Product differentiation and populistic entry strategies in a mortgage market with Bertrand competition

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to analyse the interaction between a profit maximising mortgagor and a newcomer to a mortgage market with Bertrand competition where the newcomer has a populistic entry strategy and undercuts mortgage market rates. The intention of the paper is to relate the populistic entry strategy to mortgage market characteristics and the strategic market position of both the established mortgagor and the newcomer in question.Design/methodology/approachThe paper analyses a mortgage market by combining the behaviour of a profit maximising mortgagor with that of a newcomer to the mortgage market which has a populistic entry strategy and does not maximise profits. The short-run market solution provides comparative statics on the strategic market position of both the established mortgagor and the newcomer to the mortgage market during the entry phase both related to product differentiation and to price mirroring and undercutting of mortgage rates.FindingsThe model finds a mortgage market solution where a lower mortgage rate helps the newcomer gain a customer base. As the newcomer's strategy to mirror prices makes it unable to pass-through funding cost to its mortgage rate, the strategy is unsustainable over time. The established mortgagor has a strategically beneficial position as the mortgage market rates only relate to its funding cost. Unless the newcomer has a funding cost advantage, the established mortgagor has a higher interest rate margin. Differentiation impacts the newcomers’ interest rate margin positively. If the newcomer lacks a funding cost advantage, there is a critical mirroring rate that ensures it a higher interest rate margin. The higher the newcomers’ own funding cost, the higher is the upper bound for price mirroring, relating market entry to a small undercutting of mortgage rates and a mortgage market with weak competition. The funding cost of the established mortgagor pulls pricing in the opposite direction, allowing for a lower mirroring rate and tougher mortgage market competition during entry.Originality/valueThe paper aims to contribute to the understanding of market equilibrium in the absence of profit maximising behaviour. Framing a mortgage market in terms of a duopoly where a newcomer enters with a populistic entry strategy offering a lower mortgage rate and a mortgage product with a different loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, a novel mortgage market case comes about. The populistic entry strategy produces an augmented reaction curve, crucial for the mortgage market rates.

Either manufacturing sector rely on capital markets on the basis of financial resources An empirical study of industries in Pakistan

The present study employed the financial resources of the manufacturing sector in Pakistan was to discover compare the performance of the manufacturing sector in Pakistan. Pakistan manufacturing sector find out effect on the performance of financial resources. Capital market firms, public financing, reallocation of internal resources, commercial financing and venture capital use various sources of finance, funds Market bonds and shares. According to (Dai, Jo, & Kassicieh, 2013; Gallagher, 2012) Relied on the release of Commercial financing, funding for these mostly companies rely on financial institutions. Few companies also use their own funds in the absence of public finances as well as companies also funding and venture capital reallocation of resources to their own use. This funding cost, magnitude of the risk associated with these resources due to their cost has a direct effect on the performance of firms that is clear. The present study used financial resources are manufacturing firms and their effect on the performance of this funding has been conducted to explore.

REAL OPTION SIGNALING GAMES OF DEBT FINANCING USING EQUITY GUARANTEE SWAPS UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

We analyze the real option signaling game models of debt financing of a risky project under information asymmetry, where the firm quality is only known to the firm management but not outsiders. The firm decides on the optimal investment timing of the risky project that requires upfront fixed funding cost and subsequent operating costs. The fixed funding cost is financed via either direct bank loan or entering into a three-party equity guarantee swap (EGS) that involves a bank granting the loan and third party guarantor. Under the EGS agreement, the guarantor is obligated to pay all the future coupon stream to the bank upon default of the firm. In return for the provision of the guarantee, the guarantor obtains certain proportional share of equity of the firm at the time when the swap agreement is signed. The share of equity demanded by the guarantor depends on the outside investors’ belief on the firm quality. The low-type firm has the incentive to mimic the investment strategy of being high-type in terms of investment timing and share of equity. The high-type firm may adopt the appropriate separating strategy by speeding up investment or choosing an alternative financing choice. The resulting loss of the real option value of the investment opportunity represents the information cost under separating strategies. We examine the incentive compatibility constraints faced by the firm under different quality types and discuss characterization of the separating and pooling equilibriums. Unlike the usual assumption of perpetuity of investment opportunity, our real option model assumes the time window of the investment opportunity to be finite. We explore how the information cost and nature of separating and pooling equilibriums evolves over the finite time span of the investment opportunity. The information costs and investment thresholds exhibit interesting time-dependent behaviors. We examine the firm’s investment and financing choice between EGS and the direct bank loan against time and other parameters via comparison of the corresponding information costs and investment thresholds.

How monetary policy changes bank liability structure and funding cost

US banks obtain most of their funding from a combination of low-interest deposits and high-interest deposits. Using local demographic variations as instruments for banks’ liability composition, I show that when monetary policy tightens, banks with a larger proportion of low-interest deposits on their balance sheet experience larger increases in their high-interest deposit rate and lend less. This happens because tight monetary policy reduces the supply of low-interest deposits to banks, and banks react by issuing more high-interest deposits. As it is increasingly expensive, that substitution is not complete, and leads to a reduction in lending.