The Epistemological Power of Taste

It is generally accepted that sight—the capacity to see or to have visual experiences—has the power to give us knowledge about things in the environment and some of their properties in a distinctive way. Seeing the goose on the lake puts me in a position to know that it is there and that it has certain properties. And it does this by, when all goes well, presenting us with these features of the goose. One might even think that it is part of what it is to be a perceptual capacity that it has this kind of epistemological power, such that a capacity that lacked this power could not be perceptual. My focus in this essay is the sense of taste—the capacity to taste things or to have taste experiences. It has sometimes been suggested that taste lacks sight-like epistemological power. I argue that taste has epistemological power of the same kind as does sight, but that as a matter of contingent fact, that power often goes unexercised in our contemporary environment. We can know about things by tasting them in the same kind of way as we can know about things by seeing them, but we often do not. I then consider the significance of this conclusion. I suggest that in one way, it matters little, because our primary interest in taste (in marked contrast to our other senses) is not epistemic but aesthetic. But, I end by suggesting, it can matter ethically.

Influence of Alcohol and Cognitive Capacity on Visual Number Judgements

We used an enumeration task to address the question of whether acute alcohol intoxication reduces cognitive or perceptual capacity. To control for individual differences in cognitive resources, we took a sober record of each participant’s working memory capacity (WMC). Alcohol was expected to impair enumeration performance, either for the automatic parallel counting of small stimulus sets indicating a perceptual impairment, or the controlled counting or estimating of larger sets indicating a cognitive impairment. Enumeration showed an overall decline in accuracy following a vodka beverage and the deficit was negligible for small sets, which is inconsistent with a loss of perceptual capacity. Having a higher WMC facilitated the enumeration of larger sets and the correlation between WMC and accuracy was stronger in the alcohol condition suggesting that low-WMC participants were more impaired by the beverage. Our findings therefore suggest that alcohol diminished cognitive rather than perceptual capacity.

Making Art in the Third Critique

This chapter inquires into the fate of artistic practice in the text responsible for making form central to the theorization of aesthetics: Immanuel Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment. When Kant turns his attention to art, it appears as a special case, not fully within the purview of his theory of aesthetic judgment. How might Hogarth’s practitioner-centered aesthetic theory, in The Analysis of Beauty, inform an interpretation of Kant’s Third Critique? Kant, like Hogarth before him, connects the pleasure in aesthetic judgment with the cognitive activity of formal abstraction. Thinking like an artist means exercising the perceptual capacity for formal abstraction. In Kant’s theory as well as Hogarth’s, the artist can be understood as she who models free play as a practice that can be cultivated by means of this perceptual exercise.

Making sense of the perceptual capacities in autistic and non-autistic adults

Recent studies highlighted that autistic individuals show increased perceptual capacity – the ability to process more information at any one time. This study examined whether there is a link between this increased perceptual capacity and the sensory hypersensitivity that many autistic people experience on a daily basis. In total, 38 autistic and 66 non-autistic adults filled in sensory questionnaires and performed an auditory load task, which assessed perceptual capacity. Results showed that higher levels of auditory perceptual capacity were correlated with higher levels of sensory sensitivities. We identified two clusters in the sample: one group of individuals with hyposensitivity and a decreased perceptual capacity ( n = 42) and a cluster with an increased perceptual capacity and hypersensitivity ( n = 47). Understanding this relationship may offer the opportunity to develop more effective techniques to ameliorate the often debilitating consequences of sensory hypersensitivity and over-arousal. Interestingly, this association between perceptual capacity and sensory sensitivities was seen for both groups; no significant association was found between perceptual capacity and level of autistic traits. As such, the findings may extend to other conditions with sensory atypicalities, such as attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder or Williams syndrome. The practical implications of the results for many aspects of daily life, education and employment are discussed. Lay abstract Perceptual capacity refers to the amount of information that we can pay attention to at any one time. Research has shown that autistic people have a higher perceptual capacity, which means they can take in more information than non-autistic people can. This can be useful in certain situations, for instance, hearing approaching cars or noticing small details. However, in other situations, a higher perceptual capacity may result in more distraction. This study looked at whether having this increased perceptual capacity is linked to being very sensitive to sensory information (lights, sounds, touch, taste and smell) – something that many autistic people experience on a daily basis. Being very sensitive to these things can make it hard to interact with the world around us, so it is important to know more about what causes the sensitivity. To explore this, 38 autistic and 66 non-autistic adults completed a computer task that measured perceptual capacity and filled in a questionnaire about how sensitive they were to sensory information. We found that perceptual capacity was related to sensory symptoms for both autistic and non-autistic participants; people who had a larger perceptual capacity showed more sensitivity, while people who had a lower perceptual capacity showed reduced sensory sensitivity. This information can hopefully be used to improve the way in which we can support people who experience unpleasant sensory sensitivity.

The Mental Files Theory of Singular Thought

The chapter outlines and evaluates the most ambitious version of the mental files theory of singular thought, according to which mental files are a wide-ranging psychological natural kind, including psychologists’ object-files as a representative subspecies, and underlying all and only singular thinking. It argues that such a theory is unsupported by the available psychological data, and that its defenders may have overestimated the similarities between different notions of “file” used in philosophy and cognitive science. Nevertheless, critical examination of the theory from a psychological perspective opens up promising avenues for research, especially concerning the relationship between our perceptual capacity to individuate and track basic individuals and our higher-level capacities for singular thought.

Metakinesis and the Average Dance Audience

Chapter 5 evaluates skeptical arguments against metakinesis in dance appreciation. The chapter surveys evidence that sensorimotor processing and observational learning support an embodied projective perceptual capacity to recognize and understand the movements, intentions, and affective states of others. Finally, the chapter evaluates recent research in neuroscience of dance exploring whether and to what extent this sensorimotor perceptual capacity supports the proposed role for metakinesis in the kinaesthetic understanding and appreciation of dance.