistemic peer disagreement is based on the idea that there are epistemic benefits to be gained from disagreement. Such benefits are unobtainable if an agent conciliates in the face of peer disagreement. I argue that there are good reasons to embrace this line of argument at least in inquiry-related contexts. In argumentation theory a deep disagreement occurs when there is a disagreement between fundamental frameworks. According to Robert J. Fogelin disagreements between fundamental frameworks are not susceptible to rational resolution. Instead of evaluating this claim I argue that deep disagreements can lead to epistemic benefits, at least when inquiry is in view. Whether rational resolution is possible in cases of deep disagreements, their existence turns out to be epistemically beneficial. I conclude by examining whether this line of argument can be taken beyond research-related contexts.Dans la littérature sur l'épistémologie du désaccord, un argument sous-développé pour une approche non conciliatoire se fonde sur l'idée qu'il y a des bénéfices épistémiques à tirer du désaccord. De tels bénéfices sont impossibles à obtenir si un agent se concilie face au désaccord avec ses pairs, du moins dans les contextes liés à la recherche. Dans la théorie de l'argumentation, un désaccord profond se produit lorsqu'il y a un désaccord entre des propositions cadres. Je soutiens que des désaccords profonds peuvent mener à des avantages épistémiques, du moins dans le contexte de la recherche. Que la résolution rationnelle soit ou non possible en cas de désaccord profond, leur existence s'avère être bénéfique sur le plan épistémologique.

Deep Disagreement, Hinge Commitments, and Intellectual Humility

Episteme ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Drew Johnson
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Humility ◽  
Deep Disagreement ◽  
Hinge Epistemology ◽  
Deep Disagreements ◽  
To Come

Abstract Why is it that some instances of disagreement appear to be so intractable? And what is the appropriate way to handle such disagreements, especially concerning matters about which there are important practical and political needs for us to come to a consensus? In this paper, I consider an explanation of the apparent intractability of deep disagreement offered by hinge epistemology. According to this explanation, at least some deep disagreements are rationally unresolvable because they concern ‘hinge’ commitments that are unresponsive to rational considerations. This explanation, if correct, seems to have troubling implications for how we should respond to deep disagreement. If my position on a topic is not responsive to rational considerations, then what choice have I but to dogmatically hold to that position, and simply dismiss the views of those with whom I disagree? I address this problem by identifying an attitude of intellectual humility that is appropriate to have towards one's hinge commitments, and suggest that this attitude provides the basis for a non-rational, constructive way to resolve deep disagreement.

scholarly journals Revisiting Deep Disagreement

2005 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dale Turner ◽  
Larry Wright
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Resolution ◽  
Informal Logic ◽  
Deep Disagreement ◽  
Deep Disagreements ◽  
Radical Claim

Argument-giving reasons for a view-is our model of rational dispute resolution. Fogelin (1985) suggests that certain "deep" disagreements cannot be resolved in this way because features of their context "undercut the conditions essential to arguing" (p. 5). In this paper we add some detail to Fogelin's treatment of intractable disagreements. In doing so we distinguish between his relatively modest claim that some disputes cannot be resolved through argument and his more radical claim that such disputes are beyond rational resolution. This distinction, along with some ofthe detail we add to Fogelin's treatment, sheds some useful light on the project of informal logic.

scholarly journals Resolution of Deep Disagreement: Not Simply Consensus

2020 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 359-382
Author(s):  
Leah Henderson
Keyword(s):  
Common Ground ◽  
Central Concern ◽  
Deep Disagreement ◽  
Rational Argumentation ◽  
Deep Disagreements ◽  
Alternative Reading

Robert Fogelin has argued that in deep disagreements, resolution cannot be achieved by rational argumentation. In response, Richard Feldman has claimed that deep disagreements can be resolved in a similar way to more everyday disagreements. I argue that Feldman’s claim is based on a relatively superficial notion of “resolution” of a disagreement whereas the notion at stake in Fogelin’s argument is more substantive. Furthermore, I argue that Feldman’s reply is based on a particular reading of Fogelin’s argument. There is an alternative reading, which takes the central concern to be the role of common ground in argumentation. Engaging with this version of Fogelin’s argument is also a worthwhile endeavour.

