COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF RHETORICAL AND ARGUMENTATIVE STRUCTURES IN THE STUDY OF POPULAR SCIENCE DISCOURSE

The proposed work is performed as a part of an on-going research project aimed at creation of discourse annotated corpus of popular science texts written in Russian. Annotation is carried out within the framework of a multi-level model of discourse, which considers the text from the perspective of genre, rhetorical and argumentative organization. We conduct a comparative study of the rhetorical and argument annotations, discuss their similarities and differences on the segment and structural levels and show them on the examples of standard schemes of reasoning described in D. Walton’s theory of structured argumentation: “Argument from Expert Opinion”, “Argument from Example”, and “Argument from Cause to Effect”. Special attention is paid to discourse markers registered during annotation as key indicators of discourse structure. We report the results of the experiment with argument indicator patterns, based on the list of rhetorical markers, and aimed at the extraction of “from Expert Opinion” arguments.

Language expression of the argumentative framework “From popular opinion vs. from expert opinion” in the text of popular science article

The paper discusses argumentation in popular science articles written by scholars. The authors focus on argumentative framework, which is presented by opposition of an expert’s judgment (argument from expert opinion) and a common, “naive” view (one from popular opinion). The framework consists of a thesis being opposed (by a subject of common sense); its authorization marker; an opposing structural constant/propositional connective; an expert’s thesis; its authorization marker; general conclusion. In summary, this paper argues that the elements of the argumentative framework can be explicit, implicit, or be presented grammatically. Text analysis of popular science articles leads to the following conclusions. (1) The opposed thesis and opposing link are typically explicit. (2) The subject of common sense can be represented by lexical and syntactic expressions of indefinite-personality, impersonality together with unreal mood and epistemic modality of uncertain knowledge (One would think…; smth may seem…; many noticed that…) etc. (3) An expert’s thesis, as a rule, is presented as a negation of the opposed statement. (4) An authorization marker of the expert’s opinion is consistently implicit. The reason is that an expert writes the entire text (except for parts with authorization markers), and in this case the additional expression of this fact is optional. (5) Normally, the general conclusion is the same as the expert’s thesis, therefore it is rarely if ever explicit.

From text to scheme

We show how to solve common problems in identifying arguments from expert opinion, illustrated by five examples selected from The Economist. Our method started by intuitively identifying many appeals to alleged experts in The Economist and comparing them to the argumentation scheme for argument from expert opinion. This approach led us to (i) extending the existing list of possible faults committed when arguments from expert opinion are performed and (ii) proposing the extension of the list of linguistic cues that would allow analysts to identify arguments from expert opinion. Our ultimate aim is to help argument identification by argument mining connect better with techniques of argument analysis and evaluation.

Using Argumentation Schemes for Argument Extraction

This paper surveys the state-of-the-art of argumentation schemes used as argument extraction techniques in cognitive informatics and uses examples to show how a series of connected problems needs to be solved to move these techniques forward to computational implementation. Some of the schemes considered are argument from expert opinion, practical reasoning, argument from negative consequences, fear appeal arguments, argument from commitment, argument from inconsistent commitments, and the circumstantial ad hominem argument. The paper shows how schemes need to be formed into clusters of sub-schemes work toward a classification system of schemes from the bottom up, and how identification conditions for each scheme can be helpful for argument extraction.

Justification of Argumentation Schemes

Argumentation schemes are forms of argument that capture stereotypical patterns of human reasoning, especially defeasible ones like argument from expert opinion, that have proved troublesome to view deductively or inductively. Much practical work has already been done on argumentation schemes, proving their worth in A1 [19], but more precise investigations are needed to formalize their structures. The problem posed in this paper is what form justification of a given scheme, as having a certain precise structure of inference, should take. It is argued that defeasible argumentation schemes require both a systematic and a pragmatic justification, of a kind that can only be provided by the case study method of collecting key examples of arguments of the types traditionally classified as fallacies, and subjecting them to comparative examination and analysis. By this method, postulated structures for schemes can be formulated as hypotheses to solve three kinds of problems: (1) how to classify such arguments into different types, (2) how to identify their premises and conclusions, and (3) how to formulate the critical questions used to evaluate each type of argument.