Postscript

For what are things independent of reason? To answer that would be like to judge without judging, or to wash the fur without getting it wet. —Gottlieb Frege Over the course of the preceding pages, I have attempted to develop an interpretation of Spinoza’s metaphysics according to which he should be counted among the metaphysical realists. His basic ontological categories—substance, attribute, and mode—are not, although they are correlated with them, reducible to nor grounded in anything epistemic, psychological, or conceptual. Neither are the basic metaphysical relations that structure his world—inherence and causation—reducible to nor grounded in anything epistemic, psychological, or conceptual. Rather, Spinoza is a realist and a rationalist. He believes that the metaphysical and the epistemic/conceptual mirror one another in such a way that the structure of the world is accessible to philosophical reason, but he does not try to justify this assumption by reducing the metaphysical to the epistemic/conceptual. He merely presumes it to be true and proceeds to philosophize on this basis. If it is to find justification at all, it will only be because if it weren’t true, then philosophy as he conceives it would be impossible. Thus, to the extent that Spinoza’s philosophy helps us solve philosophical problems and otherwise understand the world, the hypothesis that being and reason mirror one another is vindicated....

God

This chapter offers reconstructions of Spinoza’s four arguments for the existence of God. Among the lessons learned from these reconstructions is that, although Spinoza’s first argument is often described as ontological, it relies on many substantive premises that go beyond the definition of God and it is not vulnerable to standard objections to ontological arguments. Additionally, the second argument introduces Spinoza’s Principle of Sufficient Reason, and seeing how Spinoza applies it to the existence of God sheds light on how he understands both the PSR and causation and explanation more generally. The chapter concludes by arguing that the third and fourth arguments pave the way for Spinoza’s claim that, besides God, no substance can be or be conceived and consideration of them shows why Spinoza’s argument for monism does not beg the question against the orthodox Cartesian.

Metaphysical Rationalism

This chapter explores the meaning of Spinoza’s Principle of Sufficient Reason (the PSR) and the role it plays in his system. Some commentators have argued that Spinoza’s PSR applies to every truth and that Spinoza relies on it in deriving a great deal of his system. Against such interpretations, this chapter argues that Spinoza’s PSR is restricted to existential truths and is applied only once by Spinoza, to the case of the existence of God. In making this case, it considers Spinoza’s arguments for necessitarianism, causal and conceptual dependence, and the identity of indiscernibles, and it concludes that none of them rely on the PSR. It further argues that the limited scope of Spinoza’s PSR is a philosophical advantage because a fully unrestricted PSR is an unattractive doctrine that creates demands for explanation that cannot be met.

Modes

This chapter argues that commentators have misunderstood Spinoza’s claim that particular things are modes of God by holding that modes are either accidents that inhere in God or objects that do not inhere but are merely caused by God. Instead, it argues that modes in Spinoza must be understood as objects that inhere in God. Modes stand to substance as waves stand to the ocean, fists stand to hands, and wrinkles stand to carpets. It further argues that, in addition to avoiding criticisms to which others are subject, this interpretation allows an attractive account of inherence in terms of constitution. It concludes by considering the question of the reality of the modes: are the modes genuine beings or are they mere illusions?

Substance

One of Spinoza’s most surprising claims about substance is that it pertains to the nature of a substance to exist. What does this mean and why does Spinoza’ believe it? This chapter begins by situating Spinoza’s concept of substance in historical context by explaining the Aristotelian and Cartesian concepts of substance. Next, Spinoza’s argument for the claim that it pertains to the nature of a substance to exist is reconstructed and discussed step by step. Particular attention is paid to the connection that Spinoza sees between causation and similarity: one thing causes another only if they are similar to each other (that is, they share an attribute). Other issues considered in detail include Spinoza’s claim that no two substances can share an attribute and whether a world devoid of substance would involve a vicious regress with respect to being.

Introduction

This chapter introduces the theme of the book: how Spinoza relates metaphysical notions on the one hand to epistemic, logical, and psychological notions on the other. It also states, explains, and justifies the methodological approach taken in the rest of the book.

The Attributes

According to Descartes, an attribute is the essence of a substance, and as such each substance has one and only one attribute. Spinoza, however, claims that the one substance, God or nature, has infinitely many attributes. But how can a single substance have infinitely many essences? This chapter argues for a new interpretation of the attributes according to which each distinct attribute of a substance is identical to its unique essence and the distinction between them is merely a distinction of reason created by the plurality of concepts used to cognize that essence. The chapter also solves a long standing puzzle about mind–body interaction in Spinoza. If minds and bodies are identical, as Spinoza claims, how can he both maintain mind–mind and body–body causation but deny mind–body causation? It argues that Spinoza’s topic, when he appears to deny mind–body causation, is, in fact, mind–body causal explanation.

The Conatus Doctrine

Spinoza believes that all things “strive to persevere in their being.” This claim, known as Spinoza’s conatus doctrine, raises many questions. Does Spinoza believe that nature is goal directed? Does he think that all natural things, including ones that are typically classified as inanimate, such as particles of matter and stars in the sky have desires and goals? This chapter explicates the meaning of Spinoza’s conatus doctrine and argues that it must be interpreted teleologically despite the apparent tension between teleology and mechanism. It also examines Spinoza’s argument for the conatus doctrine and argues that it is not meant to follow from claims about the impossibility of self-destruction alone, as many commentators would have it. Rather, he must be relying on important assumptions about the nature of God and the expressive relationship that finite individuals bear to it. It concludes by considering the problem of goal-directed human action in Spinoza.

Spinoza’s Starting Points

This chapter begins by explaining the nature of and reasons for the geometric method in Spinoza’s Ethics. It argues that Spinoza’s definitions and axioms are not intended to be neutral starting points but rather proclaim a substantive picture of the world that receives further development in the propositions that Spinoza derives from them. The chapter also explores this substantive picture by showing how it is both similar to and different from those of his predecessors, focusing especially on Aristotelian scholasticism and orthodox Cartesianism. It argues that, whereas nearly all of Spinoza’s definitions and axioms would be, on one natural interpretation of them, rejected by Aristotelian scholastics, they all look to be acceptable, at least at first glance, to orthodox Cartesians.