A builder's duty of care - When should it apply to the directors and employees of companies involved in the creation of defective buildings?

<p>This thesis considers the issue of when a tortious duty of care to prevent economic loss should be imposed on the company directors and employees who stand behind the complex structure of companies and contracts involved in the creation of a defective building. Set against the background of the leaky building crisis, and what are (it is argued) unfair litigation outcomes, the thesis traverses the emergence and development of the principles that underpin liability for negligence and negligent misstatement in respect of defective buildings. A review of the cases confirms that the concepts of control and general reliance are the basis of New Zealand law in this area. There follows a discussion of the difficult relationship between company law principles and negligence principles, and the role of assumption of responsibility in the law of negligence and negligent misstatement, including a discussion of developments in the leaky building litigation. The thesis advanced is that, in respect of the creation of defective buildings, the approach to the issue of whether to impose a duty of care on company directors and employees would benefit from placing significant weight on the factor of de facto control of the inputs that dictate the outcome of a building project, and on the lower level factor of a direct or indirect financial interest in the outcome of the project. It is argued that the approach to imposing a duty of care should be the same for directors and employees and in respect of statements and actions. In cases where the evidence establishes that the financial interest factor is not present, this should give rise to an inference that the company director or employee does not have control of the inputs that dictate the outcome of the project, so that no duty of care arises. This would enable a director or employee to exit litigation by way of an application for summary judgment. This is intended to discourage the practice of joining minor parties to litigation for the purpose of extracting a precautionary settlement. If control of the inputs that dictate the outcome of a project can be established by inference from the existence of the financial interest factor, or by the other evidence, then the two stage approach to the imposition of a duty of care would require a consideration of other factors that might negate the duty, such as the contractual matrix.</p>

A builder's duty of care - When should it apply to the directors and employees of companies involved in the creation of defective buildings?

<p>This thesis considers the issue of when a tortious duty of care to prevent economic loss should be imposed on the company directors and employees who stand behind the complex structure of companies and contracts involved in the creation of a defective building. Set against the background of the leaky building crisis, and what are (it is argued) unfair litigation outcomes, the thesis traverses the emergence and development of the principles that underpin liability for negligence and negligent misstatement in respect of defective buildings. A review of the cases confirms that the concepts of control and general reliance are the basis of New Zealand law in this area. There follows a discussion of the difficult relationship between company law principles and negligence principles, and the role of assumption of responsibility in the law of negligence and negligent misstatement, including a discussion of developments in the leaky building litigation. The thesis advanced is that, in respect of the creation of defective buildings, the approach to the issue of whether to impose a duty of care on company directors and employees would benefit from placing significant weight on the factor of de facto control of the inputs that dictate the outcome of a building project, and on the lower level factor of a direct or indirect financial interest in the outcome of the project. It is argued that the approach to imposing a duty of care should be the same for directors and employees and in respect of statements and actions. In cases where the evidence establishes that the financial interest factor is not present, this should give rise to an inference that the company director or employee does not have control of the inputs that dictate the outcome of the project, so that no duty of care arises. This would enable a director or employee to exit litigation by way of an application for summary judgment. This is intended to discourage the practice of joining minor parties to litigation for the purpose of extracting a precautionary settlement. If control of the inputs that dictate the outcome of a project can be established by inference from the existence of the financial interest factor, or by the other evidence, then the two stage approach to the imposition of a duty of care would require a consideration of other factors that might negate the duty, such as the contractual matrix.</p>

Party systems in the UK

The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of contemporary party systems in the UK by way of context for the detailed account of party politics in the chapters which follow. It starts by defining the term ‘party system’ before highlighting the difference between party systems under majoritarian and consensus models of democracy and considering various ways of classifying party systems. It then surveys the varieties of party system found at Westminster, devolved, and local levels. It argues that the classic two-party system label now obscures as much as it reveals. If it does still apply, then it is mainly at the level of Westminster politics; even there, however, the minor parties have become more relevant in both the electoral and legislative arenas—and even, on occasion, in the executive arena.

France: Electoral Necessity and Presidential Leadership Beyond Parties

Coalition-making in France is under-studied, due to the peculiar way coalitions are formed, maintained, and terminated. Due to the majoritarian two-round electoral system, parliamentary elections often result in a one-party parliamentary majority, which barely leaves room for post-electoral coalition bargaining. Coalition agreements are negotiated prior to elections. They mostly consist of pre-electoral deals in which the coalition’s senior party grant a few seats to its potential partner, after both parties agree on a laconic policy document. Moreover, in a semi-presidential regime where the executive enjoys increasing powers, coalition members play a small role compared to the president (or the prime minister in times of cohabitation). Cabinet formation and portfolio allocation rest in the discretionary power of the chief of the executive and no real (in)formal coordination or negotiation takes place. Over the past few decades, France has undergone major institutional and political transformations that have reinforced those dynamics, effectively increasing the weight of the president in coalition bargaining and leaving minor parties quite powerless.

