The concept of (depth) cues: An exemplification of homuncular language in vision science

The term “depth cue” is fundamental to and widely used in vision science. However, despite the prevalence and importance of that concept, there is virtually no study on its theoretical foundations and coherence. This article aims at filling that gap by investigating both its historical development and its current use within the predominant computational approach to vision. Against the backdrop of Wittgenstein’s therapeutic approach to philosophy, it is shown that both traditional and current characterizations of depth cues suffer from a serious logical flaw known as “homunculus” or “mereological fallacy.” It is suggested that the problem of homuncular language impedes critical thinking and theorizing in vision science since it obscures the matters at issue by disguising explanatorily empty expressions as explanatory hypotheses. Furthermore, it is argued that homuncular language is not confined to the concept of depth cues but typical of current cognitive science in general since it is linked to its most fundamental assumption of the brain being an information processing system. In conclusion, resulting implications for cognitive science and cognitive scientists are considered.

THE STORY OF RAPE: WRONGDOING AND THE EMOTIONAL IMAGINATION

This is a response to John Gardner’s article – The wrongness of rape. It claims that Gardner is fundamentally or radically wrong; not by attacking his careful and well-constructed argument from the ‘inside’ – by attempting to demonstrate some logical flaw in his argument – but by attacking his world-view. He shows us a world which simply does not accord with reality as perceived in our everyday lives by most, or all, of us. Whilst many philosophers, and certainly most philosophers of law, analyse the world in the way exemplified by Gardner, it is to be hoped that they reserve this analysis to their professional lives and do not make the mistake of thinking that it is connected with reality. For them reason prevails with emotion being relegated to the status of a mere ‘epiphenomenon’; whilst, for most of us, our emotional life is at least as important as our rational life.This article is an invitation to Gardner and others to make a ‘paradigm shift’ in the sense proposed by Thomas Kuhn. Kuhn, in his explanation of the history of cosmology, showed how in order to explain the observed motion of the planets increasingly complicated systems of circular orbits were used (consisting of cycles, epicycles, epi-epicycles and so forth). These complex systems of orbits were used to explain the motion of the planets round the sun because people refused to believe that the planets could move in anything other than perfect circles. However, as the observational data grew it became clear that no system of circular orbits, no matter how complex, could explain the observations. When Johannes Kepler advanced the work of Nicolas Copernicus, Tycho Brahe and Galileo Galilei and showed that the orbit of Mars could be best modelled by showing that it was elliptical, the problem was solved. Similarly, it is averred that no system of purely rational explanation, such as that advanced by Gardner, can explain the wrongness of rape. The explanation needs to start from a different position by explicitly including emotion in the explanation.

HOW BELIEF WORKS

Why do we believe what we believe? The answer may seem obvious: we believe what we've assessed to be true. However, there's a surprisingly basic logical flaw in this theory. And even more surprising is the real answer to the above question.

Simpler for evolution: Secondary representation in apes, children, and ancestors

Great apes show behavioral evidence for secondary representation similar to that of children of about two years of age. However, there is no convincing evidence for metarepresentation in apes. A good evolutionary interpretation should be parsimonious and must bring developmental and comparative data in accord. I propose a model based on the work of Perner (1991) and close by pointing out a logical flaw in Heyes's second proposed experiment.

9. On the Fu Hao Inscriptions

ABSTRACTBoth the paper and the author's presentation.The paper deals with the oracle-bone inscriptions referring to Fu Hao (or Zi), indirectly addressing the question whether this Fu Hao is the same person as the one mentioned in the bronze inscriptions from M5 at Anyang. The combined researches of Shima Kunio and Yen I-p'ing have already established that all but one of the 262 Fu Zi oracle inscriptions so far known are from Tung Tso-pin's Period I. The only doubtful instance remaining is Jiabian 668, dated by Shima to Tung's Period IV. The main reason for this dating was the shape of the graph used for the character wu. On Jiabian 668, this graph is rendered as , whereas according to the received opinion it should, in Period I, have been 1, or 8. Chang Ping-Ch'üan, however, had also observed the graph in Period I oracle bones. Therefore he agreed with Hu Houxuan's opinion that Jiabian 668 ought to date from Period I. Among Tung Tso-pin's criteria for dating oracle bones, calligraphic style was decidedly the weakest, and it should not be made the basis for far-reaching arguments.There is a logical flaw in dating Jiabian 668 to Period IV and at the same time assuming that Fu Hao was Wu Ding's consort. Neiteher Wu Yi nor Wenwu Ding could have referred to her as fu, but would have had to address her as mu, or bi, or gaobi. Yen-I-p'ing's hypothesis that Jiabian 668 was inscribed when Fu Hao had already long been dead did not take this into account.

Two Kinds of Moral Reasoning: Ethical Egoism as A Moral Theory

Ethical egoism, when summarized into a single ethical principle, is the position that a person ought, all things considered, to do an action if and only if that action is in his overall self-interest. The criticisms standardly advanced against this view try to show either that it is subject to some fatal logical flaw or else that, even if logically coherent, it can give no account of the basic parts of morality. Both these objections are mistaken, however, and it is the point of this paper to make this clear. Central to my argument is the distinction drawn in Section 1 between two kinds of moral reasoning and hence two kinds of moral reasons. I call these ‘traditional’ and ‘nontraditional’ (the latter could be termed ‘conventional’ or ‘institutional’ without much change of meaning). Both are present in the writings of contemporary moral philosophers but have not been emphasized or seen as crucial.

The Pros and Cons of ‘Intelligent Design'

The theories of Darwinian evolution and Intelligent Design appear to be locked in an intractable debate, partly because they offer rival scientific explanations for the phenomenon of descent with modification in biology. This paper analyses the dispute in two ways: firstly, it seeks to clarify the exact nature of the logical flaw that has been alleged to lie at the heart of Intelligent Design theory. Secondly, it proposes that, in spite of this error, the Intelligent Design theory advocated by Michael Behe takes at least one significant step in the right direction. Although Behe's suggestion is promising, it is shown to be not nearly radical enough.