scholarly journals Deep Disagreement, Rational Resolutions, and Critical Thinking

2005 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Feldman
Keyword(s):  
Critical Thinking ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Deep Disagreement ◽  
Deep Disagreements ◽  
Suspension Of Judgment

According to Robert Fogelin, deep disagreements are disagreements about fundamental principles. He argues that deep disagreements cannot be rationally resolved. In this paper I argue against this thesis. A key part of the response depends upon the claim that disagreements can be rationally resolved not only by one participant rationally coming around to the other's point of view, but also by both of them rationally suspending judgment about the disputed proposition. I also claim that suspension of judgment may be the rational response in the examples Fogelin characterizes as deep disagreements. I deny that this result has any troubling implications for critical thinking.

Deep Disagreements and Political Polarization

2021 ◽  
pp. 226-243
Author(s):  
Jeroen de Ridder
Keyword(s):  
Political Science ◽  
Feedback Loop ◽  
Social Identities ◽  
Political Polarization ◽  
Empirical Results ◽  
Deep Disagreement ◽  
Deep Disagreements

In deep disagreements, parties disagree about relatively fundamental underlying moral or epistemic principles and therefore see each other as less than fully rational or morally subpar. The chapter argues that deep disagreements lead to both cognitive and practical polarization, especially when they concern matters that are central to people’s social identities: deeply disagreeing parties will think less of each other and tend to treat each other worse. This, in turn, entrenches their disagreement even further, resulting in a vicious feedback loop. Support for the claims made here comes from both conceptual connections between deep disagreement and polarization as well as widely established empirical results in psychology and political science.

Lectures on Religious Belief and the epistemology of disagreements

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 217-235
Author(s):  
Victoria Lavorerio
Keyword(s):  
Religious Belief ◽  
On Certainty ◽  
Hinge Epistemology ◽  
Deep Disagreements

Abstract The influence of Wittgenstein’s work in the study of deep disagreements has been dominated by On Certainty. Since the metaphor of ‘hinges’ plays a central role in the scholarship of On Certainty, a Wittgensteinian theory of deep disagreements is assumed to be based on hinge epistemology. This means that a disagreement would be deep because it concerns parties with conflicting hinges. When we shift our attention to a different part of Wittgenstein’s oeuvre, however, another picture of deep disagreements emerges. This article proposes a new Wittgensteinian approach to disagreements through the analysis of the Lectures on Religious Belief. Some of the disagreements that Wittgenstein and his pupils discuss in these lectures are deep, but not because they are grounded in different hinges, but because they are disagreements about pictures. This article is an extension of a paper presented at the 41st International Wittgenstein Symposium. It was published in the proceedings of the symposium with the title: “Pictures in Wittgenstein’s Treatment of Disagreements in the so-called Lectures on Religious Belief” (Lavorerio, 2018b). I would like to thank the audience at that presentation for their comments, as well as Dejan Makovec, Martin Kusch and an anonymous reviewer for their comments on previous drafts of this paper.

Current Issues: Evidence-Based Practice for the Real World: Thoughts on Clinical Education in Communication Disorders

2010 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 100-105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne K. Bothe
Keyword(s):  
Clinical Education ◽  
Real World ◽  
Evidence Based Practice ◽  
Communication Disorders ◽  
University Faculty ◽  
Evidence Based ◽  
Speech Language Pathology ◽  
Basic Principles ◽  
The Real ◽  
Language Pathology

This article presents some streamlined and intentionally oversimplified ideas about educating future communication disorders professionals to use some of the most basic principles of evidence-based practice. Working from a popular five-step approach, modifications are suggested that may make the ideas more accessible, and therefore more useful, for university faculty, other supervisors, and future professionals in speech-language pathology, audiology, and related fields.

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