Websites as Spaces for Building the Identities of Political Parties

Initially, studies on policy and the internet considered websites as spaces for the propagation of political and electoral marketing. However, this proposal presents a different perspective regarding the internet as a space for building the identity of political parties with their diverse audiences: cross-party and intra-party. The chapter is divided into three parts: the first deals with politics and the internet focusing on the theory of equalization and normalization to match the political game between major and minor parties. Thus, to understand the organizational structure of the parties, the theory of the parties of cadres and masses is offered. Also, to deepen this discussion, the selective and collective incentives that are part of the genetics of political parties are treated. As the results, the website serves as an instrument of communication of the party, divulging the objectives, the internal disputes between the different factions, and the way the party works.

THE FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN TURKEY (1908-1980)

Political parties started to be established in Turkey in the second half of the 19th century with the formation of societies aiming at the reform of the Ottoman Empire. They reaped the fruits of their labour in 1908 when the Young Turk Revolution replaced the Sultan with the Committee of Union and Progress, which disbanded itself on the defeat of the Empire in 1918. Following the proclamation of the Republic in 1923, new parties started to be formed, but experiments with a multi-party system were soon abandoned in favour of a one-party system. From 1930 until the end of the Second World War, the People’s Republican Party (PRP) was the only political party. It was not until after the Second World War that Turkey reverted to a multiparty system. The most significant new parties were the Democrat Party (DP), formed on 7 January 1946, and the Nation Party (NP) formed on 20 July 1948, after a spilt in the DP. However, as a result of the coup of 27 May 1960, the military Government, the Committee of National Union (CNU), declared its intentions of seizing power, restoring rights and privileges infringed by the Democrats, and drawing up a new Constitution, to be brought into being by a free election. In January 1961, the CNU relaxed its initial ban on all political activities, and within a month eleven new parties were formed, in addition to the already established parties. The most important of the new parties were the Justice Party (JP) and New Turkey Party (NTP), which competed with each other for the DP’s electoral support. In the general election of October 1961, the PRP’s failure to win an absolute majority resulted in four coalition Governments, until the elections in October 1965. The General Election of October 1965 returned the JP to power with a clear, overall majority. The poor performance of almost all the minor parties led to the virtual establishment of a two-party system. Neither the JP nor the PRP were, however, completely united. With the General Election of October 1969, the JP was returned to office, although with a reduced share of the vote. The position of the minor parties declined still further. Demirel resigned on 12 March 1971 after receiving a memorandum from the Armed Forces Commanders threatening to take direct control of the country. Thus, an “above-party” Government was formed to restore law and order and carry out reforms in keeping with the policies and ideals of Atatürk. In March 1973, the “above-party” Melen Government resigned, partly because Parliament rejected the military candidate, General Gürler, whom it had supported in the Presidential Elections of March-April 1973. This rejection represented the determination of Parliament not to accept the dictates of the Armed Forces. On 15 April, a new “above party” government was formed by Naim Talu. The fundamental dilemma of Turkish politics was that democracy impeded reform. The democratic process tended to return conservative parties (such as the Democrat and Justice Parties) to power, with the support of the traditional Islamic sectors of Turkish society, which in turn resulted in the frustration of the demands for reform of a powerful minority, including the intellectuals, the Armed Forces and the newly purged PRP. In the last half of the 20th century, this conflict resulted in two periods of military intervention, two direct and one indirect, to secure reform and to quell the disorder resulting from the lack of it. This paper examines the historical development of the Turkish party system, and the factors which have contributed to breakdowns in multiparty democracy.

Trustworthiness, Stability and Productivity of Minority Governments in Australia

In this study, we question commonly held negative perceptions of minority governments and determine whether they can be trusted to deliver on the promises contained in governance agreements, whether they are stable in being able to govern over full terms of parliament, and whether they are productive in being able to successfully pass legislation. We examine eight minority government agreements and the following eight majority government opening parliamentary agendas in Australian national and state governments from 1989 to 2018 and compare their performance using legislative data. The main differences are not how long they last or how much legislation they pass, but rather that majority governments generally make more commitments, particularly more policy-focused commitments. They are also more successful in fulfilling their promises, albeit not completely. We theorise that major parties faced with having to form a minority government agreement will overpromise in order to secure power but can underdeliver due to the risks for minor parties and independents in forcing elections over breaches.

New Puerto Rico governor will face divided electorate

Significance The pro-US-statehood New Progressive Party (PNP) has retained the posts of governor and Resident Commissioner, and the consultative referendum produced its first indisputable majority for gaining US statehood. Yet statehood is not high on Washington's agenda and Puerto Rico faces longer-term structural problems. Impacts Minor parties did well in this election, which might put the PNP and PPD on notice to reform. Puerto Rico’s prospects will be dimmed as long as labour migration to the mainland United States continues. There will be pressure to improve the administration of elections. Puerto Rico could benefit economically if the island is again used as a base for pharmaceutical and healthcare suppliers.